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These studies define a Buddhist conceptualization of compassion and describe the 
development of the Compassion Scale. The definition of compassion was adopted 
from Neff’s (2003) model of self-compassion that proposes that the construct entails 
kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness. The six-factor structure was adopted 
from the Self-Compassion Scale (2003) representing positively and negatively 
worded items of the three components proposed to entail compassion. The six-factors 
for compassion are named: kindness vs. indifference, common humanity vs. 
separation, and mindfulness vs. disengagement. Study 1 was conducted to provide 
support for content validity. Study 2 was conducted to provide initial validation for 
the scale. Study 3 was conducted to cross-validate findings from the second study. 
Results provide evidence for the structure of the scale. Cronbach’s alpha and       
split-half estimates suggest good reliability for both samples. Compassion was 
significantly correlated with compassionate love, wisdom, social connectedness, and 
empathy providing support for convergent validity. Factor analysis in both samples 
indicated good fit using Hu & Bentler (1998) criteria. Results suggest that the 
Compassion Scale is a psychometrically sound measure of compassion. Given that 




(e.g. Davidson, 2006; Gilbert, 2005, Goetz, 2010) this scale will hopefully prove 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“I consider that compassion is the base, sovereign support of humanity.” 
    -The Dalai Lama 
 
The study of psychology has developed within a period of little over a hundred 
years. However, within that span of time compassion has received little attention and has 
mostly been neglected within the field of psychological study (Gilbert, 2005, Goleman, 
2003; Harrington, 2002; Kristeller & Johnson, 2005; Sarason, 1985). In fact, Glaser 
(2005, p. 3) so aptly states that: “though much of psychology circles around the vale of 
compassion, nowhere does it make compassion central to the foundation, process, or goal 
of psychological health and wholeness.”  
 Despite the lack of attention, the field is beginning to become aware of 
compassion and note its relevance. For example, Gilbert (2005) edited a published 
volume containing various authors’ perspectives to conceptualize and integrate 
compassion’s use in psychotherapy. Further, Davidson & Harrington (2002) have also 
produced a book generated from a conference in 1995 with the Dalai Lama that brought 
various scholars from psychology, psychiatry, ethics, and philosophy to begin to question 
the nature, purpose, and science of compassion. In groundbreaking preliminary research, 
Davidson (2006) has begun to investigate brain activity of Buddhist monks while they 
were meditating specifically on compassion. In 2004, the Compassionate Love Research 
Conference took place in Washington, D.C. to investigate “other-centered love.” A year 
later, Sprecher and Fehr (2005) published the first scale solely devoted to the measure of 
love and/or compassion called the Compassionate Love Scale.  
Undeniably, the work of researchers like Sprecher and Fehr is sorely needed. In 
order to open up the possibility of empirical study and further the dialogue about 
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compassion in psychology, it is necessary to be able to measure the construct. 
Researchers are beginning to make a specific and explicit call for the measurement of 
compassion (e.g. Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005; Wang, 2005) and for the study of 
compassion more generally (Allen & Knight, 2005; Gilbert, 2005; Goleman, 2003 
Harrington, 2002; Wang, 2005).  
In Sprecher & Fehr’s (2005) Compassionate Love Scale, compassion is 
conceptualized as a type of love that can be expressed both to close others and to all of 
humanity. Sprecher & Fehr decided to name the scale compassionate love due to the 
work of Underwood (2002, p. 78) who suggests that compassion alone leaves out “some 
of the emotional and transcendent components” that love would include. Compassionate 
love is defined as a behavioral, emotional, and cognitive attitude focused on care and 
concern for others that manifests itself in supporting and helping in times of suffering and 
need (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). This type of love is described as selfless and                
self-sacrificing. 
 An alternative conceptualization of compassion is offered in Neff’s (2003a) 
article introducing the concept of self-compassion. In this work compassion is defined as 
“being touched by the suffering of others, opening one’s awareness to others’ pain and 
not avoiding or disconnecting from it, so that feelings of kindness towards others and the 
desire to alleviate their suffering emerge” (p. 86-87). Within this definition lies the three 
elements that are proposed to compose self-compassion and compassion more generally. 
They include kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness (Neff 2003a, 2003b). 
Kindness is defined as being warm and understanding to others as opposed to being 
harshly critical or judgmental. Common humanity is the recognition of a shared human 
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experience that allows for a sense of connection to others. Mindfulness is an emotional 
balance that prevents over-identification or disengagement from the pain of others (Neff 
2003a, 2003b).  
Thus, Neff’s conceptualization is somewhat different from the proposal of 
Sprecher & Fehr. Although both conceptualizations are focused on kindness and caring 
directed toward the suffering of others, Neff’s proposal is drawn from Buddhist 
principles that suggest compassion also includes the elements of common humanity and 
mindfulness. This alternate conceptualization consistent with Buddhist principles will 
form the theoretical basis for a compassion scale that will be the focus of the present 
study.  
Compassion is a very important over-arching concept within Buddhist thought. 
Unlike the Sprecher & Fehr conceptualization that suggests that the term compassion 
alone lacks transcendent qualities, in Buddhism compassion is a key, stand-alone 
concept. Compassion is suggested to be the beginning and essence of Buddhist 
philosophy (e.g. Dalai Lama, 1995; Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998; Davidson, 2006; 
Hopkins, 2001; Ladner, 2004, Salsberg, 1997; Silk, 2000). In Buddhism’s early 
development compassion was the catalyst that inspired the Buddha to take up his spiritual 
journey when he was exposed to the suffering of others (Pandit, 1999). Still relevant 
today, the Dalai Lama (1984) indicates that compassion is the building block of Buddhist 
practice and morality. Given the growing number of psychologists that are examining the 
mental health benefits of Buddhist practices such as mindfulness or loving-kindness 
meditation (Frederickson et al., 2008; Gilbert, 2005), it would be useful to develop and 
measure compassion from a Buddhist perspective.  
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The Benefits of Compassion  
 The following section will specifically address uses and benefits of compassion. 
In specific, compassion may be helpful in that: 1) it may be associated with a host of 
positive psychological outcomes; 2) it could be a boon to explicitly recognize and 
develop in counseling and psychotherapy; 3) it may be transformative if encouraged and 
developed further in the fields of medicine and education; and 4) and it would be helpful 
to practice in everyday interactions with families.  
Psychological Outcomes 
 Davidson (2006) has done some preliminary study of brain activity in monks 
while they were engaged in compassion meditation and found activation in parts of the 
brain that are associated with positive emotion. Thus, this finding suggests that there may 
be a link between compassion and happiness. In Buddhist traditions, it has long been 
suggested that compassion is linked to happiness (e.g. Dalai Lama, 2002c; Ladner, 2004; 
Wang, 2005) and may be protective against negative emotions such as fear, anger, envy, 
and vengeance (Goleman, 2003). A western perspective recognizes the benefit that can 
result from being a recipient of a compassionate act. However, what may be provocative 
in these preliminary findings and in Buddhist thought is the suggestion that the donor is 
also benefiting from the generation of their own compassion for others. This idea that the 
donor may also be a receiving a positive impact from the generation of compassionate 
feelings is beginning to be recognized (e.g. Crocker & Canevello 2008; von Deitze & 
Orb, 2000; Goleman, 2003; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2004). 
 Thus, compassion may act as a protective agent against various negative 
psychological conditions and given its affiliative nature it may also be associated with 
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improved social relationships. Crocker & Canevello (2008) in a recent study suggest that 
compassionate goals may be associated with a host of positive outcomes such as 
improved social bonds, enhanced well-being, feeling less lonely, depressed, and anxious. 
In Sprecher & Fehr’s (2005) conceptualization of compassion in the development of the 
Compassionate Love Scale they found that compassionate love was positively associated 
with empathy, helpfulness, volunteerism, and social support. 
A closely related construct to compassion, self-compassion has been proposed 
and has been found to be associated with a variety of positive psychological outcomes 
(e.g. Neff, 2003a, 2003b). Given that self-compassion and compassion presumably share 
common properties, some of Neff’s findings may lend support for the association of 
compassion with markers of positive functioning. In Neff’s (2003b) study, she found that 
self-compassion was positively correlated with life satisfaction, social connectedness, and 
emotional intelligence suggesting an overall connection to positive well-being. Further, 
she found that self-compassion had a significant negative correlation with self-criticism, 
neurotic perfectionism, anxiety, and depression. These encouraging results help support 
the necessity of similar research with compassion to examine the possibility of 
comparable findings. 
Psychotherapy 
  Compassion’s usefulness is beginning to be specifically recognized in the field of 
counseling and psychotherapy (e.g. Gilbert, 2005; Lewin, 1996; Firestone et al., 2003; 
Matta, 2004; Sarason, 1985). Stosny (2004) suggests that a lack of compassion can 
initiate power struggles within families and is the most common reason why people go to 
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family therapists. Ladner (2004) makes a passionate plea for the inclusion of compassion 
in society and therapy and suggests we are limiting ourselves without it: 
Without any means for developing the qualities that give life meaning and that 
bring genuine peace and joy, we are left to follow the advice of advertisers, 
purchasing things and seeking entertainment to find the happiness for which we 
hope. The more psychologically minded of us are left to seek pills to bring 
happiness through changes in brain chemistry, or we’re left to think endlessly 
about our childhoods, our self-esteem, our boundaries, and our coping skills for 
getting as many of our desires met as is humanly possible. Without any real 
emphasis on sincere love, compassion, contentment, and joy, we are left with a 
terribly limited approach to psychology, which is useful in curing certain 
pathological conditions but offers us almost nothing when it comes to living good 
lives or teaching our children to do so. In brief, we are left poor of heart.  
(p. xv – xvi). 
 Not only is there a call for compassion in society and therapy, but also a striking 
observation about professional programs for training in care-giving fields. Sarason (1985) 
reports that there are no selection criteria to assess compassionate ability for admission to 
programs in care-giving professions that require compassionate care. For example, 
assessment for admission to counseling fields is based primarily on academic capabilities 
evaluated on the basis of test scores, written essays, and grade point averages. Some 
information about the personable qualities is sometimes gleaned from short on-site or 
phone interviews, but is not always required for admission. Some graduate students in 
programs in counseling and psychology report that they do not receive any specific 
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training in compassion in order to work with future clients (Ladner, 2004; Sarason, 
1985). Once in the field, practitioners are expected to treat psychological pain without the 
aid or understanding of compassion (Glasser, 2005). In fact, Glasser (2005, p. 5) says 
that, “we have left the practice of compassion to the winds of chance. To say it may 
sound unbelievable and absurd, but it is true.”  
 Despite the desperate plea for compassion in society, therapy, and in training 
programs for professionals, it would be amiss to say that counseling theory is completely 
devoid of any discussion of warmth and kindness in the care of clients. It should be taken 
into consideration that other terms that are considered more scientifically appropriate 
have been discussed in counseling and therapy that are closely aligned in meaning to 
compassion. Gilbert (2005) suggests a variety of alternative names for the concept of 
compassion that has been utilized in psychotherapy including empathy, unconditional 
positive regard, containment or holding, client-therapist rapport, and working alliance. 
Gilbert & Irons (2005) indicate that the working relationship or rapport is the same 
concept as compassion because similar to compassion, these terms suggest a process that 
helps the client feel safe and create a bond with the therapist in order to facilitate therapy.  
 Bates (2005) suggests that compassion is a boon to psychotherapy in general 
because it creates a safe and supportive environment that allows for the exploration of 
distressing topics. Specifically, Greenberg and Paivio (1997) report that the presence of 
compassion in the therapeutic alliance allows for a new view point to be developed in 
order for the client to examine painful experiences. Teasdale (1997) describes this  
view-point as a way for the client to separate their problems from their identity thus 
issues and concerns are no longer inherent to the client and change is therefore possible. 
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A new meaning is created for the experience (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). This dynamic 
is carried from counseling into a general life practice where individuals learn to relate 
differently to themselves. This process is referred to as a new “self-to-self” relating 
(Gilbert & Irons, 2005). This way of relating to the self can also be called                    
self-compassion and is the focus of an emerging body of work (e.g. Leary, 2007a, 2007b; 
Neff, 2003b; Neff et al., 2007). 
Self-compassion, compassion, and the dialogical interchange between them in 
therapy are theorized to be particularly crucial in group counseling (Bates, 2005) and for 
the remediation of depression (Allen & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Canevello, 2008; 
Teasdale, 1997). The therapist’s demonstration of compassion allows for the client’s 
internalization of warmth and kindness and serves as a model for the client to be more 
self-compassionate. While it is possible for a therapist to induce self-compassion through 
compassionate counseling, it is also possible for clients to learn it from each other in 
group counseling as it can be observed and absorbed in a context of interacting with 
others. In fact, compassion in group therapy is considered essential to creating an open 
and honest environment for clinical work (Bates, 2005). When compassion is expressed 
from client to client, the experience can seem particularly real and transformative (Bates, 
2005).  
 Compassion has also been theorized to be of particular use in depression. Allen & 
Knight (2005) suggest a variety of reasons why compassion may be specifically helpful 
to the remediation of depression. First, compassion is other-centered and it is theorized 
that a shift in attention can alleviate negative self-focus in depression to a more positive 
other-focus in compassion. Second, a compassionate mind-set does not lend itself to a 
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negative or hostile world-view. Thus compassion may buffer a general pessimistic 
perspective. Third, this compassionate attitude is theorized to positively affect behavior 
decreasing social withdrawal and thereby facilitating the possibility of social interaction 
with others. In sum, compassion is posited to have some buffering effects from a negative 
self-focus, a pessimistic world-view, and social isolation that when taken together may 
contribute to the amelioration of depressive symptoms. 
Consequently, there seems to be theoretical support for the beneficial effects of 
compassion for clients in the counseling experience. However, some researchers are 
suggesting that professional care-givers may have difficulty sustaining compassion for 
their clients (e.g. Adams, Boscarino, & Figley, 2006; Figley, 1995; 2002; Hesse, 2002; 
Jenkins & Baird, 2002; Kanter, 2007; Sexton, 1999). This phenomenon is called 
compassion fatigue. In compassion fatigue, counselors may become depleted due the 
emotionally demanding nature of their profession (e.g. Figley, 2002; Keidel, 2002; 
Kinnick et al., 1996; Pieper, 1999; Sexton, 1999). Compassion fatigue can be defined as 
“the formal caregiver’s reduced capacity or interest in being empathetic” (Adams, 
Boscarino, & Figley, 2006, p.103) and is considered the “natural consequence of working 
with those who have experienced a trauma or another stressful event” (Meadors & 
Lamson, 2008, p. 26).  
This practical concern in helping professions necessitate research attempts to seek 
out answers for the failure of compassion in these instances. The deleterious effects of 
compassion fatigue are theorized to be numerous. First, there is a negative impact on the 
professional care-giver experiencing compassion fatigue because it leads to emotional 
exhaustion (e.g. Hesse, 2002; Jacobson, 2006; Salston & Figley, 2003). Second, it can 
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lead to clinical errors that could jeopardize the care of clients (e.g. Hesse, 2002; 
Pfifferling, 2008). Third, it can have a negative impact on the workplace environment as 
a whole (Meadors & Lamson, 2008). Further research on compassion would permit an 
investigation of its possible application to the remediation of this condition.  
However, it is unclear what connection compassion fatigue has to compassion. 
Originally, compassion fatigue was referred to as Secondary Traumatic Stress (STS), but 
Figley (1995) introduced the term compassion fatigue to provide a more user-friendly and 
a less stigmatizing connotation to the phenomenon (Bride, Radey, & Figley, 2007; 
Jenkins & Baird, 2002). In addition, other terms such as burnout, vicarious 
traumatisation, empathetic stress, and counter-transference have been used to describe the 
experience (Sexton, 1999). Therefore, given the multiple names for the experience, it is 
unclear if compassion or lack of compassion is the key ingredient that defines the 
disorder. Further research in both compassion fatigue and into the nature of compassion 
may begin to answer some of these questions.  
Additionally, and of note, conceptualizations of compassion may have an impact 
on the understanding of how this condition is understood and named. In the Sprecher & 
Fehr’s (2005) conceptualization of compassionate love the main element of the construct 
is kindness. Thus, it is possible to be taxed to the point where kindness is difficult to 
maintain in the face of one’s own emotional strain. However, in Neff’s (2003a, 2003b) 
conceptualization compassion is not only defined by kindness but also mindfulness. 
Thus, this element of mindfulness allows for a sort of emotional balance that prevents an 
individual from focusing on their own emotional distress in order to continue to have 
feelings of compassion. Due to the presence of mindfulness within its definition, the 
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fatigue of compassion could be considered a contradiction in terms. Taking the element 
of mindfulness into account, once an individual experiences fatigue it would no longer be 
compassion that is experienced. Research into how compassion is conceptualized, 
generated and/or how it may be regained after emotional stressors may provide valuable 
information about how to prevent or remediate compassion fatigue. Therefore, this would 
be yet another reason to examine the properties of compassion as it could serve as a 
defense against the harmful effects of compassion fatigue.  
 In short, compassion may facilitate a positive context for counseling both in 
individual and group settings, may assist a client’s ability to be more self-compassionate, 
and may aid specifically in the remediation of depression and compassion fatigue. 
Clearly, given these theoretical suppositions, compassion is worthy of investigation to 
understand its possible application in psychotherapeutic settings. 
Medicine 
 The salience of compassion extends to other fields such as the medical field (e.g. 
Coulehan & Williams, 2001; Kemper et al., 2006; Lally & Barber, 1974; Rousseau, 2004; 
Strasser et al., 2005; von Dietze & Orb, 2000). Specifically, compassion is listed in Item 
1 of the American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics (1981) as an 
important quality of a physician. Lally & Barber (1974) suggest it serves a protective 
function for the rights and welfare of patients. Furthermore, patients also view it as an 
important quality in physicians (Strasser et al., 2005).  
 Yet, there are barriers within the medical field that question if compassion is as 
useful as it would seem on the surface. Ladner (2004) indicates that some medical school 
students report that empathy or compassion for patients is discouraged in training 
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programs because it is assumed to taint objectivity in medical judgment and encourage 
inefficiency in making rounds in a timely manner. Kim (2007) also reports that feeling 
compassion is considered dangerous because it can lead to compassion fatigue or 
burnout. Therefore, the implied remedy to this problem is to refrain from feeling 
compassion all together thus averting the concern of becoming emotionally overtaxed. 
Thus, currently, the medical field seems to have a mixed message of valuing compassion 
theoretically but questioning it in actual practice.  
 Robert Thurman in the forward to Glaser’s (2005) book on compassion predicts 
that compassion will cease to be questioned in the future and will be embraced as a 
valuable quality in the field: 
I predict that decades from now, when more and more individuals have used 
Buddhist education to their own relief and satisfaction and have continued with it 
as a service to others, the whole nature of medicine and healing in our society will 
have changed. Compassion will have become a working watchword, a constant 
presence, a sine qua non, a powerful stream of life-giving water (p. xii).  
 In accord with this prediction, research is beginning to investigate compassion 
and its relationship to better medical health outcomes (e.g. Strasser et al., 2005). In a 
practical application, Kemper and colleagues (2006) provided compassion meditation 
training to second year medical students to enhance care to patients and to develop 
protective skills against compassion fatigue and burnout.  
 In sum, further research on the nature of compassion in the medical field may 
help clarify the conflict between valuing compassion as an ethical principle while 
simultaneously rejecting it in practice for fear that it may interfere with medical 
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objectivity, workplace efficiency, and effective practice given the hazards of burnout. 
More research may elucidate if compassion is salubrious to patients as theorized and if it 
can act as a buffer from compassion fatigue for medical servicer providers. 
Education & Families 
 In education, the integration of intentional training of compassion for teachers is 
beginning to be suggested (e.g. Goleman, 2003; Miller, 2006; Post, 2005). Further, 
recommendations that children be taught and learn emotional coping and regulation 
strategies are being proposed as well (Goleman, 2003; Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 
1997). Goleman (2003) specifically makes mention to Columbine in regard to how 
compassion might have transformed that situation and other similar situations if social 
and emotional learning was taught to students and made a priority in schools. It could be 
considered imbalanced that children are taught academic skills explicitly, but are left to 
their own devices to learn how to interact socially with their peers and to successfully 
avoid the “school yard bully.” In Davidson & Harrington (2002), the Dalai Lama 
suggests that explicit instruction of compassion could transform families and schools so 
that compassion becomes widespread in society in order to “change humanity.” (p. 242).  
In families, compassion may be a particularly applicable skill to parenting. It 
seems amiss that there is an emphasis on education in society without very much 
instruction on effective parenting. It is odd that this is not considered an important 
educational topic particularly due to the fact that most people become parents and it is a 
serious and important endeavor. It is left up to individuals to either self-educate or to 




 Consequently, more information about compassion and its use in educational 
settings and families might be transformative for society. Specifically, it may: 1) ease the 
early social terrain that children have to navigate without instruction; 2) buffer the 
occurrence of violent and tragic events taking place more and more in educational 
settings; and 3) provide information on better parenting practices. 
 In conclusion, compassion may be associated with a variety of positive 
psychological outcomes such as happiness, improved social relationships, and may be 
protective against a host of negative emotions such as anxiety, fear, and anger. Within 
psychotherapy, it may be useful as a positive context for clinical work in both individual 
and group therapy, promote better interpersonal and intrapersonal functioning, and may 
be of particular use with the treatment of depression and compassion fatigue. Compassion 
is considered valuable in the medical profession as an ethical principle, a protection for 
the right of patients, and an important quality that patients seek in their service providers. 
In education, it serves an important function for teachers to provide a good learning 
environment and for students to learn emotional coping strategies. Finally, for families, it 
is a way for parents to build relationships with their children and teach compassion as a 
skill that could be passed on to others as a means to transform society.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
 “In the last thirty years some psychologists have begun research on altruism 
and empathy, though they had not yet linked those with the idea of compassion. The time 
is ripe for the field to pay attention to compassion as well as positive emotions in 
general.” 
    -Ervin Staub 
 
Western Views of Compassion 
 The topic of compassion arises in Western circles particularly and more explicitly 
in the context of Christian religious traditions and within philosophical discourse. 
Although mentioned in a cursory fashion in the works of Plato, the first in-depth 
treatment of the topic appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1385/1984). In fact, 
Socrates, Plato’s teacher and many of the Stoics believed that good people cannot be 
harmed and thus an emotion like compassion was dispensable because it was believed 
that compassion should only be reserved for the innocent (Vlastos, 1991). Thus, 
Aristotle’s notion of compassion is one of the earliest Western philosophical definitions 
of the construct. First it should be mentioned that the word that Aristotle often used was 
pity and that pity had often been used interchangeably with compassion. It was not until 
Victorian era that pity’s definition transformed and an acquired element of contempt or 
condescension was introduced into its meaning (Nussbaum, 1996). Aristotle (1385/1984, 
p. 113) defined pity or compassion as “a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or 
painful, which befalls one who doesn’t deserve it, and which we might expect to befall 
ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover befall us soon.”  
 Various modern philosophers suggest that from the work of Aristotle sprung three 
requirements that must be in place for an individual to feel pity or compassion: 1) the 
suffering or trouble must be viewed as a serious issue or problem; 2) the sufferer must not 
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be responsible for their own suffering; 3) the individual feeling compassion must be able 
to picture himself or a similar loved one or friend in the same situation (e.g. Cassell, 
2002; Nussbaum, 2001).   
 Reflecting the notions of the early philosophers Plato and Aristotle, a debate on 
the viability of compassion as a valuable emotion for human interaction and society 
ensued in philosophy. Various philosophers either supported the study of compassion and 
others dismissed it on the belief that compassion was an irrational emotion. For those that 
considered it irrational, it was suggested that it did not have much place in the human 
condition and society in general (e.g. Brown, 1996; Kant, 1797/1971; Neitzsche, 
1887/1956). Nussbaum (1996) summarizes the problem with compassion for those 
philosophers that rejected it: 1) compassion is considered to be an emotion without any 
cognitive element; or 2) the cognitive element in compassion is considered to be faulty. 
 Nussbaum (1996) explains that the opposers of compassion view the belief that 
bad things happen to good people as flawed reasoning. In this tradition of thinking, the 
only valuable aspect of life is developing reason. Once this is attained, it cannot be taken 
away. Ill circumstances in life are inconsequential and therefore unworthy of attention or 
compassion. In this line of thinking, compassion falls away. In the first condition, an 
individual has attained reason and that cannot be taken away. Therefore, there is no need 
for compassion. If an individual feels a loss for any other element in life besides reason, it 
is considered to be foolish. In the second condition, an individual has not attained reason. 
In this scenario, it is the individual’s own responsibility that he has not developed reason 
and therefore is unworthy of compassion. Kant (1797/1971), a supporter of this position 
indicates that the recipient of compassion is insulted because he is unworthy of the 
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sentiment. Further, the giver also insults their own dignity in offering it. He indicates 
compassion should not be a process that occurs between human beings because it 
demeans both parties. 
 Nietzsche (1887/1967) indicates that this type of sentiment directed towards the 
self can erupt in anger towards a world that is considered callous. In this line of argument 
against compassion, compassion is actually considered to be dangerous and a catalyst for 
vengeance when an individual feels sorrow for their own misfortune. Compassion, in this 
view, must be kept in check in order to diffuse violence and chaos. Some modern views 
of compassion may not conceptualize it as such a risky and fearful emotion, but still 
dismiss it as a pointless endeavor. For example, Brown (1996) views compassion an 
over-idealistic aspiration that has little relevance in the practical world. Further, he 
suggests that offering compassion in instances where self-harm is risked is simply 
irrational (Brown, 1996). 
 However, there are some Western philosophers that support the notion of 
compassion. These philosophers saw compassion as an ethically valuable emotion 
because it was their contention that bad things do sometimes happen to good people. 
A supporter of Aristotle’s definition, Rousseau (1911/1963) provides further illustration 
one of the elements (common humanity) of the three part definition suggesting that a sort 
of identification is necessary for individuals to feel compassion. In Rousseau’s 
(1911/1963) Emile, Rousseau indicates that Kings have so little compassion for their 
subjects because they are ignorant of their subject’s position. It is suggested that once a 
King understands the fate of his subjects as related to his own, then his perspective 
changes and compassion is possible. Further, Hobbes (1651/1962), Hume (1888/1978), 
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Schopenhauer (1844/1966), and Blum (1987) all similarly give accounts of the 
importance of identification and mental imagining of oneself in the position of the 
sufferer to illicit compassion. Further, various other philosophers have embraced it 
indicating that it provokes a sense of shared humanity (e.g. Blum, 1980; Cassell, 2002).  
 In Christian traditions, the conditions set forth in Aristotle’s definition are not 
required. Compassion is offered regardless of the innocence of the sufferer. In fact, the 
good news in Christianity is that despite the fact humans are sinners, God still has mercy 
and compassion (Psalms 86:11; Psalms 111:4; Psalms 112:4; Lamentations 3:22; Micah 
7:19 ) (Authorized King James Version). When God’s people sinned, He still forgave 
them (Psalms 78:38) (Authorized King James Version). Jesus demonstrated compassion 
many times when he offered people healing (Matthew 14:14; Matthew 20:34; Mark 1:41) 
(Authorized King James Version), exorcised unclean spirits from afflicted individuals 
(Mark 9:22) (Authorized King James Version), and offered spiritual teachings (Matthew 
9:36; Mark 6:34) (Authorized King James Version). He recognized their suffering in 
illness and in the lack of knowledge for spiritual fulfillment. 
 Two Christian parables demonstrate the importance of compassion within the 
Christian tradition. In the story of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:33) (Authorized King 
James Version), a Samaritan helps an injured person on the side of the road even after 
others including a priest passed the individual without assisting. Within the biblical 
context, Samaritans were considered to be an out-group to God’s chosen people. Thus, 
this illustrates not only compassion, but also the importance of treating all people with 
compassion even across barriers. In another famous parable referred to as the prodigal 
son (Luke 15:20) (Authorized King James Version), a man has two sons and one son 
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leaves home with his inheritance and squanders it. After realizing his mistake he returns 
home and his father filled with compassion receives him. Through his father’s 
compassion he forgives his son and receives him back into the family. In both of these 
stories, the importance of compassion is illustrated as a moral lesson about how to live 
life as a good Christian.  
 These stories illustrate compassion as a moral lesson within Christianity, but it 
could even be suggested that the heart of Christianity involves compassion. Compassion 
lies at the center of the Christ’s motivation in enduring the torture and crucifixion in 
order to absolve sinners of their original sin. Christ felt compassion for all of humanity 
and took on the burden of a painful death so that others may be free of sin.  
 Thus, Western conceptualizations have examined the relevance and definition of 
compassion within philosophical and intellectual discourse with some supporters and 
some dissenters of the salience of the construct for interpersonal interaction and use in 
society. Further, Christian tradition has underscored its importance in a morally upright 
life suggesting that compassion should be offered universally, in instances of forgiveness, 
and at a very high spiritual level of development in self-sacrifice.   
 
An Eastern Model of Compassion 
 Neff (2003a, 2003b) has proposed a conceptualization of self-compassion derived 
from Buddhist principles that can also apply more generally to compassion. In this work 
compassion is defined as “being touched by the suffering of others, opening one’s 
awareness to others’ pain and not avoiding or disconnecting from it, so that feelings of 
kindness towards others and the desire to alleviate their suffering emerge” (p. 86-87). 
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Within this definition lies the three elements that are proposed to compose compassion 
more generally. They include kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness (Neff 2003a, 
2003b). The following sections are a description of these three elements as they apply to 
compassion.  
Kindness. 
“It is a little embarrassing that, after forty-five years of research and study, the best 
advice I can give to people is to be a little kinder to each other.”  –Aldous Huxley 
 
Kindness is probably the element most recognized and associated with 
compassion in western conceptualizations. In fact, Lewin (1996, p. 27) in his book on 
psychotherapy defined compassion as “the knowing pursuit of kindness.” Neff (2003b) 
defines kindness within the context of self-compassion as “extending kindness and 
understanding to oneself rather than harsh judgment and self-criticism (p. 89). Thus, the 
concept applied more generally to compassion would essentially retain the same basic 
elements but would be applied to others. Therefore, compassion is offering understanding 
to others in instances of failure or suffering instead of being critical or indifferent. 
Understanding creates a sense of closeness or limits the perceived difference between the 
donor and the individual who is suffering. Gilbert (2005) describes this closeness as 
warmth and emphasizes its importance in his biopsychosocial approach to compassion. 
Warmth is characterized to be part of the care-giving system in the parent-child 
interaction that allows the child to feel protected and safe. Gilbert (2005) suggests that 
this social safeness system may be an underpinning aspect of compassion. Glaser (2005, 
p. 44) concurs suggesting that “compassion is characterized by warmth. This warmth is 
not fabricated or generated: it emerges naturally in the absence of aggression.”  
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Gilbert (2005) explains that when children receive love and are soothed in early 
life this develops psychological and biological systems that lay the foundation for the 
child to mature into a calm individual who is open to others because they feel safe. This 
disposition allows these children to develop in such a way that compassion is more likely 
in adulthood. Also, these adults can recall loving and soothing memories in instances of 
stress that help them regulate their mood. Supporting evidence for these claims have 
shown that children who are securely attached are more willing as adults to care for older 
relatives (Sorensen et al., 2002) and are considered to be more approachable and 
supportive by their peers (Priel et al., 1998). Contrasted to this, children can also develop 
a strong threat system when they are not cared for or feel endangered. Those children 
may become defensive because they do not feel safe. In adulthood they may be more 
likely to rely on defensive anger or fear in instances of stress (Gilbert, 2005).  
These early developmental patterns that Gilbert suggests may have a powerful 
impact on the development of compassion. It is only logical that children who are treated 
with kindness will then have the knowledge and skills to act with kindness as adults. 
However, the implication here is more than that, it is that children develop beliefs about 
what kind of world that they live in and what to expect, and how to best respond. 
Kindness and warmth allow for the exploration of the world because it is safe. In these 
instances, the focus no longer has to be on the self and that frees an individual’s attention 
up to be open and responsive to the suffering of others. Kindness can then flow naturally.  
However, in instances where threat is present the individual feels the need to 
focus attention to the self as a protective response. When the focus is on the self, 
indifference to the suffering of others or a critical view of the world becomes more 
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adaptive because the attention to the safety of the self is an imminent priority. The threat 
creates a barrier for the natural response of kindness. Thus, the opposing construct to 
kindness would be indifference. Note that this is a different conceptualization from that 
of self-compassion. In self-compassion, the opposing construct to kindness is               
self-judgment. When a critical stance is turn inward, a sense of understanding for the self 
is lost and kindness slips away in favor of a critical and judgmental stance. When 
kindness is lost for others in compassion, a cold and apathetic response ensues. 
Common Humanity. 
“If we all reflect deeply, we will find that our common humanity is precisely the 
universal principle that can bind us all together peacefully.”  - The Dalai Lama 
 
Common humanity, the next proposed component in Neff’s model may not be as 
well known and associated with compassion as kindness. However, the concept is not 
foreign to western discussions. There is a famous phrase that conveys the sentiment. John 
Bradford, a religious man who while imprisoned watched another man going off to his 
execution stated: “There but for the grace of God, goes John Bradford.” This phrase 
became popularly adopted as “there but for the grace of God, goes I.” The meaning 
behind this suggests that John Bradford understood that he could easily be in the place of 
the man who was facing his execution. Thus, common humanity is recognizing that the 
plight of others is not divorced from one’s own understanding due to a shared human 
experience.  
Neff (2003b) defines common humanity in self-compassion as recognizing that 
one’s experience is part of the larger human experience. Therefore applying it to 
compassion more generally, it is defined as the ability to see other’s suffering and pain as 
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part of the human experience as opposed to being a separate event. Recognizing and 
responding to suffering is commonly understood to be part of compassion. Suffering may 
underpin how common humanity works. Suffering acts as a common denominator that 
allows individuals despite their differences to understand, relate, and connect to each 
other through the experience of suffering, because it is a common human experience 
(Blum, 1980; Cassell, 2002; Dalai Lama, 1984; 1997; 2002a; Dass & Bush, 1992; 
Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987; Ladner, 2004). It renders all human beings as equal (Blum, 
1980; Dalai Lama, 2002c; Hopkins, 1999; 2001; Ladner, 2004). In order to reiterate this 
premise in his lectures, the Dalai Lama is fond of beginning his talks by referring to the 
audience members as his brothers and sisters (Hopkins, 2001; Miller, 2006). He reports 
that he views everyone as a brother or sister because he understands their condition as a 
human being because he also is human. He has often repeated the teaching in his lectures 
that all human beings are the same because “we all want happiness and do not want to 
suffer” (Dalai Lama, 1984; 1997; 2002a).  
This is not only an eastern concept but has also been present in western dialogues 
as far back as the time of early Greek philosophers. Cassell (2002) reports that from the 
time of Aristotle, it was generally accepted that a requirement for compassion was the 
ability to envision oneself in the same predicament of the sufferer. In other words, there 
is an identification with the sufferer, and the boundary between self and other becomes 
looser (Wang, 2005; Wayment & O’Mara, 2008). In fact, some even suggest that we 
begin to own and understand the suffering of others like it were our own (Dass & Bush, 
1992; Ladner, 2004; Stosny, 2004). Blum (1980) articulates it well saying: 
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I can put this by saying that compassion involves a sense of shared humanity, of 
regarding the other as a fellow human being. This means that the other person’s 
suffering (though not necessarily their particular afflicting condition) is seen as 
the kind of thing that could happen to anyone, including oneself insofar as one is a 
human being. (p. 511) 
This understanding or wisdom creates a viewpoint that has been articulated as 
interconnection (Dass & Bush, 1992; Ferrucci, 2006; Miller, 2006), oneness (Salzberg, 
1997; Wang, 2005), we-ness (Cassell, 2002), or collective self-identity (Wayment & 
O’Mara, 2008). Once this wisdom is finally garnished, the belief in separateness is 
considered to be a delusion (Ladner, 2004; Salzberg, 1995; Wayment & O’Mara, 2008). 
Glaser (2005, p. 27) emphasizes this in the statement: “we now know that even the 
movement of butterflies in China has a ripple effect throughout the world. There is no 
absolute separation, anywhere.” Additionally, once this sense of connection is grasped it 
is also possible that it may be the motivating force that shifts a compassionate feeling to a 
compassionate act (Salzberg, 1997; Wayment & O’Mara, 2008).  
 In contrast, the absence of this perspective can lead to distancing and denying of 
the suffering of others (Ladner, 2004; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). A natural consequence 
of this is to start to engage in the in-group and the out-group classification of individuals. 
One of the most poignant historical examples of this is the holocaust. In interviews 
conducted with both individuals who helped Jewish families and those who did not, the 
critical difference was found to be how Jewish people were viewed. For those Europeans 
who helped, they reported that they viewed Jewish people as fellow human beings, but 
for those who did not help, they viewed Jewish people as outsiders (Monroe & Epperson, 
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1994; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). This phenomenon is also noted in post-war Jewish 
perspectives of Germans as well. For example, Wohl & Branscombe (2005) conducted a 
series of empirical studies with Jewish participants and were able to provide supporting 
evidence that when Germans were inclusively categorized as human, Jewish people 
blamed them less for collective responsibility of the holocaust. However, when Germans 
were categorized as an out-group, Jewish people assigned more collective guilt to them. 
In a more everyday example and with less severe consequences, Hopkins (2001) suggests 
that most people do it frequently when they classify some co-worker, neighbor, or 
customer service provider as a “jerk”. This label allows individuals to temporarily see 
this person as someone separate and different and therefore less deserving of respect.  
 One common way that individuals justify out-group classification is to 
dehumanize others (Goleman, 2003; Hopkins, 2001; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). Goleman 
(2003) reports that training for people who become torturers involves learning to deny the 
suffering of others by refusing to see the victim as human. Once the person is no longer 
human the suffering becomes tolerable to the torturer. It is divorced from their personal 
experience of being human. Further, Hopkins (2001) suggests that governmental entities 
when promoting war to its citizens make it more palatable by dehumanizing the opponent 
thus making killing and violence more acceptable. In these instances our common 
humanity is denied and out-groups and violence is the consequence.  
Thus, a sense of separation is the opposing construct to common humanity. Once 
an individual is able to see another as separate from the self, it is possible to forego a 
compassionate response to that individual in instances of suffering. In  
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self-compassion if an individual does this to the self, that individual cuts themselves off 
from a sense of common humanity and become isolated. Thus, in self-compassion, 
isolation is the opposite of common humanity, but with compassion more generally it is 
conceptualized in a slightly different manner such that the opposing construct to common 
humanity allows for a sense of separation from others, particularly in instances where 
others are suffering. 
Mindfulness. 
“As compassion entails the wish to free ourselves from suffering, we must see our 
suffering clearly in order to develop compassion.” –Lorne Ladner 
 
 Mindfulness, the last component in Neff’s three-pronged definition is probably 
the least understood and conceptualized in western circles in terms of understanding 
compassion. Neff (2003b) describes mindfulness in self-compassion as holding painful 
thoughts and feelings in a balanced way where one does not wallow or over-indentify 
with pain but where one also does not deny it either. Lazarus and Lazarus                
(1994, p. 123-124) concurs with this description indicating that “most of us who are 
capable of compassion recognize that we must not allow ourselves to wallow in other 
people’s misery, or alternatively, to avoid them if we cannot keep our emotions in 
check.”  
Thus according to Neff’s description of mindfulness, there are two emotional 
extremes that can interfere with a compassionate stance. For those who over-identify with 
the pain in others, they may find themselves paralyzed by the experience. This 
phenomenon has been noted in the empathy-sympathy research as personal distress. 
Eisenberg and colleagues (1999, p. 1360) have defined personal distress as “an aversive, 
self-focused emotional reaction to the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
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emotional state or condition.” In these instances, the person so identifies with the pain of 
the other that the focus shifts from the person who is suffering to the self. Compassionate 
feelings and actions are thus stymied because the individual is too busy attending to their 
own feelings to help the sufferer (Lazarus, 1991). Supporting research in the literature on 
helping indicates that when individuals are experiencing personal distress they are less 
likely to help (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Fabes et al., 1993). 
Disengagement is another emotionally imbalanced response that can obstruct 
mindfulness. McNeill and colleagues (1982) suggest that it is quite normal to try to 
disassociate from pain; it is part of the human condition. One of the first steps to 
overcoming disengagement is awareness (Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987; Hopkins, 1999; 
Ladner, 2004; Salzberg, 1995). One of the most crucial steps is described as opening to 
the experience (Chodron, 2002; Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998; Goldstein & Kornfield, 
1987; Ladner, 2004; Salzberg, 1995; 1997). This would push past mere awareness. It 
would include being present and not denying, pushing away, shutting down, 
disassociating, disengaging, or avoiding suffering that could illicit pain, anger, or 
sadness. It means to share in suffering (Braun, 1992; Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998; 
McNeill et al., 1982).  
These emotional responses of over-identification or disengagement are a natural 
function of personal filters that individuals have created over time. These filters are 
developed by emotional responses to past experiences. They color how we perceive the 
world. Salzberg (1997) refers to this conditioning as an interpretation that is “not an 
inherent part of that particular experience.” In other words, our emotional response to a 
situation becomes a part of how we view the situation itself even though our emotional 
 
28 
experience is separate from it. For example, Goleman (2003) suggests that if you mistake 
a piece of rope for a snake, your emotional perspective of fear becomes a part of what is 
real to you in that experience even though the rope was never actually a snake. An 
individual who encounters the rope and sees it for what it is does not have a fear response 
and their reality of that situation is much different. Therefore, taken together, the 
suggestion here is that when a balance is achieved between disengagement and          
over-identification, a more realistic view is reached (Glaser, 2005; Trungpa, 1987).  
 Theoretically, self-compassion and compassion function differently in regard to 
this polar distinction. When an individual is not mindful in situations involving the self, it 
is more likely they may over-identify with the pain because they are focusing on the self. 
Denying one’s own pain is not as common as focusing on it and therefore becoming 
overly involved with the pain. In instances of compassion for others, it is less common to 
become over-identified with someone else’s pain. Therefore, in those instances, it is 
much more likely to deny or disengage from the pain and suffering of others. Thus, the 
opposing construct to compassion tends to be disengagement while in self-compassion it 
is proposed to be more likely an over-identification response.  
Kindness, Common Humanity, & Mindfulness: A Symbiotic Relationship   
Kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness may have discrete descriptions, 
but they work together symbiotically to manifest compassion. Mindfulness serves as a 
platform for both common humanity and kindness. At a very base level, mindfulness 
assists in the awareness of suffering because it manifests a level of emotional balance that 
leaves one open to others as opposed to becoming emotionally self-involved. Only with 
attention is kindness offered or common humanity elicited. Ferrucci (2006, p. 79-80) 
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states: “Attention is thus a form of kindness, and lack of attention is the greatest form of 
rudeness. Inattention is cold and hard. Attention is warm and caring. No attention, no 
kindness.” Once attention is gained, the emotional balance within mindfulness helps to 
sustain a compassionate stance. Further, the emotionally balanced, non-judgmental 
standpoint of mindfulness allows for a less critical viewpoint on others that prompts 
kindness and tears down barriers between self and other eliciting an understanding of 
common humanity (Neff, 2003b).  
Further, kindness and common humanity can elicit each other. Harsh and critical 
feelings for others can assist in viewing those others as outsiders. However, when acting 
with kindness, it is more difficult to continue to view the recipient as an outsider because 
kindness engenders a certain sense of closeness. Conversely, when common humanity is 
felt the barrier between self and other is less distinct and feelings of warmth and kindness 
become a natural extension of viewing others like the self. Common humanity helps to 
broaden the repertoire of recipients of kindness. It is natural for most individuals to offer 
kindness to friends and family members, but common humanity suggests that it is to be 
offered on the basis of sharing a common human link. Thus, common humanity makes 
acts of kindness more expansive and inclusive.  
Thus the theoretical structure proposed from Neff’s model not only includes 
kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness but a sense that these three elements work 
in consort to manifest compassion. Given that the model has now been outlined the 
following section will review a variety of similar constructs in relation to this 




Compassion & Similar Constructs 
Empathy & Sympathy: A Conceptual Muddle 
 There is a lack of agreed upon definitions of empathy and sympathy in the 
literature (Eisenberg, 1983; 2002; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Goldstein & Michaels, 
1985; Langer, 1972; Olinick, 1984; Wispe, 1991). In fact, Staub (1987) indicates that 
most articles begin with a definition of terms to ensure that meanings are understood.  
A variety of reasons have been proposed identifying possible explanations for the 
confusion.  
First of all, it is suggested that terms like empathy and sympathy are often used 
interchangeably in common vernacular (Kim & Flakerland, 2007; Wispe, 1991), thus this 
misunderstanding may be extended to scholarly endeavors when the terms are unclear in 
everyday language. Further, it is possible that these terms are so functionally inter-related 
(Eisenberg, 2000a; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg et al., 
1994; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988) that the distinction between them may not be readily 
apparent (Zhou et al., 2003). Logically, if the terms are so inter-related, it also begs the 
question if it is fair to say that there is only one construct that represents the whole 
psychological process (Wispe, 1991). Some theorists do discuss their chosen term for the 
process as if it were a choice among various options to best represent the one term that 
they mean (e.g. Haidt, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). In fact Lazarus (1991) indicates that he 
believes that the prosocial term that researchers are actually looking for in the empathy 
and sympathy research is compassion and he endorses its use over empathy, sympathy, or 
pity. Davis (1996) indicates that part of the confusion in terms is that the process should 
not be seen as a whole and should be broken down into process and outcome. He defines 
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the process as what happens when an individual is exposed to someone who is distressed. 
The outcome is the result of these processes and is typically affective in nature. 
Therefore, Davis is suggesting that part of the misunderstanding in the research is an 
inability to sort out the cognitive and affective aspects of empathy and sympathy.  
 An alternative explanation may be that biases against emotion may have shaped 
choices and understandings in researching empathy and sympathy that inadvertently 
created more confusion. Emotion has been presumed to prejudice our thinking and lead to 
false conclusions. Eisenberg (2000a, p. 665) states that: “Emotion has been viewed as 
biasing one’s evaluations and cognitions and as disrupting rational, moral thought.” 
Campos (1984) even suggests that in research that emotion has been considered at best 
inconsequential or at worse a nuisance variable. Harrington (2002) indicates that through 
the lens of science, emotion for many becomes irrelevant. In some ways, the values and 
perspectives of science suggests that we are at war with emotion as inferior to intellect. In 
Western science what is valuable is cold, hard, and objective thus there is no room for 
soft emotion in this rational world. In Goleman (2003) the Dalai Lama suggests that this 
tension between emotion and cognition historically extends back to the times of 
Enlightenment. During that time, a revelation occurred that many misperceptions about 
the world were predicated on being subject to and adhering to emotion as a way of 
knowing. The era of Enlightenment brought an emphasis on reason. Reason was viewed 
as a way to more accurately understand and study the world without falling into the trap 
of following emotional instincts that left one subject to irrational conclusions. 
 However this bias which may be largely unconscious could be a confusion of 
content and process. Science is a method, a way of investigating the world. Thus, it 
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should be applicable to any topic; the topic itself should not be able to bias or corrupt the 
method. Yet, this may be the assumption and the aversion of studying emotions. Further, 
this bias may have infiltrated the history of research on empathy and sympathy thus 
helping to create confusion. The following illustrates this premise while providing a brief 
sequential history of how empathy and sympathy became topics of relevant investigation. 
 Altruism. It might be suggested that at least in part, the interest in the study of 
empathy and sympathy is its connection to altruism (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990, Eisenberg 
& Miller, 1987a; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1984a). Altruism perhaps lent itself as 
a topic for study because it included behavior that could be observed and presumably 
measured. However, it soon became evident that altruism consists not only of behavior 
but it also implies selfless motivation to help others. Thus, helping behavior that was 
presumed to be altruistic may not always be so because the motivation may stem from 
other factors (Eisenberg, 1983; Hoffman, 1981; Krebs, 1975). In further investigation, 
some of those other factors became evident and examples include: moral principles, guilt, 
fear of punishment, hedonistic concerns, need for approval (Eisenberg, 1983; Eisenberg 
& Miller, 1987a) to obtain rewards, to alleviate one’s own personal distress, feelings of 
responsibility, social expectation or approval, and to avoid conflict (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a). With this recognition, the term, prosocial behavior 
began to be used in research to avoid the trap of designating a subjective intention. Thus, 
prosocial behavior could be used in place of altruism to talk about helping behavior 
without having to specify the motivation. 
 In addition to the problem of motivational intent that is implied in the meaning of 
altruism, altruism research has struggled to sort out if any behavior can truly be altruistic 
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(Eisenberg, 2000a; Einoff, 2008). Establishing that there are purely altruistic intentions 
may prove to be too difficult a task to undertake. In fact, Krebs (1975) indicates that it is 
impossible to prove because he suggests that it requires proving the null hypothesis. He 
suggests that altruism can only be substantiated through establishing the lack of 
expectation for return or reward after an act of giving. Batson (1997) tackles the question 
by indicating that an individual can have altruistic and other motivations simultaneously. 
Therefore, in other words, Batson is not a purist in terms of his view on the functioning 
of altruism. Thus, this suggests a complexity that may make it difficult to ever sort out if 
any behavior is clearly associated with altruism due to the co-occurrence of other 
motivations. However, at the same time, it also circumvents the question of whether 
altruism exists or not. It is less difficult to suggest that altruism co-exists with other 
motivations than to establish that any act is purely and singularly related to altruism.  
 In order to further understand the motivational intent behind altruism, researching 
constructs thought to lead to altruistic behavior became essential. Empathy became one 
the most researched constructs in this effort (e.g. Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 1983; 
Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; 
Hoffman, 1976; 1977; 1984b; 1987; Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001; Miller & Eisenberg, 
1988; Stotland, 1969; Zhou et al., 2003). However, in some ways, empathy was an odd 
choice to represent this internal process.  
Empathy. Empathy, as a word was only introduced into the English language in 
the 20th century (Davis, 1996; Ladner, 2004). Originally, it was not a term for psychology 
but a term for aesthetics and its original meaning suggested that it was a process in which 
one would project oneself into an object, typically an object of beauty. Lipps (1903) used 
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the term in a psychological context and then Titchener (1909) created an English term for 
the German word, thus the word empathy was invented for use in the English language. 
Therefore, empathy has had a short tenure in the English language and this may explain 
some of the vernacular inconsistencies in determining the meaning of the word in the 
empathy and sympathy research. Empathy’s selection, despite its short tenure in the 
English language, may have to do with empathy’s connotation as a cognitive construct. In 
many definitions of empathy, it is associated with understanding (e.g. Dymond, 1949; 
Borke, 1971; Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Hogan, 1969; Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001; Mead, 
1934). Thus, there may have been a preference of cognitive processes over emotional 
ones that may have biased researchers’ selection of the word. Empathy may have seemed 
more scientific. 
 The emphasis on the cognitive processes of empathy acted as a catalyst for further 
investigation on how cognition may function within the construct. Therefore, a variety of 
terms sprung up to clarify and further elaborate the cognitive process of empathy. 
Examples include conditioning (Eisenberg et al., 1991), ability to differentiate between 
self and other (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Hoffman, 1982; 1984b) simple categorization 
or labeling (Eisenberg et al., 1991), retrieval of elaborated cognitive networks or memory 
(Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1991), perspective taking (Eisenberg et al., 
1991; Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001), and role taking (e.g. Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b, Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman, 
1976).  
 Despite this emphasis on cognition, various researchers recognized the absence of 
emotion within the conceptualization of the construct and began to advocate for a 
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restructuring to include an affective component within empathy (e.g. Davis, 1996; 
Eisenberg, 2000b; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1982; 1984b; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Stotland, 1969). It is also possible that sympathy was 
introduced into the literature in order to provide a construct with more explicit emotional 
connotation.  
 Given this brief sequential history of key terms of empathy, sympathy, personal 
distress, prosocial behavior and altruism, the dilemma of proper definitions for each of 
these constructs remain. There are many researchers, theorists, and therapists that have 
proposed a variety of definitions (e.g. Batson, 1991; Buber, 1948; Dymond, 1949; Kohut, 
1959; Mead, 1934; Rogers, 1975; Wispe, 1991). In order to successfully compare and 
contrast compassion to these similar constructs it is imperative to having working 
definitions. With so many definitions and conceptualizations of these constructs of 
interest it could be a quite confusing objective to sort out what definitions to use.   
Eisenberg’s Model. Eisenberg’s (1986, 2002) conceptualization will be used for 
two reasons: 1) the definitions include both cognitive and affective elements and 2) 
Eisenberg has begun to build up a cohesive base of literature with consistent definitions 
(e.g. Eisenberg, 1983; 1991; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; 1999; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; 1987b; Eisenberg et al., 1989; 1991; 1994; Eisenberg & 
Strayer, 1987; Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Zhou et al., 2003) 
that provides a platform for further research. 
 Thus, Eisenberg’s (1986, 2002) restructuring of terms to provide clarification and 
advance research in making connections between empathy, sympathy, and altruism is 
presented here. The following is a brief summary of what she proposes: 
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1. Empathy is an affective response due to the comprehension of another’s 
emotional state that is considered to be similar to what the other person is feeling. There 
are two important implications of this definition. First, that empathy is a mirror-like 
responding to any emotion in another and does not need to be any specific emotion 
(Eisenberg, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; Zhou et al, 2003). Therefore, one could 
experience empathetic sadness as commonly associated with the term, but for example, 
one could also experience empathetic anger, fear, or joy. Second, this knowledge of 
another’s emotional state is typically associated with a positive response such as 
consoling or assisting another. However, it is suggested that empathy can also be used for 
nefarious purposes such as inappropriately influencing or manipulating others (Gilbert, 
2005; Ladner, 2004). 
 2. Sympathy is a response to another’s emotional state that is not identical to the 
other’s emotion, but instead includes feelings of sorrow and concern for another. In 
contrast to the implication previously mentioned in empathy, Wispe (1986) makes an 
interesting point that the implication in sympathy is that it can only be positive and can 
not be negative because there is a sense that one takes the side of the person in distress. 
 3. Altruism is a voluntary, intentional behavior benefiting another, and is not 
performed for egoistic or self-interest purposes.  
 4. Personal distress, a term that was originally created in the work of Batson  
(1991) is defined as an experience brought on by the recognition of the distress of another 
and is experienced as anxiety or worry that leads to egoistic and self-focused concern. 
 5. Prosocial behavior is voluntary, intentional behavior that helps another, but the 
motivation for the helping is unspecified.  
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 Given these definitions, Eisenberg and colleagues began to theorize how these 
various constructs were connected to each other attempting to understand how empathy 
and/or sympathy were linked to altruism or at the very least, prosocial behavior (e.g. 
Batson & Coke, 1981; Barnet et al., 1983; Blum, 1980; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; 
Eisenberg, 1982; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; 1987b; Hoffman, 1981; 1982; Mehrabian & 
Epstein, 1972; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; Staub, 1978; 1979; Toi & Batson, 
1982).  
 Eisenberg and colleagues (1991) exhaustively conceptualized how it might be 
possible to have almost any sequencing between the constructs of interest, but that in 
general, however, empathy is considered to be the base that sympathy and personal 
distress stems from (Eisenberg, 2000b; Eisenberg et al., 1991; 1994; Losoya & 
Eisenberg, 2001; Zhou et al., 2003). Hoffman (1984a) even suggests that the empathy 
and sympathy are developmental with sympathy being a more complex emotion than 
empathy. Further, empathy is considered to be neither self or other focused (Eisenberg, 
1986; 2002; Eisenberg et al., 1989; 1991; 1994); sympathy is considered to be          
other-focused (Eisenberg, 1986; 1991; 2000b; 2002; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; 1987b; 
Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1977); and personal distress is considered to be        
self-focused (Eisenberg, 1986; 1991; 2000b; 2002; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; 1999; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; 1987b; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989; 
1991; 1994).  
 This structuring is considered to be important because Eisenberg and colleagues 
suggest that feeling sympathy or personal distress has an impact on whether or not an 
individual is motivated to help others, and to help for selfless reasons. Specifically, 
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following the lead from Batson and colleagues (Batson & Coke, 1981) empathy and 
sympathy is theorized to lead to altruism and/or prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b; Eisenberg et al., 1989; 1994). In contrast, personal 
distress is assumed to either lead to avoidance or escape if that option is available (Batson 
& Coke, 1981; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a). If escape is 
not available, personal distress is theorized to lead to helping behavior, but only as a 
means to reduce personal aversive feelings (Batson & Coke, 1981; Coke, Batson, & 
McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; Eisenberg et al., 1989). Thus, in these 
instances it is thought that personal distress may block altruistic behavior due to the 
redirection of attention on the self instead of the person in distress. To further support this 
notion, it has been found that personal distress scales appear to be unrelated to prosocial 
responding (Batson et al., 1986; Davis, 1983).    
How Compassion is Distinct from Other Constructs  
Given this Eisenberg’s model, compassion can now be theoretically examined to 
consider how compassion is different from empathy, sympathy, altruism, and personal 
distress. The following addresses compassion and these constructs of interest. 
 Although compassion has not received much attention as a viable construct of 
interest in its own right, it has often been used to describe or define empathy (e.g. Batson 
et al., 2005; Cassell, 2002; Davis, 1996; Dhawan et al., 2007; Eisenberg et al., 1989; 
Lazarus, 1991; Staub, 1987) and sympathy (Eisenberg et al.,1989; Cassell, 2002; Davis, 
1996; Friedman & Riggio, 1999; Iyer et al., 2003; Lazarus, 1991; Staub, 1987). Thus, 
although there hasn’t been a lot of elaboration on compassion it seems to have been 
thought of as a term that is synonymous with these terms. In other words, compassion is 
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viewed as if there is no difference between it and the constructs of empathy and 
sympathy. In support of this proposition, some use the words compassion and 
empathy/sympathy interchangeably (e.g. Batson et al., 1981; 1997; 2005; Cassell, 2002; 
Eisenberg et al., 1989; Friedman & Riggio, 1999; Irwin et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003; 
Post, 2005). Wispe (1991) defines sympathy in a way that sounds similar to compassion 
suggesting that in sympathy suffering is recognized as something to be alleviated. 
Further, methodologically sympathy has often been measured as a function of emotion 
adjectives that includes compassion in its checklist (e.g. Batson et al., 1997; Batson & 
Morron, 1999; Batson & Ahmad 2001; Cialdini & al., 1987; Harmon-Jones et al., 2003; 
Irwin et al., 2008; Oswald, 1996).  
 Therefore, of note, as has been mentioned previously, compassion may not be a 
term that is considered worthy of distinct definition or particular relevance in the 
empathy/sympathy literature. However, it has had a minor role in that research base due 
to its consistent use both theoretically and methodologically as an assumed equivalent to 
the terms of empathy and sympathy. Despite the assumption of the role of compassion as 
an equitable term to empathy and/or sympathy, it will be suggested here that there are 
several distinctions between these terms of interest.  
 Empathy is a construct that has been strongly related to cognitive functioning (e.g. 
Dymond, 1949; Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Hoffman, 1984a; 1984b; Ickes, 2000; Kohut, 
1971; Mead, 1934). Further, it is considered to be an emotion that can be reliant on 
context. For example, Hoffman (1987) suggests that empathy is stronger when an 
individual in distress is considered to be a victim. Further, he suggests that an empathetic 
response is more likely when it is occurring in the here and now. Also, Hoffman (1977) 
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indicates that if the distress of an individual increases it often warrants a quicker 
empathetic response. In each of these instances, context was a cue to either elicit or 
increase empathetic responding. Salzberg (1995, p. 110) also suggests that compassion 
requires context as well: “To view life compassionately, we have to look at what is 
happening and at the conditions that gave rise to it. Instead of only looking at the last 
point, or the end result, we need to see all the constituent parts.”  
 While both empathy and compassion are presumed to have cognitive elements 
including a sense of contextual understanding, it is proposed here that compassion is not 
described as explicitly in a cognitive fashion like empathy is. Therefore, theoretically, the 
two would be considered to be dissimilar in the level of emphasis on cognition. Various 
theorists assume that empathy is essential for compassion (e.g. Brown, 1996; Dalai Lama, 
2001; Gilbert, 2005; Glaser, 2005; Goleman, 2003; Ladner, 2004; Lazarus & Lazarus, 
1994; Miller, 2006; Salzberg, 1995). Further, theoretically it has been suggested that 
empathy may be a developmental construct that lends itself as a building block to 
compassion (Glaser, 2005; Dalai Lama, 2001; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). Thus, if this 
were the case, the cognitive element may be more salient at the level of empathy even 
though it is also required for compassion as well. In this view, cognition is a marker of 
having acquired the key aspect of the construct of empathy whereas in compassion it 
would only be one element among other elements, and it would have been previously 
successfully acquired in the stage of empathy. An analogy would be a baby learning to 
become mobile. First the baby crawls and then the baby walks. Mobility would be more 
striking in the stage where the baby crawls because it is a new skill. When the baby 
walks, he or she retains the aspect of mobility but it is no longer novel.  
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Neff’s Model of Compassion as It Relates to Empathy 
 Neff (2003b) has defined compassion as being composed of three main 
components: kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness. In this section these three 
components will be related to empathy. 
 Mindfulness is a term that has not been applied to the literature base on empathy, 
sympathy, and altruism. However, some elements of personal distress appear to function 
in opposition to mindfulness. In mindfulness, there is an emotional balance where one 
does not deny emotions or ruminate in them either. In personal distress emotions are so 
overwhelming that the individual experiencing it has to attend to their own overarching 
and painful feelings. As a result, they deny and avoid their own feelings by escaping 
helping situations as demonstrated previously in various studies. However, due to the fact 
that mindfulness is more explicit in the conceptualization of compassion, it is assumed 
that the element will be more predominant even though there might be some sort of 
inverse relationship between the concept of mindfulness and the concept of personal 
distress in these two separate research bases. 
 In terms of common humanity, once again, the explicit concept of identifying 
with others based on an understanding of the common human experience is not explicitly 
articulated within empathy/sympathy research. However, there is an emphasis in empathy 
on understanding. Almost all of the various definitions include some sort of description 
of understanding the experience of another (e.g. Batson, 1991; Dymond, 1949; Mead, 
1934; Rogers, 1975; Wispe, 1991). In this vein, there may be some similarity between 
common humanity and general understanding. However, specifically bridging the gap 
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between self and other as a function of recognizing the humanity in other seems unique to 
compassion.  
Staub (1987) points out an aspect of empathy that may illustrate a key difference 
between the aspect of understanding in empathy and the aspect of common humanity in 
compassion. Staub (1987) indicates that identifying or connecting with others in empathy 
may mean separating or even feeling hostility towards others in an out-group. An 
example would be feeling empathy for a victim and simultaneously feeling hostility for 
the aggressor of that victim. However, in common humanity the connection is based on a 
shared human experience. Thus, it would be possible to feel compassion for both the 
victim and the aggressor, as they are both human and both experience suffering. The 
victim’s suffering would be acknowledged in the context of the harm that the aggressor is 
imposing on the victim. Yet, the aggressor would also be seen as a human being that 
suffers and is most likely acting in a harmful manner as a result of their own personal 
suffering.  
 A point of commonality between empathy and compassion may be kindness. 
Despite the fact that Eisenberg (1986, 2002) clarified empathy as a term that is no 
specific emotion, but instead reflective of another’s state, empathy is still often described 
and measured in terms of concern and caring (e.g. Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale, 
Davis IRI). This is most likely due to early definitions that included those elements in 
their definitions of empathy. One of the earliest researchers, Batson (1991) described 
empathy in terms of how Eisenberg (1986, 2002) describes sympathy. Thus, these 
conceptualizations are reflected in the most commonly used measures on empathy. Thus, 
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psychometrically if not theoretically, the kindness reflected in both of these constructs 
would be expected to be similar.  
As previously noted, compassion is used to describe and define sympathy as if the 
two terms were synonymous. Wispe’s (1986) definition of sympathy is virtually 
indistinguishable from a general definition of compassion. He indicates that sympathy is 
an emotion where suffering is recognized and seen as something to be alleviated. 
Sympathy, as defined by Eisenberg is an emotion characterized by sadness and concern. 
While in compassion there is a recognition of suffering, the process does not end there 
but positive other-focused feelings motivate an individual to wish for the alleviation of 
suffering of another. Therefore, sympathy may have more of an emphasis on sadness than 
compassion. In fact, it is possible that the way that Hoffman (1982) suggests that 
empathy and sympathy have a developmental link, sympathy and compassion may as 
well. Gilbert (2005, p. 42) reports that “sympathy may be a key competency for 
compassion.” Sympathy may end with a sense of sadness or concern for another and 
compassion begin with these sentiments and develop into an other-focused wish for the 
alleviation of suffering. This may be why Davidson (2006) found in his initial studies 
with Buddhist monks that compassion was associated with happiness. If compassion were 
only a process in which the suffering of others was recognized, it would presumably be a 
negative emotion. However, the ensuing concern for another may be the element that is 
key for the association to positive emotions such as happiness entailed within 
compassion. 
 There may also be a link between the concept of mindfulness and another term 
used in empathy/sympathy research, emotion regulation. Unfortunately, Eisenberg and 
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colleagues (1999, p. 321) report that there has not been much agreement on the meaning 
of the term. Despite this, they do provide a working definition of the term and indicate 
that emotion regulation is the “process of initiating, maintaining, modulating, or changing 
the occurrence, intensity, or duration of internal feelings states and emotion-related 
physiological processes.” Therefore, one commonality between these two terms may be 
that they are both suggestive of an ability to cope with emotions successfully.  
 More specifically, within the empathy/sympathy research, sympathy has been 
associated with emotional regulation (Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1999; 
Eisenberg & Okun, 1996; Murphy et al., 1999; Zhou et al., 2003). It is theorized that due 
to sympathy’s other-focused nature and its ability to successfully cope with the emotional 
distress of another that sympathy is thus freed up to motivate altruistic or prosocial 
behavior (Batson, 1991; Batson & Coke, 1981; Toi & Batson, 1982).  In contrast, 
personal distress being self-focused is thought disrupt the empathy/sympathy link to 
altruism/prosocial behavior (e.g. Batson & Coke, 1981; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a). Therefore, in addition to having a commonality in the way 
emotion may be managed, they both are suggestive of other-focused orientation as well.   
However, there may be differences in how these concepts are practiced. For 
example, one of the methods in emotion regulation would be to shift attention elsewhere. 
In mindfulness, unpleasant emotions are not denied so attention shifting would not be a 
way in which an individual would act mindfully. Further research is needed to understand 
how these two constructs may be similar and different. It is possible that these two 
constructs conceptualized in different traditions are getting at something similar in how 
emotion is handled successfully in order to act compassionately or altruistically.  
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 Kindness may be a point of commonality between compassion and sympathy. In 
sympathy, there is concern and in compassion there is kindness and understanding thus 
suggesting that there is positive emotion for another in both constructs.  
 One of the most obvious differences between compassion and altruism is that 
altruism includes an act or a behavior. Thus, it distinguishes itself from compassion and 
other internal subjective states such as empathy and sympathy. However, as previously 
noted, altruism conveys a meaning that is not just a behavior, but a particular type of 
behavior that is tied to an internal states characterized by giving without expectation of 
personal return. Thus, altruism shares an other-focused element also theorized to be part 
of sympathy and compassion. Thus, altruism straddles between behavior and motivation 
and is inclusive of both.  
 As suggested among other constructs, there may be a developmental link between 
compassion and altruism. Empathy, sympathy, and compassion may be internal states 
that occur prior and may act as a precursor to altruism. Much of the research on empathy 
and sympathy is devoted to understanding and establishing the link between empathy/ 
sympathy and altruism/prosocial behavior. The general perspective is that there is a link. 
Theoretically, compassion may be a state that provides the motivation via the wish to 
alleviate the suffering of others to act and to act altruistically. The Dalai Lama (2002b, p. 
91) says that when Buddhist practitioners meditate on compassion and actively cultivate 
the emotion, they are eventually compelled to engage in acts of compassion “like a mad 
dog.” Thus, theoretically there is presumed to be link between the internal state of 




Helping, volunteerism, and cooperation 
 A variety of behaviors including volunteerism, helping, and cooperation have 
been discussed in association with altruism and are presumed to have some association 
with empathy, sympathy, and compassion. They are all constructs theorized to involve a 
contribution to others that is beneficial. Distinguishing and pinpointing the meaning of 
these terms can sometimes be difficult. Thus, the following sections will attempt to: 1) 
make some basic distinctions between these terms; and 2) clarify some of the various 
proposed aspects of these behaviors and report their respective research histories in order 
to compare them to the construct of interest, compassion. 
 Both volunteerism (Clary et al., 1998; Wilson, 2000) and helping (Dovidio, 1984) 
are presumed to include cognitive deliberation that involves weighing the pros and cons 
in order to decide to initiate service. Helping is considered to have a much shorter 
duration of deliberation as it been traditionally defined in helping research as assistance 
that is one-time and immediate; often they are emergency situations (Clary et al., 1998). 
Volunteerism, therefore differs in that it is assumed to have more time for deliberation 
and can involve more proactive premeditation or planning (Clary et al., 1998). It is this 
time element coupled with the possibility of repeated acts of service in volunteerism that 
allows for the possibility of making a commitment (Wilson, 2000). It is also this element 
that some suggests makes volunteering less demanding than helping because the situation 
is less urgent (Clary & Snyder, 1999; Wilson, 2000).  
 Cooperation is dissimilar to volunteerism and helping on a number of levels.  
However, before comparing and contrasting cooperation to volunteerism and helping, it 
should be noted that cooperation can be quite confusing because it can be used with 
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multiple meanings. In common vernacular, cooperation can be used as term that simply 
means to comply. For example, the term is often used when arresting criminals. 
Cooperation in this instance means that the criminal does not try to escape arrest; they 
comply. However, often in research it is clear that cooperation means exchange (e.g. 
Ferrin et al, 2008; Biele et al., 2008). Clearly, there is no exchange for a criminal if they 
cooperate. In fact, in those instances, cooperation means that they are arrested and loose 
their freedom. Adding further complexity to the term is different contextual aspects that 
can tweak the meaning as well. It is possible for cooperation to occur in a dyad, but it is 
also possible for cooperation to occur in a group where members work together for a 
common goal or good. These differing contexts can have an impact on the meaning of 
cooperation as well. For simplicity’s sake the type of cooperation discussed here will be 
the one used most in research involving an exchange relationship. 
Cooperation may have a few similarities to volunteerism and helping. 
Cooperation is similar to volunteerism in that cooperation takes place over time and 
volunteerism has the option of doing so as well. Also, all three constructs involve 
deliberation to act and can be beneficial to others.  
However, cooperation differs greatly from helping and volunteerism in that 
cooperation involves an on-going exchange between parties of interest. There are no 
return expectations in volunteerism and helping even if one does receive benefits (Smith, 
1981), and the act is conducted with the intention to benefit others (Wilson, 2000). In 
cooperation, benefiting others would not be the main objective. The impetus to cooperate 
is to receive personal benefit. Thus, the decision to continue a relationship based on 
cooperation involves the assessment of the viability of that personal benefit.  
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Thus, cooperation involves a sense of mutuality (Ferrin et al., 2008), trust (Ferrin 
et al., 2008; Irwin et al., 2008) and reinforcement (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Biele et 
al., 2008). Parties engage in a mutually beneficial association where each party trusts the 
other to hold up their part of the bargain in the relationship. As each party follows 
through delivering their expected part in the dynamic, the relationship is reinforced as a 
successful cooperative bond. Ferrin and colleagues (2008) refer to this constant cognitive 
reassessment of the viability of the relationship as “spirals.” Thus, spiraling continues to 
occur only when each party is personally satisfied with the benefits received. Therefore, 
cooperation is an act that may be mutually beneficial but is primarily engaged in by a 
party in order to maximize self-interest. In other words, in general, individuals do not 
cooperate solely for the good of others. The motivation that drives the process and 
continuation of cooperation is egoistic.   
 Given a sense of these various constructs and how they differ from each other, 
each construct can now be discussed in turn and then compared to compassion. 
Volunteerism, like altruism is an act or a behavior. Compassion is theorized to be a 
precursor to altruism and in some instances altruism can take the form of volunteerism 
(e.g. Clary et al., 1998; Plummer et al., 2008). However, the same problem exists in 
volunteerism as it did in altruism, and that is that individuals can have many reasons for 
volunteering (Smith, 1981; Clary et al., 1996; 1998; Clary & Synder, 1999; Okun et al., 
1998). For example, just a few of the suggested reasons include seeking out feelings of 
satisfaction (Alessandrini, 2007; Smith, 1981; Switzer et al., 1997), personal connection 
to a cause (Alessandrini, 2007; Switzer et al., 1997; Plummer et al., 2008; Wilson, 2000), 
social obligation (Alessandrini, 2007; Switzer et al., 1997), faith and religion 
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(Alessandrini, 2007; Plummer et al., 2008), values acquired from parents (Alessandrini, 
2007; Wilson, 2000), and the desire to keep busy and for job training purposes (Smith, 
1981). Thus, there are many other reasons why a person might volunteer other than 
having compassionate feelings for someone in pain. 
 Despite the fact that altruism and compassion might not be the only reasons that 
individuals volunteer, it still may function as a manifestation of those attributes in some 
instances. Some theorists do believe that altruism is primary in the volunteering process 
(Alessandrini, 2007; Plummer et al., 2008). Sprecher & Fehr (2005) found that their 
conceptualization of compassion, compassionate love was found to be positively 
correlated with volunteerism. Further empathy, as a related construct was found to be 
associated with giving in an interview study of philanthropists (Monroe, 1996). Oliner & 
Oliner (1988) found that empathy was an important factor in those who decided to help 
Jews during the holocaust. Bekkers (2005) found a correlation between empathetic 
concern and voluntary participation. However, in a follow up study Bekkers (2006) found 
no relationship between empathetic concern and blood and organ donation. Additionally, 
in another study, Davis and colleagues (2003) found no correlation between empathy and 
longevity in volunteering. Penner and colleagues (1995) found no statistically significant 
relationship between empathy and informal helping behaviors.  
 Therefore, from this research it is unclear what relationship volunteering has to 
compassion and related constructs. The confusion in results may lie in two factors: 1) due 
to the fact that individuals volunteer for many reasons, it may be hard to pinpoint the 
relationship between compassion and volunteering even though compassion may be the 
motivating element in some instances; and 2) related constructs such as empathy may be 
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different enough to provide insufficient information about how compassion relates to 
volunteering and should not necessarily be taken as a marker of the relationship between 
the two constructs. 
 In those instances where volunteerism may be motivated by compassion, it is 
theorized that kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness may help to facilitate the 
process of engaging in those acts. 
 Being mindful and keeping emotional perspective allows one to withstand the 
suffering of others. Those who volunteer presumably would be individuals who are 
capable of managing their emotional responses to suffering in order to aid others. Thus, 
they are open to the needs in their community and aware of what may be happening 
globally. Awareness of needs is a practical starting point for an individual to contemplate 
volunteering. If one can accept that there is suffering it becomes possible to consider 
doing something about it. Denial or disengagement from others suffering would thwart 
the process because it would stymie acknowledgement of other’s pain, suffering, and 
need. 
 Recognizing one’s own common humanity in relation to others may motivate 
volunteers to understand that the plight of the people they volunteer to help. The 
homeless, disabled, poor, sick, or old are people that are recognized as no different than 
the volunteer. Common humanity acts as a universal denominator. While engaging in 
service, the volunteer begins to realize through the stories of the individuals that they 
could easily be in the place of those they help. Thus, there is a sense of “there but for the 
grace of God, go I”. 
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 Kindness may also function as a way to create closeness between the volunteer 
and those being helped. Feelings of understanding and warmth lend to connecting with 
individuals who need help and may even make the volunteer feel compelled to do 
whatever necessary to aid those in need. 
 Helping is viewed by some as an over-arching construct under which 
volunteerism falls (e.g. Wilson, 2000). However, helping research has had a long history 
of viewing the construct in terms of immediate and often urgent assistance (Clary et al., 
1998). Perhaps, research has been influenced by the famous case of Kitty Genovese. 
Kitty was a woman who was attacked and killed by a man in Queens, New York but 
received no help from almost forty bystanders in nearby buildings who could have 
provided her with assistance. Sparking research on the reasons why people do or do not 
help, Latane & Darley in a series of studies found two prevalent situational factors that 
detract from helping: 1) individuals tend to help less with more people around, perhaps 
due to a diffused sense of responsibility when others are available to help; and 2) 
individuals tend to help less when others do not take action; presumably individuals take 
cues from others in the situation to decide whether or not to interpret a situation as an 
emergency and act (e.g. Latane & Darley, 1968; 1970; Darley & Latane, 1968a, 1968b).  
 In another classic study, Darley & Batson (1973) showed that time constraints can 
compete with the desire to help and thus prove to be a situational factor that limits 
helping behavior as well. The finding was particularly poignant being that the pool of 
participants were Princeton Theological Seminary students who would feasibly be 
expected to be disposed to helping others (Reynolds & Karraker, 2003). A variety of 
costs in helping in general can detract from assisting others (Dovidio, 1984). Examples of 
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various costs include feeling too much aversion (Piliavin et al., 1975), being afraid of 
harm (Shotland & Straw, 1976), loss of personal freedom (Berkowitz, 1973), not feeling 
capable or fearful of causing more harm in attempting to help (Ashton & Severy, 1976; 
Schwartz & David, 1976).  
 However, other situational factors may facilitate helping. The converse of 
diffused responsibility and lack of helping suggests that when people are alone they are 
more likely to help because they feel the weight of responsibility to act when there is no 
one else available to do so (Staub, 1970). Further, making need for help clear may 
influence others as well. For example, it has been found that when individuals call out for 
help, they are more likely to receive it (Staub, 1978; Pilavin et al., 1981).  
 Various researchers indicate that these situational factors may have little to do 
with a disposition that generally lends itself to helping (e.g. Ross & Nisbett, 1991; 
Reynolds & Karraker, 2003). For example, Reynolds & Karraker (2003) suggest that in 
the study with seminary students pressed for time, that conscientiousness may have been 
the key determining factor that motivated students to assist as opposed to the desire or 
willingness to help. Further, Mikulincer & Shaver (2005) report that another dispositional 
factor may impact helping. They suggest that those who were made to feel safe and 
secure in experimentally induced interventions or those who just feel secure generally are 
more likely to help others as well.  
 In fact, helping in Western contexts has often been viewed as a function of 
disposition or identity in that it is often assumed that individuals who conceptualize 
themselves as the type of person who help are also the individuals presumed to follow 
through and engage in helpful behaviors (Batson et al., 1979; Bierhoff, 2002; Penner & 
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Finkelstein, 1998; Piliavin & Callero, 1991; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Strenta & Dejong, 
1981). Gilbert (2005) points out that compassion is a function of learning to let go of 
building up, defending, and maintaining self-identity. When there is less emphasis on the 
self it frees one up to focus on and help others. Oddly, it seems that the two perspectives 
are providing almost directly opposing views with one suggesting that identity and self 
are central to helping while the other suggests that letting go of the focus on self leads to 
helping. Perhaps, the diverse perspectives on helping are understood through a cultural 
lens in these two groups. In Western circles, individualism may be pervasive enough to 
be an organizing factor for understanding self and others while in more collective 
cultures generally associated with Eastern perspectives focus more on others than the 
self.  
 In any case, similar to altruism and volunteerism, there are many reasons why 
individuals are motivated to help. Thus, giving more complexity to the context of helping 
are not only situational and dispositional factors, but also motivational factors. Various 
reasons offered for helping include but are not limited to moral reasoning (Underwood & 
Moore, 1982), as a function of learned behavior (Dovidio, 1984), a variety of different 
social expectations (Berkowitz, 1972; Gouldner, 1960; Karylowski, 1982; Schwartz & 
Howard, 1982; Weiner, 1980), self-serving or egoistic reasons (Batson et al., 1981), 
helper’s high where assisting creates a good feeling (Post, 2005), and feeling a sense of 
similarity with the victim (Batson et al., 1981; Burnstein et al., 1994; Hornstein, 1978; 
Levine et al., 2005; Park & Schaller, 2005). It is this cognitive factor where one feels 
similar to the helpee that some believe facilitate empathy-motivated helping (Hornstein, 
1978; Turner et al., 1987).  
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 Thus, empathy also is another motivational factor that is assumed to contribute to 
helping. A long-standing tradition focuses efforts in finding support for a connection 
between empathy and helping (alternatively referred to as altruism and/or prosocial 
behavior) in empathy/sympathy research (e.g. Batson, et al., 1986; Bierhoff et al., 1991; 
Eisenberg, 1983; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987a; 1987b; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Fultz et al., 
1986). Compassion is often lumped in with empathy and sympathy, thus all of those 
constructs are thought to be associated with helping. Compassion is assumed to manifest 
itself in helping behavior (e.g. Batson et al., 2001; 2008; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992).  
Interestingly, although helping behavior is also assumed to be linked to 
compassionate behavior in Buddhism, there is additional emphasis on tolerance, patience, 
and acceptance in regard to others. The Dalai Lama is fond of saying that if an individual 
wants to practice compassion then the best teacher is the individual’s enemies (Dalai 
Lama, 1984; 1995; 1997). It requires a great deal of tolerance, patience, and acceptance 
in order to treat one’s enemies as well as one would his loved ones and is considered to 
elicit compassion. This conceptualization of the ways in which compassion manifests 
itself is a departure from the common Western understanding of viewing compassion 
solely in terms of helping behavior. 
 Compassion is often considered to a natural reason for helping. In several studies, 
helping is assumed to be a behavioral manifestation of compassion (e.g. Batson et al., 
2001; 2008; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992) despite the many other reasons previously 
discussed that could motivate helping. Theoretically, compassion is defined as a 
motivator that elicits helping (Lazarus, 1991; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). In Mahayana 
Buddhism, great compassion is defined as the commitment to attain enlightenment in 
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order to help others attain it as well (Hopkins, 1999). The Dalai Lama indicates that those 
who cultivate compassion in meditation will be motivated to act on it “like a mad dog” 
(2002b, p. 91) 
 While not the only reason for helping, compassion may contribute to helping. 
Specifically, the three elements of compassion namely kindness, common humanity, and 
mindfulness may shed light on how compassion functions in order to elicit helping. 
Kindness in its warmth and understanding may create a connection between the helper 
and the helpee thus facilitating the will to act. Kindness may eradicate the indifference 
necessary to refrain from helping in many instances. Thus, when feeling kindness for 
someone it is more difficult to ignore or discredit that individual’s suffering. 
 Common humanity serves as platform for understanding someone’s plight from a 
shared position. If the helpee’s humanity is recognized in connection to one own’s 
humanity then it may function as a catalyst for helping. This is very similar to previous 
studies mentioned where being part of an in-group or seeing the victim as similar to the 
self may facilitate helping. In these studies the point of similarity may be race, gender, 
culture, or affiliation to any number of groups. Common humanity is more inclusive and 
leaves little room for out-groups. In fact in Buddhism, the recognition of suffering 
extends to all sentient beings. Therefore, common humanity may be an element that 
serves as a springboard for compassionate action more generally because of its inclusive 
nature (in contrast to in-group identifications). As previously mentioned, an illustration of 
common humanity as a catalyst for helping occurred in Nazi Germany. Germans that 
helped Jews during the war indicated that they viewed those individuals as similar 
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because they were human whereas those who did not help saw Jews as outsiders (Oliner 
& Oliner, 1988).  
 Mindfulness or allowing for emotional balance may permit an individual to 
recognize and subsequently respond to others who need help. If overwhelmed with 
emotion, an individual may deny or ignore the suffering of others. Thus, mindfulness 
may allow for the process to be initiated permitting feelings of kindness and common 
humanity to follow.  
 Cooperation takes a departure from volunteerism and helping as discussed 
previously because it involves exchange and it predicated on egoistic benefit. 
Comparably, it differs from compassion in several ways as well. Similar to volunteerism 
and helping compassion is not dependent on reciprocity (Mercadillo et al., 2007). 
Subsequently, the dynamic then does not lend itself to requiring much trust or 
reinforcement like cooperation does. The motivation in compassion is not egoistic and 
therefore there is little expectation of return (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990) whereas the 
relationship in cooperation is dependent on it. Therefore, due to the emphasis on         
self-benefit in cooperation the elements of kindness, mindfulness, and common humanity 
would not be primary as motivators and/or a necessary functional aspect in the dynamic. 
If present, it would be assumed that it would be secondary or incidental to the first 
primary purpose of cooperation, namely to give only in expectation of return.  
Love 
 The word love is a term that conveys many different nuances of meaning and is 
considered to be classified by its many types. Thus it has been referred to as a 
prototypical emotion and various psychologists have proposed different numbers of 
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typologies including two (Hatfield & Walster, 1978; Maslow, 1955), three (Kelley, 1983; 
Shaver et al., 1987), five (Fromm, 1956), six (Lee, 1977), seven (Kemper, 1978), and 
eight (Sternberg, 1986). The types are varied and include such examples as parent-infant 
love (Kemper, 1978), brotherly or motherly love (Fromm, 1956), erotic or passionate 
love (Lee, 1997), and agapic or altruistic love (Lee, 1977).  Most research has focused 
specifically on the type of love that occurs within romantic relationships (Sprecher & 
Fehr, 2005).  
However, the type of love that is most relevant and comparable to compassion is 
love that has been referred to by a variety of names such as altruistic love (Kelley, 1983; 
Sprecher & Fehr, 2005), giving love, unconditional love (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005), and 
agape (Lee, 1977). It is the type of love that is given without an expectation of a return; 
other-centered love. This type of love is what Sprecher & Fehr (2005) define as 
compassionate love. In that conceptualization, compassion is a type of love and the 
qualities of that love are characterized by a sort of self-less giving to others.  
The term “compassionate love” originated within a World Health Organization 
work group consisting of individuals from various cultures and religious traditions 
(Underwood, 2002). The group was posed with the task of developing an instrument to 
measure spiritual quality of life. Across traditions, other-centered love or compassion 
seemed to be a key aspect of in spiritual life. In conceptualizing a term to capture this 
meaning, love alone was viewed as too confusing given the many typologies of love. 
Compassion was viewed as too limited and failed to encompass “some of the emotional 
and transcendent components of which the word love brings in” (Underwood, 2002, p. 
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78). Thus, the combination of the two was thought to properly convey this spiritually 
relevant construct. 
However, within Buddhist circles, compassion is salient and is functionally used 
as a stand-alone concept. It could be considered that the motivation behind the Buddha’s 
spiritual journey was the realization of suffering, an essential component to compassion. 
However, love and compassion are considered to be strongly related in Buddhist thinking 
(Gilbert, 2005; Glaser, 2005; Nagao, 2000; Salzberg, 1995). Glaser (2005) reports that 
there was a great Tibetan teacher who was once asked to explain the relationship between 
love and compassion. He reportedly held out a napkin and said that one side was love and 
that the other was compassion. Thus, Glaser (2005, p. 25) states “in essence, love and 
compassion are two aspects of one mind.” Clearly, that indicates the strong link between 
the two constructs.  
Despite how closely related the two constructs are the distinction between them in 
Buddhism is fairly straightforward. While compassion is the wish to alleviate suffering of 
others, love is the wish for the happiness of others (Dalai Lama, 2001; Glaser, 2005; 
Goleman, 2003; Hopkins, 2001; Ladner, 1999; 2004). Both constructs share a focus on 
being other-centered but the purpose of that focus is either happiness or alleviation of 
suffering. This other-centered focus is well captured in the term “compassionate love.” 
However, in terms of understanding the concept of compassion, the wish for the 
happiness of others or to alleviate suffering is not distinguished in the construct of 





Chapter Three: Compassion & Other Constructs  
The following sections will further clarify and define compassion presenting a 
variety of associated constructs in order to compare and contrast them to compassion. 
The constructs are grouped by one of three clusters: 1) constructs often confused with 
compassion; 2) functionally related constructs; and 3) similar constructs related to     
well-being. In each of the sections and within the review of each construct the elements 
inclusive of compassion including kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness will be 
utilized to distinguish how these various constructs are similar and/or different from 
compassion. 
Constructs often confused with compassion 
In this section, constructs that are often considered to be synonymous with 
compassion will be discussed. However, unlike the previous constructs discussed, it will 
be the contention here that they are not conceptually similar to compassion, and that these 
constructs are merely confused with/or for compassion. Each construct will be presented 
and an explanation of how they differ from compassion will be outlined. Constructs in 
this section include niceness, pity & charity, naïveté & weakness, and sacrifice.  
Niceness. Compassion is viewed as a type of emotion that is associated with nice 
behavior. However, there are times in which compassion can be confused with niceness. 
Glaser (2005, p.47) mentions that niceness is sometimes referred to as “idiot compassion” 
because trying to appear to be a nice person can be a masquerade for compassion. 
Therefore, the implication here is that the motivation behind the emotion determines the 
nature of the emotion itself. In some instances, nice behavior can be motivated by merely 
wishing to be liked (Ladner, 2004). This motivation is clearly very different from the 
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self-less wish to alleviate the suffering of others associated with compassion. The 
primary difference is whether or not the motivation and subsequent behavior is focused 
on the self or other. Niceness driven by the need to uphold and promote the self is 
practically the exact opposite to compassion. Compassion is driven by the wish to 
alleviate suffering of others and the focus is not on promoting the self. Interestingly, on 
the façade, judging only by behavior they can seem the same.  
 Ladner (2004) suggests that compassion can at times appear to be quite active and 
even fierce. For example, when a loved one is in danger a mild or soft response may not 
be very compassionate. Compassionate action in this instance may be vigorous and quick 
in order to assist the loved one. Further, there are times in which being compassionate 
may mean being brave and facing up to personal fears to reach out and feel the suffering 
of others. At these times, it is the element of mindfulness that services compassionate 
individuals to balance their emotions in order for compassion to evolve. Facing fear and 
acting brave, for example are not soft or fuzzy sorts of behaviors; they require great 
strength.  
Pity and charity. Pity has often been defined and used synonymously with 
compassion because both constructs imply an emotional response to another where 
suffering is recognized (Cassell, 2002). In fact, Nussbaum (1996) indicates that 
historically it wasn’t until the Victorian era that pity began to take on connotations of 
condescension in response to the sufferer. Kornfield (1988) reports that pity is called the 
near enemy of compassion in Buddhism because it can appear to be the same in some 
instances. However, there is a difference and the main distinction is that there is a sense 
of superiority in pity that is absent in compassion (Blum, 1980; Cassell, 2002; Dalai 
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Lama, 2002c; Fox, 1990; Glaser, 2005; Kornfield, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & 
Lazarus, 1994; Rinpoche, 1992; Wachhotlz & Pearce, 2007). Pity can result in a 
downward comparison of the sufferer (e.g. Cassell, 2002; Dalai Lama, 2002c) that 
suggests that the sufferer is not worthy of concern (Lazarus, 1991). The individual who 
pities another sees the sufferer as separate and different (Kornfield, 1988). This view 
helps to drive a wedge further between the conceptualization of the self and individual 
that is suffering. 
In contrast, compassion is open to pain and does not build up boundaries between 
the self and the sufferer (Fox, 1990; Neff, 2003a; 2003b). It fails to assume the inferiority 
of the individual who suffers (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). Common humanity is the 
function that creates a sense of equality between the sufferer and the self because it 
recognizes the pain of others as something that the self is also prone to experience. 
Individuals experiencing common humanity recognize that everyone deserves 
compassion for the sole reason that they are in pain (Blum, 1980). Pity fails to observe 
this common ground. One way that pity can function is to disassociate through blame. 
The individual who is suffering is viewed as culpable for their misfortune and the 
individual who pities assumes that they could never be in such a predicament (Blum, 
1980; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). It may be assumed that the sufferer is 
weak and brought on their own failure (von Dietze & Orb, 2000; Wachholtz & Pearce, 
2007). Further, it is suggested that pity in general does not provide the motivation to 
reduce the suffering of others (Blum, 1980; Wachholtz & Pearce, 2007) while in 
compassion the motivation to act is considered imperative (Dalai Lama, 2002b).  
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Pity may be transformed into action in cases of charity and thus may be the 
exception to the general premise that pity does not lead to helping behavior. Charity, 
similar to pity has connotations of superiority. There is not a sense of equality between 
the donor and recipient of the help. Thus, charity like pity lacks a sense of common 
humanity where the donor and recipient are perceived as equals. Additionally, the helping 
behavior may not be an act of kindness, but one that is engaged in for the purpose of 
bolstering the image of the donor. Thus, the donor is viewed as an individual who does 
charity work and helps those who are “less fortunate” in order to be perceived as an 
upstanding community member. In those instances, the intention behind the helping 
behavior is not compassionate because its purpose is not kindness but self-aggrandizing. 
Compassion exudes kindness. There is a sense of closeness in compassion while 
in pity there is only a sense of distance (Glaser, 2005). In compassion an individual feels 
concern (Dalai Lama, 2002c) but in contrast, the feeling in pity consists of distain and 
contempt (Lazarus, 1991). Pity lacks respect (Dalai Lama, 2002c; Glaser, 2005) and 
strips dignity from the sufferer (von Dietze & Orb, 2000). This is why in some instances 
pity is responded to as an insult and is rejected (Cassell, 2002). Thus, compassion 
consists of a kind response while pity is a cold reaction to the suffering of others.  
Compassion also exhibits mindfulness, or emotional balance. In contrast, it is 
possible that pity may be influenced by the emotional reactions of fear and anger. For 
example, Rinpoche (1992) suggests that pity can buffer fear. Pity creates a sense of relief 
because it protects against seeing the self in the same position as the sufferer. The 
individual who pities can evade their feelings of fear distancing themselves and thus 
avoiding real contemplation of suffering and pain. von Dietze & Orb (2000, p. 169) 
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suggests that the individual who pities can literally say to themselves that, “I’m glad it is 
not me.” Pity, in this instance would act as a defense for the self. In compassion, the 
mindfulness aspect would keep the fear response in check thus allowing for a more open 
response that has no need to protect the self. Pity can also act as a function of anger 
(Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). When offended, pity can act as an attack to degrade and 
debase another. When someone says “I pity you” they may be suggesting pity as an insult 
implying a lower status to the object of their affront. In a mindful response, the anger 
would not be overindulged in and the resulting response may be more likely to be 
compassion. 
Naïveté and weakness. Compassion is sometimes confused with naïveté, 
foolishness (Ladner, 2004), or even stupidity (Glaser, 2005; Hopkins, 2001). The 
kindness in compassion is assumed to cloud an individual’s reasoning to the point where 
it is possible to be taken advantage of or manipulated. Thus, this orientation is thought to 
be connected with an overly trusting view of others (Hopkins, 2001). Compassion, as an 
emotion is assumed to override our mental capacities rendering our thinking fuzzy or 
irrational. Thus, compassion is proposed to be a dangerous response that may lead us to 
disaster (Ladner, 2004). McNeill and colleagues (1982) suggests that we are skeptical 
about envisioning a world that is governed by compassion. He indicates that “the idea of 
such a world strikes us as naïve, romantic, or at least unrealistic” and that “for those who 
do not live in a dream world can keep their eyes open to the facts of life, compassion can 
at most be a small and subservient part of our competitive existence” (McNeill at al., 
1982, p. 5). Therefore, at the level of society, compassion is viewed as unrealistic and at 
the level of an individual compassion is portrayed as an unwise choice. 
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This unwise choice of succumbing to an emotional response is presumed to 
override our cognitive abilities to think through a situation. Therefore, in this line of 
thinking, compassion is thought to be a weak response (Gilbert & Irons, 2005; Hopkins, 
2001; Ladner, 2004). Salzberg (1997) indicates that she travels to various places in the 
world to teach the Buddhist principles of loving-kindness, sympathetic joy, equanimity, 
and compassion and has repeatedly encountered the assumption that these states imply 
vulnerability, weakness, and idealism. She indicates that students report that, “If I am 
loving and compassionate, I will allow myself to be abused and hurt” and “To me those 
are sweet sentiments, but it’s not really possible to live like that” (Salzberg, 1997, p. 30).  
However, these perceptions of compassion may be misguided. Some have 
proposed that compassion is not unintelligent (Dalai Lama, 1995; Glaser, 2005; Hopkins, 
2001), and does require strength or courage to display (Chodron, 2002; Dalai Lama, 
1995; Gilbert & Irons, 2005; Hopkins, 2001; Ladner, 2004; Salzberg, 1997).  
 Mindfulness may be a key element that provides the emotional balance necessary 
to allow an individual to think through a compassionate response not only with kindness 
but with intelligence as well. It functions in such a way that any possible emotional 
imbalance no longer acts as a barrier to careful and wise consideration of a situation. The 
presumption of kindness running amok without intelligent contemplation creates a false 
impression that compassion can result in a foolish or unintelligent response. The response 
is considered to be foolish because it is presumed to fail to take into consideration the 
safety and the well being of the donor (Brown, 1996).  
However, the Dalai Lama (2002a) explains that a compassionate response is a 
very intelligent response because it benefits both the recipient and the donor. Both feel 
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happy as a result of receiving and giving compassion. However, if an individual acts in 
anger or hatred, then both the angry individual and the recipient feel unhappy. The 
recipient suffers from the attack and the angry individual suffers from merely holding on 
to angry feelings (Ladner, 2004). Further, the angry individual is likely to only receive a 
similarly negative response back from the recipient thus creating a cycle of anger and 
unhappiness. It is wise or intelligent to choose the response that will benefit all parties 
involved. Embracing a sense of common humanity can facilitate this response. 
Understanding that all human beings want to be happy and avoid suffering helps to 
imagine how undesirable it is to be the recipient of angry feelings thus giving us pause 
when deciding to act in anger. Similarly, compassion becomes more natural to offer to 
others because we understand it as a response we wish from others for ourselves. In 
Christianity this principle is known as the golden rule that is “to do unto others as you 
would have done to yourself.” 
Individuals may feel that this logic fails them when they feel attacked or 
vulnerable. To protect themselves they go on the defense. This dualistic thinking of either 
having the choice to be vulnerable or to attack in defense is countered by the Dalai Lama 
(2002a, p. 56) when he says that,  “Another question is that if you always remain humble 
then others may take advantage of you and how should you react? It is quite simple: you 
should act with wisdom and common sense, without anger and hatred.” This statement 
suggests that it is possible to act with kindness, refrain from anger and hatred and still 
have an intelligent response. To be kind does not necessarily mean that an individual is 
not aware of the possible ill motivations and intentions of others. 
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 Hopkins (2001) suggests that it is not necessary to trust indiscriminately to be 
compassionate. In fact, once it is understood that all human beings want happiness and do 
not want suffering, it is also realized that it is possible that some individuals will go to 
any means to achieve those ends. Stosny concurs (2004) indicating that it is not the 
failure of compassion that leads to harm but unwise trust. Therefore, it is proposed that 
kindness can be felt and acted on without being unwisely or indiscriminately trusting. 
This sentiment is also conveyed in Christian doctrine when Jesus sends his disciples out 
to be, “sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as 
doves” (Matthew 10:16) (Authorized King James Version). Once the fear of being 
harmed is diminished and compassion is offered it is more likely for the other to return 
the response in kind thus creating a cycle of compassion that is not likely to lead to any 
party taking advantage of the other (The Chinese Brahma’s Net Sutra, 2004). 
Thus, wisdom is considered to be an important counterpart to compassion in 
Buddhism. Wisdom acts as a base of knowledge to effectively act compassionately. An 
interesting difference in this Eastern concept is that there is an assumption that wisdom 
and compassion can work in consort with each other. In Western circles, compassion is 
often viewed as lacking wisdom, but more profoundly it appears that it is assumed that if 
an individual acts compassionately it is not possible to act with wisdom simultaneously.  
Compassion can not only be misperceived as an unintelligent response but it is 
also sometimes seen as a failing or weakness. However, in order to be mindful and 
present with the suffering of others it requires that we do not turn away or avoid pain. 
This takes great strength and courage. Chodron (2002) suggests that being compassionate 
is a challenge because it requires an open heart that does not shut down or push away 
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from what is unpleasant. Keeping the emotional balance that occurs in mindfulness 
provides us with the platform of strength to directly face pain in order to feel compassion 
and help others. Salzberg (1997) suggests that sometimes our fear runs away with us and 
we convince ourselves that we are being compassionate when we do not act in some 
situations. However, in fact, we are really afraid to confront a person or situation. 
Ironically, the compassionate response may be to do the exact opposite and confront the 
situation. For example, Bates (2005) indicates that it takes courage and strength to 
confront someone else who is engaging in acts that are self-harmful. In these cases 
compassion may even be perceived as fierce (Ladner, 2004). Thus, it becomes possible to 
become a warrior for compassion (Ladner, 2004).  
It is also takes strength to keep in mind the common humanity of others, and 
continually act in accordance with an understanding that loved ones, strangers, and 
enemies are all equal (Hopkins, 2001). They are equal because they are all individuals 
who are human and share in a common human experience. From a personal perspective, 
however, it is easy to forget this and see these individuals differently based on how we 
perceive and interact with others. Approaching someone that we do not like with 
compassion requires a great deal of strength.  
Sacrifice. Sacrifice may often be assumed to be a part of compassion. For 
example, in Christianity, Jesus sacrificed his life in order to pay for the sins of 
humankind. This could be considered as an ultimate act of compassion, to lay down one’s 
life to take away the suffering of others. However, some Buddhist thinkers suggest that 
what may appear to be sacrifice can actually be something quite different. Ladner (2004, 
p. 25) suggests that, “what appears to be self-sacrifice is actually an advanced form of 
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taking care of yourself.” To explain, the element of common humanity within 
compassion becomes a helpful concept. As an individual develops a stronger sense of 
common humanity with others, the boundary between self and other becomes less rigid. 
The value of others becomes on par with one’s own value as an individual due to a 
recognition of shared human experience. To act compassionately towards others is as 
valuable to the donor as it is to the recipient because the boundary between the donor and 
the recipient is less distinguished when common humanity is realized. Ladner (2004) 
underscores this process indicating that “when you get to that level, sacrificing yourself 
to take care of others becomes naturally a way of achieving your own highest welfare at 
the same time.” He suggests that “genuine compassion for others never harms and only 
benefits us” (p. 23).  
 Salzberg (1995) illustrates this understanding in a very frightening story where a 
drunken man in India accosted her. She thought the drunken man was going to 
successfully drag her away and harm her, but her friend was able to pull her away from 
him. When she arrived at her destination and relayed the story to her meditation teacher, 
he reportedly said to her, “Oh, Sharon, with all the loving-kindness in your heart, you 
should have taken your umbrella and hit that man over the head with it” (p. 103). The 
point of the story was to illustrate that compassion need not be confused with passiveness 
or permissiveness of abuse. This illustrates the angle that recognizing common humanity 
of others also means recognizing one’s own participation in that common humanity. As 
the value of others is on par with the self, so is the self on par with the value of others. 
The work of Neff (2003a; 2003b; 2007) and the development of the concept of           
self-compassion for Western audiences illustrate the importance of this understanding.  
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Additionally, Gilbert’s (2005) work with compassionate mind training utilizes this 
understanding to help clients with difficult past experiences to overcome destructive   
self-to-self relationships that devalue the self in relation to others. However, one 
important caveat here is that this should not be confused with selfishness or undue      
self-focus. In those instances, the self is promoted over others as more valuable and a 
sense of common humanity is lost. If an individual views the self as more than others it is 
impossible to truly feel a sense of common humanity. The Dalai Lama (2002a, p. 83) 
suggests that this type of self-centeredness or “self-cherishing” is the cause of most 
individual’s “troubles, worries, and sadness in life.” Therefore, the notion suggests that 
the self is as valuable as others but it is not more valuable than others, either.  
 To further demonstrate this point, Salzberg (1995) relays another story. Her 
meditation teacher posed a dilemma to her. He suggested that she imagine that she and a 
benefactor, a friend, a neutral person, and an enemy were walking in the forest and were 
confronted by a bandit. The bandit asks her to select one of the members of the group to 
die so that the others may live. Her meditation teacher then asked her which one would 
she sacrifice, and if she would sacrifice herself. Salzberg (1995) indicated: 
He asked me the question as if more than anything else in the world he wanted me 
to say, “yes, I’d sacrifice myself.” A lot of conditioning rose up in me—an urge to 
please him, to be “right,” to win approval. But there was no way I could honestly 
say yes, so I said, “No, I can’t see any difference between myself and any of the 
others.” (p. 37-38) 
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The point of the exercise was to recognize the value of all the members of the group, the 
self was as important as the enemy, the benefactor, or the neutral person. All were 
considered as valuable as the other. 
 Allen & Knight (2005) suggest that this misunderstanding of compassion occurs 
in therapeutic settings as well. They suggest that at times, working with the concept of 
compassion clients misunderstand it to mean subordination. Allen & Knight (2005) 
suggest this can be damaging particularly to depressed clients who may have trouble 
affirming their own self-compassion. Further, Worthington and colleagues (2005) 
indicate that the misunderstanding can hinder clients in working through anger or leave 
them vulnerable to feelings of guilt. Indeed, compassion does not mean subordination and 
the misinterpretation of the concept in these instances may be disruptive to the 
therapeutic process.  
 Therefore, sacrifice can often appear to be a part of compassion, but various 
theorists, researchers, and therapists suggest that compassion should not be equated with 
devaluing the self or subordinating the self to others.  
 
Constructs functionally related to compassion 
In this section, constructs considered to be functionally related to compassion will 
be discussed. These constructs either facilitate compassion or compassion facilitates 
them. First in this section is wisdom. In Buddhist circles, wisdom is an essential trait to 
have in conjunction with compassion. Wisdom facilitates compassion because it provides 
the information and skill to demonstrate compassion effectively. In the following sections 
gratitude and forgiveness are discussed illustrating how compassion may facilitate them. 
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Gilbert (2005) suggests that forgiveness occurs in the context of other’s harming behavior 
while gratitude occurs in the context of other’s helpful behavior. Feeling compassion may 
facilitate the ability to feel gratitude when others help and to forgive when others offend. 
Wisdom. Wisdom is a complex concept without a commonly agreed upon 
definition in psychology (Ardelt, 2003; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Kramer, 2000). 
However, there is agreement that wisdom is a multi-faceted construct (Ardelt, 2003; 
Shedlock & Cornelius, 2003).  
A litany of definitions and descriptors has been used to illustrate the meaning of 
wisdom. Some of these include: living life to the fullest or having the optimal life (Baltes 
et al., 2002; Garrett, 1996; Ryan, 1996), being in balance (Baltes et al., 2002; Sternberg, 
1998), possessing superior cognitive abilities (Clayton, & Birren, 1980; Dittmann-Kohli 
& Baltes, 1990), having the ability to integrate and put knowledge into perspective 
(Ardelt, 2003; Baltes et al., 2002: Kunzmann & Stange, 2007; Labouvie-Vief, 1990; 
Shedlock & Cornelius, 2003), being capable of handling contradiction (Shedlock & 
Cornelius, 2003), being intuitive (Ardelt, 2003; Clayton & Birren, 1980), having the 
ability to be tolerant and value the views of others (Baltes et al., 2002; Kunzmann & 
Stange, 2007; Shedlock & Cornelius, 2003), being able to admit a lack of knowledge 
when appropriate (Baltes et al., 2002; Meacham, 1990), having good judgment (Ardelt, 
2003), being mature (Shedlock & Cornelius, 2003; Kunzmann & Stange, 2007), and 
having positive affective attributes such as sympathy and compassion (Ardelt, 2003; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990; Levitt, 1999; Pascual-Leone, 1990).   
While there are some variations in the conceptualization of approaches to 
wisdom, essentially, there are three camps of thought (Shedlock & Cornelius, 2003). 
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Shedlock & Cornelius (2003) suggest that those camps include: 1) wisdom as a social 
judgment that has also been referred to as implicit understanding; 2) wisdom as a 
function of personality development; and 3) wisdom as a type of cognitive expertise.  
Wisdom as a social judgment includes understandings of wisdom based on 
common perceptions. Sternberg (1998, p. 348) suggests that it is “an account that is true 
with respect to people’s beliefs.” Wisdom has also been seen as a part of personality 
development. In Erikson’s (1959) stage model, life span development progresses as a 
function of successfully negotiating and integrating psychosocial themes that can be 
suggested to culminate in wisdom with age. Age is commonly considered to be 
associated with wisdom (e.g. Baltes et al., 2002; Clayton & Birren, 1980; Shedlock & 
Cornelius, 2003; Takahashi & Overton, 2005) and allows for a developmental approach 
to the construct. In the last camp, wisdom is cognitive. In this camp, cognitive 
development allows for wisdom to manifest (Kunzmann & Stange, 2007). Within this 
paradigm, the developmental, cognitive theories of Piaget are influential. An example of 
a well-known model for cognitive personality theorists is the Berlin Wisdom Project. 
Paul Baltes and colleagues (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Baltes et al., 2002; Smith & 
Baltes, 1990; Staudinger et al., 1993) suggest various types of knowledge that contribute 
to wisdom are: factual, procedural, understanding context, relativism, and being able to 
handle uncertainty. 
Various authors have recognized the importance of viewing wisdom as a cultural 
concept (Ardelt, 2003; Takahashi & Overton, 2005; Clayton & Birren, 1980). However, 
Takahashi & Overton (2005) suggests that Western conceptualizations of the construct 
may emphasize the cognitive component heavily whereas Eastern cultures may put more 
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emphasis on its affective nature. Clayton & Birren (1980) suggest that the type of 
cognition relevant in the West is intellect whereas in the East the intellect can be seen as 
an impediment to wisdom and qualities like contemplation and compassion are more 
salient to its development. Thus, different types of knowledge and the presence of affect 
may be at odds within these cultural concepts of wisdom.  
In Buddhism, compassion’s theorized relationship to wisdom is considered 
essential (Dalai Lama, 1995; 1997; Ladner, 2004). Nagao (2000, p. 2) indicates that 
prajna (wisdom) and karuna (compassion) are “the two main pillars of Buddhism; they 
are like two wings of a bird or two wheels of a cart.” In very practical terms, the Dalai 
Lama (1997, p. 11) says that, “the Buddha always emphasized a balance of wisdom and 
compassion—a good brain and a good heart should work together.”  
Wisdom in Buddhism is viewed as a type of understanding or awareness that all 
things change and are ephemeral (Dalai Lama, 1995) and that the self and others are 
interdependent (Galin, 2003). In Buddhist philosophy, this sense that all things change is 
often referred to as “emptiness” (e.g. Dalai Lama, 2001; 2002a; Hopkins, 1999). The 
emptiness is meant to imply that existence is dynamic and ever changing thus suggesting 
that nothing is intrinsic or inherent (Dalai Lama, 2002a). Once this type of wisdom is 
gained, it is suggested that individuals see and understand the true nature of things (Dalai 
Lama, 2001; Galin, 2003; Glaser, 2005; Goleman, 2003; Ladner, 2004). This awareness 
is thought to facilitate compassion because once the world is viewed as an interconnected 
and an ever-changing entity; there becomes less reason to defensively protect the self. 
The self is no longer seen as permanent and it is perceived to be in connection to all other 
things (Galin, 2003; Glaser, 2005; Ladner, 2004; Salzberg, 1997). Thus, wisdom allows 
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for self pre-occupation to drop away (Cassell, 2002). Consequently, compassion can flow 
more freely when the self is no longer viewed as separate and permanent engendering a 
more selfless and other-focused nature that is willing to extend kind attention to others 
(Master Sheng-yen, 1999; Wang 2005).   
This type of wisdom illustrates the logic of compassion. The Dalai Lama (2002a) 
suggests that even if one is “selfishly wise” that compassion is still a product of good 
sense. He indicates that offering either compassion or hatred to others usually bring the 
same response in kind. Offering compassion and receiving it contributes to happiness 
while showing hatred and receiving it in kind diminishes happiness for all involved. 
Others have resonated this understanding that helping or treating others well can benefit 
the self (e.g. Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Downie & Calman, 1994; Lazaraus, 1991; 
Shaver & Mikulincer, 2004).   
Within this conceptualization of wisdom, wisdom would have a facilitative effect 
on compassion. Specifically, it may impact levels of kindness, common humanity, and 
mindfulness. When individuals view all things as connected and interdependent kindness 
can be offered more readily and a sense of common humanity becomes natural. The Dalai 
Lama (1995) suggests that once a letting go of the illusion of permanence has occurred 
then the bearing the pain of others in compassion becomes possible because the 
compassionate one does not hold on to the pain. This process is a mindful one as it 
practices emotional balance of accepting and opening to difficult emotions when they 
manifest and letting them go when they have run their course.  
Thus, although wisdom and compassion are distinct, there may be some overlap 
of the cognitive elements of wisdom and compassion as compassion encompasses 
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mindfulness. Additionally, there may be an overlap of the affective components as well 
as wisdom may facilitate kindness and common humanity. As previously mentioned, 
some have directly conceptualized compassion and sympathy to be a part of wisdom 
(Ardelt, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990; Levitt, 1999; Pascual-Leone, 1990). 
Thus, compassion and wisdom are functionally related in Buddhism and may share some 
common characteristics. 
 While there are many models that are offered within these various camps of 
thought, the model that best illustrates the Buddhist approach to wisdom is presented in 
the works of Ardelt (2000; 2003). Ardelt (2003) developed a scale, the Three 
Dimensional Wisdom Scale (3D-WS) to measure wisdom that was “based on Eastern 
wisdom traditions” (p. 284). The underlying structure of the scale is based on the research 
of Clayton & Birren (1980) suggesting that three elements compose wisdom: reflective 
aspects, cognitive aspects, and affective aspects. 
 The reflective element may be one of the most key elements in wisdom as it has 
been suggested to have a facilitative effect on both the affective and cognitive elements. 
In order to think deeply and to be impacted emotionally from events, reflection is needed. 
In essence, it is the material that allows for cognitive and emotional processing. In 
reflection, events are considered from multiple perspectives leading to a more meaningful 
and less self-focused view of the world. Thus, a reflective individual would be less likely 
to blame others or external circumstances for any particular life situation or condition.  
The cognitive element allows for a more holistic grasp of events and situations in 
life both interpersonally and intrapersonally. Specifically, a cognitive grasp of the world 
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allows an individual to come to certain understandings that the world is unpredictable, 
contains contradictions, and that much is unknown.  
The last element, the affective aspect of wisdom is often omitted in other models 
of wisdom. The reflective and cognitive elements are suggested to impact the affective 
element allowing for and promoting feelings of compassion and sympathy. It is theorized 
that these emotions are presumed to have an impact on prosocial behavior as well.   
These elements are considered to work together to synergistically in order to 
authentically be called wisdom. Ardelt (2003) suggests that for example, without the 
affective element the construct may more closely approximate intelligence or cognitive 
functioning. Further, without the cognitive component, an individual’s heart may be in 
the right place but they may not have the skill to execute compassionate behavior.  
Gratitude. Similar to compassion, there has not been much empirical study on 
gratitude (Emmons & Shelton, 2002). Also, like compassion, gratitude is considered to be 
a positive emotion (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Mayer et al., 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; 
Weiner, 1985) and is thought to be associated with strength (Emmons & Crumpler, 2000; 
Emmons & Shelton, 2002) and happiness (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; van Overwalle 
et al., 1995; Walker & Pitts, 1998). Lazarus and Lazarus (1994) define gratitude as 
having appreciation after being the recipient of an altruistic act. Ortony, Clore, & Collins 
(1988) suggest that it is a combination of admiration and joy. Pruyser (1976, p. 69) 
suggests that it has to do with kindness, generousness, gifts, giving and receiving, and 
getting something without the expectation of return. Clearly, gratitude is contextual 
occurring within a particular set of circumstances where one gives and another receives 
and the receiver feels the positive emotion of gratitude as a result of the interpersonal 
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transaction. Compassion differs in context where the focus of the interpersonal 
transaction is centered in one suffering and the other wishing that the suffering were 
alleviated.  
 Despite contextual differences, gratitude and compassion may share more than a 
general positive association and a specific positive connection with strength and 
happiness. Lazarus & Lazarus (1994) suggests that both gratitude and compassion require 
the ability to be empathetic. The skill is suggested to be necessary within the 
interpersonal exchange to recognize suffering or need respective to the genesis of either 
compassion or gratitude. So, there may be a need for a base ability to sense the emotions 
of another to act accordingly. This ability to focus on the other may extend throughout 
the exchange thus both emotions may be characterized as resulting in a focus on the 
sufferer or the recipient as opposed to the self.  
In accordance, Emmons & McCullough (2003, p. 377) indicate that “the object of 
gratitude is other-directed.” Wayment & Bauer (2008) produced an edited book 
describing this type of focus as a “quiet or other-oriented ego” and within this edition, 
McAdams (2008) specifically recognizes both compassion and gratitude as falling within 
this category. The “quiet or other-oriented ego” is one in which the focus is on others and 
the “noisy or self-serving” ego is one in which the focus is directed back towards the self 
when defensive. Emmons & Shelton (2002) suggest that the process of gratitude can be 
disrupted when the focus is taken from the other and directed back towards the self. In 
instances where giving occurs but the recipient interprets that gift to imply a lack of   
self-sufficiency or inferiority, the focus becomes shifted to the self in defense and the 
attention is no longer on the giver and the giver’s good intentions. This disrupts feelings 
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of gratitude and replaces it with a more protective and defensive stance. Farwell & 
Wohlwend-Lloyd (1998) provide some empirical support for this proposition finding that 
in the context of an interdependence game conducted in a lab, narcissism was inversely 
related to gratitude.   
Compassion and gratitude may also share common ground in their association 
with love. As previously indicated, selfless love is theorized to be strongly associated 
with compassion both in Buddhist thinking and in other religious traditions. Similarly, in 
gratitude it has been suggested that when individuals focus on the gifts they have 
received from a donor the results are feelings of being loved and cared for (McCullough 
et al., 2001; Reynolds, 1983; Shelton, 1990). Thus, gratitude becomes associated with 
feelings of love in those instances. Therefore, in compassion the projection of kindness 
and love for another may couch the self in those same feelings and in gratitude 
recognition of the love of the donor allows the self to take it in. The interpersonal 
dynamic seems to suggest that to give love or to recognize it from others both result in 
positive feelings. 
 The last theorized similarity between compassion and gratitude is the possible 
common association to mindfulness. What may be shocking about this association is that 
theorists describing various elements of gratitude wrote their descriptions prior to Neff’s 
(2003a; 2003b) conceptualization of mindfulness. Emmons & Shelton (2002) wrote about 
a preliminary study that was subsequently published in 2003. In this study 
undergraduates were asked to log their emotions, physical symptoms, and health 
behaviors under three conditions for 10 weeks. One group was to write about the hassles 
they experienced during the week; another group was to write about things that they were 
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grateful for during the week; and the last control group was to write about five major 
events of the week. As expected the gratitude group felt better, reported better physical 
health, and were more optimistic than the other two groups. Despite these positive 
findings, Emmons & Shelton (2002, p. 466) reported that, “Gratefulness does not appear 
to be equivalent to a Pollyannaish state where suffering and adversity are selectively 
ignored, but it might induce requisite psychological resources to successfully weather 
unpleasant emotional states.” This conclusion is very much descriptively similar to a state 
of mindfulness where difficult or painful feelings are not ignored nor are not held on to in 
a self-wallowing state. Thus, this balanced approach also helps to “weather unpleasant 
emotional states” as suggested above. 
 Therefore, compassion and gratitude may share common ground despite 
contextual differences such as a focus on suffering or appreciation. Gilbert (2005, p.53) 
however characterizes compassion as a blanket emotion that can encompass other 
emotions such as gratitude suggesting, “Compassion also involves abilities for gratitude, 
generosity, and forgiveness.” 
Forgiveness. Forgiveness is also thought to have a strong relationship to 
compassion (Wachholtz & Pearce, 2007; Worthington & Wade, 1999; Worthington et al., 
2005). Specifically, forgiveness has been characterized to be a part of compassion 
(Gilbert, 2005). Indeed, Thoresen and colleagues (2000) define forgiveness suggesting 
that it is a process in which negative feelings are released and compassion is developed 
for the offender. Worthington and colleagues (2005) explain this dynamic suggesting that 
when a transgressor shows regret and/or apologizes it allows the victim to feel 
compassion for the transgressor and subsequently forgive. Thus, compassion is thought to 
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facilitate forgiveness. It may be a necessary component that allows for the process to 
occur. Similar to gratitude, forgiveness is contextual. It occurs specifically when one 
transgresses and another is offended or victimized. Compassion, however, is broader 
reaching in the sense that it functions in a more broad range of contextual situations. It 
could be said that in forgiveness the transgressor feels regret and is suffering as result of 
their mistake and the victim is given the opportunity to alleviate that suffering through 
forgiveness. As such, forgiveness could be viewed as a specific case of suffering that is 
alleviated through reconciliation. There is some preliminary support for the possibility of 
this theoretical position in that forgiveness has been linked to empathy (Berry et al., 
2004; Macaskill et al., 2002; McCullough et al., 1997; 1998). Further, Farrow and 
colleagues (2001) have found that when participants made social judgments regarding 
some vignettes they were asked to read, empathy and forgiveness activated the same part 
of the brain. 
 This theory suggests how forgiveness may function, but investigating what may 
inhibit forgiveness may provide further support for common ground between compassion 
and forgiveness. Like gratitude and compassion, forgiveness may require a level of 
mindfulness to function. Worthington and colleagues (2005) suggest that rumination 
interferes with forgiveness. The proposed dynamic is that within rumination an individual 
rehashes negative thoughts associated with some injury or offense that makes the 
possibility of forgiveness less likely. Replaying harmful events and thoughts in the mind 
create a sort of re-experiencing of the offense making it psychologically fresh and the 
injury is experienced anew with each cycle of thought. Gilbert (2005) suggests that when 
individuals are being attacked or harmed, their threat-defense system reacts with the most 
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effective strategy for self-protection. It is possible in these instances that the            
threat-defense system is activated in response to mental thoughts and representations of 
previous harm sending a biological signal for self-protection. That physiological response 
may have an impact on the ability to forgive because the danger seems present due to 
ruminative thought as opposed to actual in-the-moment experiences. Some research may 
be beginning to support a connection between rumination and lower levels of forgiveness 
(Berry et al, 2001; 2004; McCullough, 2001). 
 If rumination is connected to lower levels of forgiveness, then being mindful may 
facilitate it. Mindfulness provides equilibrium in emotional processing that would hinder 
the ruminative process of reliving negative emotions repeatedly. The balance consistent 
with mindfulness would facilitate a letting go of negative emotions. This in turn, would 
allow for the possibility of forgiveness. To re-illustrate Gilbert’s (2005) model of the 
threat-defense system, in mindfulness the negative thought would be experienced but it 
would not be re-experienced because the negative thought or feeling is not rejected but it 
is not held either. The letting go allows for the deactivation of the threat-defense system 
and the need for self-protection. Forgiveness becomes more likely because the threat is 
no longer being held cognitively. In a sense, the offense is forgotten or at least it is not 
fresh in the mind. 
 
Compassion & Well-Being 
In this last section, those constructs that have an impact on well-being and are 
related to compassion are reviewed. Constructs believed to have either a positive or 
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negative impact on well-being are discussed. This final section looks at happiness, hope 
& depression, and guilt. 
Happiness. The advent of the positive psychology movement has brought to the 
forefront an interest in the explicit study of happiness and other positively oriented 
constructs (e.g. Chambers & Hickinbottom, 2008; Diener, 2000; Lyubomirsky, 2001; 
Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Recognition of a historical focus on pathology in 
psychology and a reconceptualization of approach have brought about a new emphasis on 
understanding and building positive qualities. Of course, various predecessors laid the 
groundwork for this movement (e.g. Allport, 1961; Erikson, 1959; Jung, 1933; Maslow, 
1968; Rogers, 1961; Terman, 1939; Terman et al., 1938; Watson, 1928).  
 The specific term of happiness has often been recoined as subjective well-being 
(SWB) in various research efforts (Diener, 2000). Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi (2000) 
suggest that the term may be used to convey a more scientifically sounding nuance than 
happiness. General findings about how subjective well-being functions is that it is equally  
possible for individuals to experience it regardless of age (Latten, 1989;  Herzog et al., 
1982; Ingelhart, 1990; Myers, 2000), gender (Haring et al., 1984; Ingelhart, 1990; 
Michalos, 1991), or race (Deiner et al., 1993; Stock et al., 1985). When it comes to 
money, it appears that a certain amount of financial stability to provide for basic 
necessities is essential for well-being (Argyle, 1999; Diener & Diener, 1995). However, 
beyond that, money does not appear to affect it (Inglehart, 1990; Lykken, 1999; Myers & 
Diener, 1995). In fact, some theorists and researchers suggest a detrimental effect on 
well-being when individuals are preoccupied or overly focused on materialistic goals 
(Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et al.,1999; Schmuck et al., 2000).  
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 Happiness or subjective well being is associated with a variety of factors. Close 
relationships have been proposed to increase happiness or well-being (Argyle, 1987; 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Burt, 1986; Deci & Ryan, 1991; DeNeve, 1999; Myers, 1999; 
Pavot et al., 1990). Additionally and more specifically, marriage has also been found to 
be a predictor of happiness (Diener et al., 1999; Inglehart, 1990; Mastekaasa, 1994; 
Myers, 2000; Wood et al.,1989). Further, religiosity is proposed to have an impact 
(Gallup report, 1984; Inglehart, 1990; Okun & Stock, 1987; Poloma & Pendelton, 1990) 
along with satisfaction in work (Crohan et al., 1989; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Freedman, 
1978; Michalos, 1986) and pursuit and achievement of intrinsic goals (Cantor & 
Sanderson, 1999; Diener & Fujita, 1995; Emmons, 1986; Ryan et al., 1999; Sheldon & 
Kasser, 1998). 
 One of the most illuminating findings that challenges general notions about 
happiness is that it appears that it is not as subject to negative or positive events as 
commonly assumed (Diener & Larsen, 1984; Gilbert et al., 1998; Kammann, 1983). 
Various researchers indicate that happiness has a strong genetic component (DeNeve, 
1999; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Tellegen et al., 1988) and that it appears to be related to 
personality and temperament (Diener, 2000; Myers, 2000). Seligman and 
Csikszentmikalyi (2000, p. 9) articulate the process well by indicating that, “it is not what 
happens to people that determines how happy they are, but how they interpret what 
happens.”  Headey and Wearing (1992) suggest that when emotional events occur 
individuals experience an emotional fluctuation that deviates from their personal baseline 
of general happiness but that within time their baseline happiness is regained. A variety 
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of research supports this proposition (Brickman et al., 1978; Costa e al., 1987; Diener & 
Larsen, 1984; Rusting & Larsen, 1997).  
 It has long been the contention of the Dalai Lama (1995, p. 50) that happiness is 
not necessarily dictated by external events themselves but from an individual’s decision 
about how to respond to those events. He suggests that in his particular situation with the 
Chinese occupation of his country that his happiness can not be destroyed by this event. 
However, he suggests that if he gave in to his anger, then his peace of mind could be 
disrupted. Whereas Western psychology has noted that temperament seems to contribute 
to how individuals react to certain situations, Buddhist traditions have recognized that 
temperament can be cultivated through meditation in order to train a response that is 
conducive to happiness.  
 It has also been the contention of many Buddhist thinkers that there is a strong 
link between compassion and happiness (Dalai Lama, 1984; 2002a; Dalai Lama & Cutler, 
1998; Goleman, 2003; Hopkins, 2001; Ladner, 2004). Further, researchers are beginning 
to note the possible connection as well. As previously mentioned, Davidson (2006) has 
begun initial investigations of brain activity of Buddhist monks while they were 
meditating specifically on compassion and found that the areas in the brain that were 
activated were ones that are typically associated with positive affect.  
Further, Wang (2005) affirms the relationship between compassion and 
happiness, but cautions against the misperception that happiness is the same as pleasure. 
Mathieu Ricard, a Buddhist monk clarifies the term in Goleman (2003) suggesting that 
happiness is a sense of fulfillment that is not dependent on a place, time, or object like 
pleasure. Indeed, there may be a need for the clarification. For example, in the subjective 
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well-being literature, Ryan & Deci (2001) suggest that there are two camps of thinking. 
The first is the study of pleasure or happiness that has been labeled as hedonism 
(Kahneman et al., 1999). The second is the study of self-actualization referred to as 
eudaimonism (Waterman, 1993). Therefore, Wang and Buddhist thinkers mean 
something quite different when using the term happiness as compared to how the term is 
used in the subjective well-being literature.  
 These theoretical and emerging research musings on the connection between 
compassion and happiness may not be intuitive on the surface. For example, Rozin 
(2003) points out that compassion begins with recognition of negative events yet is still 
considered to be a positive emotion. On the surface, this may be the paradox of 
compassion. However, the focus does not remain on suffering. In instances where it does, 
compassion fails to manifest. In the empathy-sympathy literature this phenomenon is 
referred to as personal distress. The focus on the suffering of others transforms into 
personal suffering and that distress is so overwhelming that it supersedes a feeling of 
compassion for others. The process that may allow for an individual to by pass personal 
distress is mindfulness. The emotional balance in mindfulness manages the initial 
negative feelings thus the distress does not become personal, and the focus can remain on 
the sufferer. Therefore, despite the fact that compassion begins with the recognition of a 
negative event, it may elicit positive feelings in the end due to the strong wish that 
suffering be alleviated in another; in other words, the feelings of concern and love for 
others may bring about the feelings of well being or happiness.   
 It is this wish that may bond the compassionate individual to the sufferer. Wang 
(2005, p. 80) suggests that compassion “enhances our inclusive sense of ‘I’ and provides 
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respite from our own destructive emotions.” Thus, another way to reconceptualize this 
assertion is to suggest that a sense of common humanity breaks the barrier between self 
and other manifesting this “inclusive I.” Destructive emotions are not as easily 
manifested when the boundary between self and other is more permeable because then 
there is less of a sense of other to project negativity towards.  
 In the end, the connection between happiness and compassion may be the 
generation of kind and loving feelings for a sufferer that in turn without active intent also 
positively impacts the donor of the compassion. Compassion may then have a reflexive 
capacity to nourish not only the sufferer but the donor as well. This contention is held in 
Buddhist traditions (e.g. Dalai Lama, 2002a) and is beginning to be recognized in western 
research circles as well (Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Davidson, 2006; Davidson & 
Harrington, 2002; Post, 2005). 
Hope and depression. While compassion may not be readily confused with 
depression, it is clear that compassion begins with recognition of suffering. Suffering, of 
course, is not pleasant and if the process of compassion stopped at that juncture or was 
unable to manage the pain of suffering, compassion could then be considered to be quite 
negative and perhaps leads to depression. The Dalai Lama (1995) suggests that the 
difference between the pain that a compassionate person feels upon recognizing the 
suffering of others and the pain that a depressed person would experience is that a 
depressed individual would feel a sense of helplessness, being overwhelmed, and loss of 
hope. Compassion, on the other hand, is filled with hope and the desire to alleviate 
suffering. The Dalai Lama (1995) describes the compassionate individual as “alert” and 
experiences no sense of a “loss of control” because the engagement in the suffering with 
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the sufferer is voluntary. The compassionate individual is open to the pain of others and 
is in control of that process. Further, the Dalai Lama (2001) suggests that the 
compassionate individual recognizes that the suffering is avoidable and can be overcome. 
There is a sense of hope for a better outcome that is absent in individuals who are 
depressed.  
 Further, individuals who experience compassion have a sense of common 
humanity that would act as a buffer against the isolation that is often a common 
experience in depression. Feeling a connection to others relieves a sense of suffering 
alone.  
 Some preliminary support for these two constructs being different is evidenced in 
the findings of Neff (2003a) where a related construct, self-compassion was found to be 
negatively correlated to depression. 
Guilt. Zahn-Waxler (2000) suggests that guilt is recognizing the self as a cause of 
harm to others either by acting or failing to act. However, Gilbert (2005) suggests that 
guilt may or may not involve a sense of responsibility. He indicates that individuals may 
experience survivor guilt in times of disaster without actually being responsible for the 
harm done. Thus, this would suggest that guilt can emerge from a sense of responsibility 
or regret about harm done to others.  
 Guilt and compassion may be theorized to have various commonalities. For 
example, Leffel and colleagues (2008) suggest that a package of emotions and motivators 
including both compassion and guilt can contribute to caring. Behaviorally, Behzadi 
(1994) indicates that both compassion and guilt can act as a motivator to correct a wrong. 
Thus, it is possible that the behaviors manifested from compassion or guilt may be utterly 
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indistinguishable. Cognitively, Lazarus (1991) suggests that both compassion and guilt 
have certain cognitive appraisal systems. The first one is goal relevance. In goal 
relevance, the suffering or harmed individual must be relevant to the person feeling 
compassion or guilt. The second one is goal incongruence. In goal incongruence, the 
harmed individual or sufferer’s situation is deemed unacceptable to the individual feeling 
compassion or guilt. Emotionally, there is some indication that both compassion (Brown, 
1996; Goleman, 2003; Ladner, 2004; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Miller, 2006) and guilt 
are associated with empathy as a base skill (Hoffman, 2000; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
 Additionally, there may be support for common ground between compassion and 
guilt biologically. Both compassion and guilt activate areas of the brain including the 
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (Kedia et al., 2008; Moll et al., 2007), the precuneus, the 
bilateral temporo-parietal junction (Kedia et al., 2008), and the superior temporal sulcus 
(Moll et. al., 2007).  Kedia and colleagues (2008) indicate the dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex, the precuneus, and the bilateral temporo-parietal junction are also associated with 
theory of mind. In theory of mind, individuals are capable of understanding stimuli from 
the perspective of others. Thus, it may be that the biological commonality for both 
compassion and guilt is a function of a necessary pre-requisite skill of understanding the 
perspective of others. This would seem to underscore the theoretical proposition that 
empathetic skill is a necessary pre-requisite to compassion or guilt.  
Despite these similarities, there are a myriad of differences between compassion 
and guilt. Biologically, it has been found that anger towards others and guilt were 
associated with the bilateral amygdala, the anterior cingulate, and the basal ganglia, but 
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not with compassion (Kedia et al., 2008). Thus, this would indicate that although 
compassion and guilt share some common brain activation, there is also support for 
differential brain functioning as well. Thus, compassion and guilt may share certain 
initial biological bases, but the full picture would indicate that they splinter off after that 
initial and common activation.  
Cognitively, Lazarus (1991) has proposed that these two emotions share some 
initial cognitive functioning but differ in that guilt requires the presence of self-blame. 
This self-blame can be theorized to be quite destructive unlike the properties of 
compassion. For example, Salzberg (1997) indicates that guilt is actually a form of anger 
or self-hatred. These unpleasant feelings may motivate the guilty to act not for the sake of 
the injured party, but for the alleviation of their own unpleasant feelings (Batson, 1998). 
As Stosny (2004, p. 58) states: “But if I feel guilt, the most important thing is to 
neutralize those darn distress signals causing me discomfort.” Thus helping behavior 
initiated by guilt may be motivated by the need to compensate (Barkan, 2000; Doosje et 
al., 1998; Frijda, 1986; Iyer et al., 2003; Ortony et al., 1988) in order to mediate those 
feelings while in compassion it is merely to help (Iyer et al., 2003). If the distress signals 
in guilt are not neutralized Stosny (2004) even suggests that those feelings may further 
degenerate to resentment and contempt for the injured party. Perhaps, this is due to an 
inability to manage the negative feelings, and a desire to push them away from the self 
and thus blame the victim as a means of relief. 
As eluded within this discussion, guilt is thought to be a self-focused emotion 
(e.g. Baumeister et al., 1995; Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schnieder, 
1989; Ortony et al., 1988; Stosny, 2004; Tangney & Fisher, 1995; Zebel et al., 2009). The 
 
90 
individual feeling guilt may focus on what they did wrong or their level of responsibility 
(Roseman et al., 1990; 1994). If dwelled upon, guilt may lead to a focus on the distress of 
feeling responsible or regret for the harm done to others. This rumination may keep the 
focus on the self as opposed to the injured party. The self-focus may even degenerate to 
shame and avoidance of the individual who had been harmed (e.g. Baumeister et al., 
1994; Freedman et al., 1967; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, guilt and other emotions 
like shame and embarrassment are referred to as self-conscious emotions (e.g. Mercadillo 
et al., 2007; Tangney & Fisher, 1995).  
In compassion, mindfulness allows for the balancing of the emotion that may 
circumvent the rumination and subsequent self-focus that may be experienced in guilt. 
Therefore, in compassion, the focus is freed up to be directed to the suffering individual. 
In some instances, Gilbert (2005) suggests that guilt may actually lead to compassion. 
Indeed, it may be possible that an individual can begin with a feeling of guilt, but through 
successful negotiation of guilt feelings, a shift occurs from the self to the injured party, 
and thus, the development of compassion may occur. 
 There may be some preliminary support for these theoretical differences between 
guilt and compassion. Various researchers have found other focused emotions like 
empathy, sympathy or compassion increased sensitivity to out-groups (e.g. Batson et al., 
1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Iyer et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1997; Karacanta & 
Fitness, 2006). Karacanta & Fitness (2006) compared participants instructed to focus 
either on self or others in response to viewing a videotape about harassment. Participants 
given the other-focused instruction self-reported an increased a sense of compassion, but 
not guilt. Similarly, participants given the self-focused instruction reported an increased 
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sense of guilt. When provided with opportunities to volunteer for a program to prevent 
harassment, the other-focused condition led to willingness to help. However, in the     
self-focused condition there was more an avoidance response to helping. In another 
study, Iyer and colleagues (2003) also found similar findings. Specifically, their findings 
suggested that self-focused instructions associated with guilt led to acts of compensation 
but that other-focused instructions were associated with sympathy and led to more broad 
support.   
 
Summary 
 Thus, a wide variety of constructs were reviewed in order to further theoretically 
conceptualize, compare, and discriminate compassion from various similar constructs. In 
sum, constructs were reviewed under four categories: 1) closely related constructs; 2) 
constructs often confused with compassion; 3) functionally related constructs; and 4) 
similar constructs related to well-being. The closely related constructs included reviewing 
the other constructs that were most like compassion that have been researched in 
psychology including empathy, sympathy, and altruism. Extensions of these constructs 
were their behavioral correlates including helping, volunteerism, and cooperation. Love 
was also included as a construct closely tied theoretically to compassion. The constructs 
most often confused with compassion were suggested to be niceness, pity & charity, 
naïveté &weakness, and sacrifice. Those constructs proposed to be functionally related to 
compassion included wisdom, gratitude, and forgiveness. Finally, both negative and 
positive constructs theoretically tied to compassion affecting well-being were proposed 
including happiness, hope & depression, and guilt.  
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Chapter Four: Development of the Compassion Scale 
 
“Compassion is of little value if it remains an idea.” 
    -The Dalai Lama 
 
Need for the Current Study 
 
An important first step to empirically examine compassion is to develop a proper 
scale to measure the concept. Once a measure is in place, it will open up the possibility 
for discussion and further empirical understanding of the construct in psychology. 
Amazingly, there have been a number of studies that have attempted to study compassion 
without a measure designed to assess it. Some have designed their own question(s) (e.g. 
Allred et al., 1997; Lally & Barber, 1974; Kemper et al., 2006), created adjective 
checklists (e.g. Karacanta & Fitness, 2006; Strasser et al., 2005; Mikulincer et al., 2001; 
Simmons, 1982), used a subscale of another measure (e.g. Cooper & Blakeman, 1994; 
Donius, 1994; Florian et al., 2000; Steffen & Masters, 2005), created their own item(s) 
(e.g. Beutel & Marini, 1995; Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Su et al., 2005), created 
stories/scripts meant to elicit the emotion (e.g. Kedia et al., 2008; Moll et al., 2007) and 
measured compassion as a function of helping behavior (e.g. Batson et al., 2001; 2008). 
Clearly, the need for a scale to measure compassion is illustrated in the fact that so many 
studies have attempted to investigate it without a proper scale. 
 There have been only a few attempts to measure compassion utilizing scale items. 
As suggested, compassion has sometimes been measured as a subscale of a larger 
construct. In other instances, items from others scales have been hand picked and 
subsequently taken as a measure of compassion. For example, Cooper & Blakeman 
(1994) developed the Motivational Spiritual Gifts Inventory and one of the seven        
sub-scales was compassion. A scale created in service of a dissertation, the Instrumental 
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Caring Inventory was developed to measure caring as a composite of empathy, 
compassion, and altruism (Donius, 1994). Hirschberger and colleagues (2005) utilized 14 
compassion items taken from the Pity Experience Inventories developed by Florian, 
Mikulincer, & Hirschberger (2000) in a study attempting to ascertain if individuals 
reacted with fear or compassion to the physically disabled. Steffen & Masters (2005) 
utilized four items from the Functional Assessment in Chronic Illness Therapy—Spiritual 
Well-Being—Expanded Scale (FACIT-Sp-Ex) developed by Brady and colleagues 
(1999) to ascertain if compassion is a mediator in the positive relationship between 
religion and health.  
 In one instance, there was a checklist developed to measure compassion within a 
specific population, children. Landsman & Clawson (1983) developed this checklist 
asking one interview question to 121 fifth and sixth graders. They were asked to 
“describe the most compassionate, unselfish, kind, thoughtful, or nicest thing which they 
have done for another or which another person has done for them” (p. 283). There was no 
specific theoretical structure proposed for compassion. The development of the checklist 
was taken directly from the children’s responses at several data collection points in order 
to develop the final version. 
 Sprecher & Fehr (2005) appear to be the only developers of a scale specifically 
designed to measure compassion. However, it could also be suggested that the Sprecher 
& Fehr’s (2005) scale was more specifically designed to measure love. The introduction 
of the term “compassion” or “compassionate” assists in explicitly defining the type of 
love the researchers were attempting to understand. Compassionate love is considered to 
be distinct from the more researched construct of romantic love where the target of love 
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is a romantic partner. In compassionate love the target is either close-others such as 
friends and family or all of humanity. Compassionate love has a sort of selfless quality 
that was conceptualized to be a motivator to help others especially in instances of need. 
Other terms used to describe the construct were unconditional love, giving love, altruistic 
love, and agape. Compassionate love is defined in terms that convey kindness such as 
“caring, concern and tenderness.” This kind orientation is presumed to motivate 
individuals experiencing it offer support and help to others. 
Sprecher & Fehr (2005) suggest that they did consider calling their scale 
compassion, but indicated that they decided to name the scale compassionate love due to 
the writings of Underwood (2002). Underwood (2002) suggested that compassion was 
not sufficient to properly convey the transcendent qualities that love suggests. The 
combination of the terms compassion and love into a single term provided two elements 
that they were trying to capture: 1) the transcendent qualities of love; and 2) the 
specification of the type of love using compassion as a descriptor. Sprecher & Fehr 
(2005) defined compassionate love: 
Compassionate love is an attitude toward other(s), either close others or strangers 
or all of humanity; containing feelings, cognitions, and behaviors that are focused 
on caring, concern, tenderness, and an orientation toward supporting, helping, and 
understanding the other(s), particularly when the other(s) is (are) perceived to be 
suffering or in need. (p. 630). 
Neff, who introduced the concept of self-compassion to the field of psychology, 
also created a scale to measure it, the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a). In this work 
compassion is defined as “being touched by the suffering of others, opening one’s 
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awareness to others’ pain and not avoiding or disconnecting from it, so that feelings of 
kindness towards others and the desire to alleviate their suffering emerge” (p. 86-87). 
Within this definition lies the three elements that are proposed to compose                  
self-compassion and compassion more generally. They include kindness, common 
humanity, and mindfulness (Neff 2003a, 2003b). Kindness is defined as being warm and 
understanding to others as opposed to being harshly critical or judgmental. Common 
humanity is the recognition of a shared human experience that allows for a sense of 
connection to others. Mindfulness is an emotional balance that prevents                     
over-identification or disengagement from the pain of others (2003b).  
The Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a) measures these elements of compassion 
as they apply to the self’s experiences of suffering. Thus, Neff’s conceptualization of 
compassion is somewhat different from the proposal of Sprecher & Fehr. Although both 
conceptualizations are focused on kindness and caring directed toward suffering, Neff’s 
proposal is drawn from Buddhist principles that suggest compassion also includes the 
elements of common humanity and mindfulness.  
This alternate conceptualization consistent with Buddhist principles will form the 
theoretical basis for a compassion scale that will be the focus of the present study.  
Given that there is a strong developing interest in compassion, particularly among 
psychologists and theorists influenced by Buddhist thought (Allen & Knight, 2005; 
Gilbert, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2010; Goetz et al., 2010; Frederickson et al., 2008; Goleman, 
2003; Harrington, 2002; Hutcherson et al., 2008; Keltner, 2009; Oveis & Keltner, 2010; 
Wang, 2005) it is hoped that this endeavor will open up a line of research like the 
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Buddhist construct mindfulness has (e.g. Davidson, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 1998, 2003; 
Kristeller & Hallet, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2010; Linehan, 1993; Segal et al., 2002).  
 
Construct Validation for the Compassion Scale (CS) 
The general purpose of the following set of studies was to establish the proposed 
theoretical conceptualization of compassion consistent with Buddhist principles as a 
construct in order to measure it. The primary goal of these set of studies within this 
project is to establish compassion as a construct. If a measure of a construct behaves in a 
way that a researcher would predict then this lends support for construct validity 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma (2003) indicates that there 
are variety of sources of evidence subsumed under construct validity including content 
validity, face validity, predictive validity, concurrent validity, convergent validity, 
discriminant validity, known-groups validity, and nomological validity. Constructs that 
are very similar, unrelated, or very different from the construct of interest (DeVellis, 
2003) are compared in relation to that construct. The expected relationship between a set 
of scale items and various constructs of interest is hypothesized a priori. Through the 
comparison of associations, the hypotheses are either confirmed or refuted. If confirmed, 
it provides support that the construct in fact did behave the way it would be expected to 
behave. Thus, this provides support that the latent variable has been identified. For the 
purposes of this initial validation, content validity, convergent validity, and some 
preliminary discriminant validity were selected to provide support for the construct 
validation of the proposed construct.  
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The construct validation study for the CS included the following phases: Phase 1) 
Initial development of the items; Phase 2) Content-Validity Study; Phase 3) Preliminary 
Development and Validation Study; and Phase 4) Cross-Validation Study. In phase 1, 
items were developed so as to be consistent with the theoretical basis of the scale (Neff, 
2003b). In phase 2, experts reviewed the items and provided feedback which was used to 
refine, augment, or drop items. In phase 3, the Preliminary Development and Validation 
Study, the items were administered to participants. Factor analyses were conducted to 
provide support for the model. In addition, correlational analyses were conducted to 
provide evidence for convergent validity and some discriminant validity. In the final 
phase of the study, phase 4, items were submitted to a new sample of participants 
duplicating the factor analyses in phase 3 to provide further support for the factor 
structure. 
Initial Development of the Compassion Scale Items 
Neff’s (2003a; 2003b) three-component model of self-compassion was adopted 
for use in this study. The theoretical underpinning of compassion was considered to be 
the same as conceptualized in the case of both the self and others. Thus, the elements of 
compassion (the same as in self-compassion) were theorized to be composed of kindness, 
common humanity, and mindfulness. In the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a) these 
three elements make up three of the six subscales in the model. The other three were 
composed of the opposing constructs of Self-Judgment (versus Self-Kindness), Isolation 
(versus Common Humanity), and Over-Identification (versus Mindfulness). Similarly, it 
was hypothesized that the CS would also be a six-factor scale.  
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Initially, it was under consideration to propose the CS as a three-factor scale. The 
model for the CS, the Self-Compassion Scale was originally proposed to be composed of 
three factors (kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness). Separate loadings for 
positively and negatively worded items in Self-Compassion Scale were unanticipated. 
Neff (2003a) suggested that this finding may not be surprising given that opposing 
constructs (e.g. common humanity and isolation) may not be mutually exclusive. In other 
words, having high levels of one may not necessarily mean the complete exclusion of the 
other. Thus, the Self-Compassion Scale was proposed as a six-factor scale. In order to 
determine if the CS should follow the original theoretical structure (3-factor model), or 
the resulting psychometric structure (6-factor model) of the Self-Compassion Scale, the 
nature of negatively and positively worded was investigated.  
Schriesheim and Eisenbach (1995) report that the recommendation/convention to 
include positive and negative items in a scale have been based on a couple of 
assumptions. First, it has been assumed that negatively worded items are the same as 
positive items and that negative items have no ill impact on the psychometrics of a scale. 
Second, it was assumed that agreement response tendency (yeah-saying) must be 
controlled for as a response bias. However, some researchers have indicated that 
negatively worded items can have an adverse affect on validity and reliability (e.g., 
Benson & Hocevar, 1985; Schriesheim, Eisenbach & Hill, 1991; Schriesheim & Hill, 
1981; Simpson, Rentz & Shrum, 1976; Roszkowski & Soven, 2010). Further a number of 
researchers have obtained differential results based on negative and positive wording in 
items (Barnette 1996; Friedman 1988; Guyatt et al. 1999; Ibrahim 2001; Weems, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Lustig 2003; Weems et al. 2003). To add to those findings, it is not 
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clear that response bias is as much of a problem as it was originally thought to be 
(Nunally, 1978). Wording or method factors are an important concern because a scale is 
meant to measure a particular construct over and above the way items are worded. Thus, 
it is crucial to give careful consideration to these effects in order to properly measure the 
construct of interest.  
In the case of the CS, the six-factor structure was retained for a number of 
reasons. First, the strongest support for replicating the six-factor structure is the 
psychometric success of the Self-Compassion Scale. The scale has been used successfully 
in a number of studies and findings are consistent with theory (e.g. Leary et al., 2007a; 
2007b; Pauley et al., 2010; Neff & Vonk, 2009; Neff et al., 2007; Thompson, 2008; Raes, 
2010; Ying, 2009). Given that the CS is modeled from the Self-Compassion Scale and the 
Self-Compassion Scale has good psychometric properties and has been successfully used 
in research, the retention of the six-factors appeared to be a sound decision.  
Second, Neff’s (2003a) theoretical explanation for the opposing constructs     
(self-judgment, isolation, and over-identification) in the Self-Compassion Scale is that 
they are not mutually exclusive to its positive counterparts (kindness, common humanity, 
and mindfulness). Similarly, it is assumed that this theoretical explanation can apply 
equally to compassion as it would self-compassion. Third, given Neff’s (2003a) 
theoretical explanation, each subscale is measuring a separate theoretically proposed 
construct, and not just a negatively worded set of items. This would also suggest that the 
opposing factors are not true negatives of the positively written factors. Given these 
reasons, a six-factor model was adopted for the CS. As such, the starting point was to 
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develop items appropriate for the CS that were conceptually derived from the six-factor 
structure in the Self-Compassion Scale. 
Theoretically, compassion for others and compassion for the self is slightly 
different. While the three basic elements of kindness, common humanity, and 
mindfulness were retained, their opposing constructs were conceptualized to be slightly 
different than in the Self-Compassion Scale. To be unkind to the self was conceptualized 
as a self-judging stance in self-compassion. However, when that critical perspective is 
turned outward toward others it becomes cold, uncaring, and dismissive. Thus, the 
opposing construct for kindness in the case of compassion was named indifference. In 
self-compassion, the lack of a connection or sense of common humanity is theorized to 
lead to feelings of isolation. In compassion a lack of a sense of common humanity for 
others was theorized to lead to feelings of separateness, thus the element of separation. 
Finally, in self-compassion, the opposing construct to mindfulness was theorized to be a 
type of emotional imbalance where an individual over-identifies with pain and thus blows 
it out of proportion. Failing to be mindful in the case of others leads to a sort of aversion 
or dismissal of other’s concerns. In order to emotionally disengage, an individual shuts 
down or blocks out the suffering of others. Thus, the final opposing construct was named 
disengagement. Thus, the items were composed to reflect the following six factors: 
Kindness versus Indifference, Common Humanity versus Separation, and Mindfulness 
versus Disengagement. 
Similar to self-compassion, it was proposed that kindness, common humanity, and 
mindfulness work together to manifest compassion. Mindfulness, coming from a place of 
emotional balance allows for an individual to attend to others. This stance provides a 
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platform for kindness and common humanity. Once an individual can focus on the 
suffering of others in an emotionally balanced way their attention can be sustained. Thus, 
this opens up the possibility of connection to the suffering of others thus facilitating 
kindness and a sense of common humanity. Given that these components work together 
symbiotically it was theorized that the inter-correlations between these three factors and 
their opposing constructs would explain a single factor of “compassion.”  
Given these theoretical parameters, 118 initial items were created (See Appendix 
A for Initial Items). There were 22 Kindness items, 19 Indifference items, 23 Common 
Humanity items, 18 Separation items, 17 Mindfulness items, and 19 
Disengagement/Over-Identified items. (Note that some items were initially written as 
over-identified items. Although it was presumed that disengagement items would be 
more appropriate for compassion, some were written as over-identified to test the 
assumption in a psychometric analysis.) The large number of items was developed 
because it is not unusual to begin with three to four times the number of items in the final 
scale (DeVellis, 2003). The desired length of the final scale was approximately twenty to 
thirty items. Thus, this number is four times or almost four times as much as the intended 
final version allowing for psychometrically sound selection of the finalized items. 
 Inspiration for the wording of the items was derived from the Self-Compassion 
Scale and theory (Neff, 2003a; 2003b). Further, the writings of other theorists and 
researchers on compassion were also utilized to find various ways of wording the items 
(Davidson & Harrington, 2002; Gilbert, 2005, Salzberg, 1995; 1997). In some cases, a 
dictionary, a thesaurus, and the internet were also consulted to provide various ways to 
word the items. 
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Best practices for writing items were adapted from DeVellis (2003). Items were 
written with an emphasis on using common language that reflects how people naturally 
speak. Sometimes, colloquial language was used in place of grammatically correct 
language to reflect this goal. The purpose of this practice was to try to ensure that items 
are clear enough so that responses capture the construct and were not stymied by 
confusing or overly sophisticated language. Specific practices were adopted to further 
this goal. Items were written concisely to avoid unnecessarily long, confusing items. 
Specific pronoun use was adopted to promote clarity. Multiple negatives were avoided 
along with statements containing multiple ideas within a single item. Items with more 
than a single idea are referred to as double-barreled. In these instances, it is possible for a 
respondent to have conflicting responses to different parts of an item. Thus,            
double-barreled items tend to introduce unwanted error into the measurement process. 
Lastly, in order to isolate the phenomenon of interest, items were written to be to be 
conceptually redundant while diversely worded in order to ascertain which items would 
best capture the theoretical domains of interest. Effective redundancy is considered to be 
the foundation for good internal consistency (DeVellis, 2003). After the items were 
developed, Neff, as an expert who developed the theoretical model of compassion based 
on Buddhist principles (Neff, 2003b) and who created the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 
2003a) reviewed the items and made suggestions and revisions as necessary. 
 
Study One: Content-Validity Study 
In order to establish content validity for potential CS items, experts were asked to 
review all 118 items to provide support for content validity. Content validity is said to 
 
103 
confirm that elements of a scale actually represent the targeted construct (Haynes et al., 
1995). The panel of experts consisted of 8 experts; 6 researchers and 2 
practitioners/trainers familiar with research and practices drawn from Buddhism. Experts 
were asked to fill out a chart requesting the following information: 1) to designate which 
of the three categories that each item best fits in (Kindness versus Indifference; Common 
Humanity versus Separation; and Mindfulness versus Disengagment); 2) to designate if 
the item does not fit any of the categories or if it does not fit the overall construct; 3) to 
indicate if the item does not make sense; and 4) to write any general comments about the 
item (see Appendix B for the instructions and categories for the Common Expert 
Checklist of Items for the CS). DeVellis (2003) suggests that it is important to clearly 
articulate to experts how the construct of interest has been operationalized to allow for 
proper assessment of the items. Therefore, an explanatory cover letter was included in the 
request for assistance that clearly outlined the construct and what was required in filling 
out the checklist (see Appendix C for the Explanatory Letter). 
The chart was created using recommendations from DeVellis (2003) for its 
construction. The chart attempted to provide an opportunity for experts to validate or 
reject items assessing if they were adequately representing the definition of the overall 
construct and the subscales. Further, it gave experts an opportunity to indicate if the items 
were clear and succinct, and to provide general feedback on any item. Utilizing the 
feedback from experts, some of the items were re-written; 38 of the 118 items were 
dropped at this phase. Items were dropped for the following reasons: 1) if more than three 
of the experts disagreed about which domain the item belonged to; 2) if three or more 
experts thought that an item did not fit any category or the overall construct; and 3) if 
 
104 
comments brought out a relevant point or points about the item that may not have been 
considered thus making it feasible to eliminate it.  
Study Two: Preliminary Development and Validation Study 
 In Study Two, the remaining 80 items (See Appendix D for 80 Items) were 
administered to a group of participants to finalize the items for the scale based on factor 
loadings. Given theoretical and psychometric support for the six-factor structure in the 
Self-Compassion Scale, the CS was designed to retain the six-factor structure. Therefore, 
a factor analysis of items in each subscale was implemented to identify final items based 
on factor loadings. The final items were then factor analyzed in a confirmatory analysis 
to: 1) provide support that the items perform well together in a six-factor correlated 
model; and 2) provide support that a single higher order factor of “compassion” 
adequately explains the inter-correlations between the six factors.  
 Further, to provide support for discriminant validity, a check for social 
desirability was administered. This check would provide support that the scale taps into 
the construct of interest and helps to ensure that the scale was not merely measuring the 
need for social approval. Additionally, in order to further establish a rough assessment of 
content validity, an overall question about compassion was posed to participants. The 
question asked if participants were concerned about the suffering of others. It was 
expected that this question would have a positive correlation to the items on the CS. 
Additionally; convergent validity was assessed using a number of related constructs. 
Constructs proposed to be similar to compassion were expected to correlate moderately 
well thus providing evidence of convergent validity. Simultaneously, it was expected that 
those same correlations would not be so high as to suggest that compassion was the same 
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exact construct as any of the compared constructs. To provide further support of 
discriminant validity, compassion was compared to compassionate love, a western 
concept of compassion. Given the differences between these two concepts of compassion, 
it was presumed that compassion would have a stronger association with constructs 
consistent with Buddhist conceptualizations (social connectedness, mindfulness, and 
wisdom) than compassionate love would. If the association is stronger between 
compassion and these constructs than compassionate love and these same constructs, it 
would provide support for discriminant validity. 
Convergent & Discriminant Validity 
 In the following sections theoretical discussions and specific hypotheses about 
compassion and how it relates to various constructs is outlined. Compassion was 
compared to constructs of compassionate love, self-compassion, social connectedness, 
mindfulness, empathy, wisdom, and social desirability. Further, gender differences were 
analyzed. When possible, hypotheses of constructs were made a priori to provide support 
for convergent validity and discriminant validity. 
Compassionate love. Compassionate love and compassion were presumed to have 
common theoretical ground with an emphasis on kindness. However, the difference 
between a conceptualization of compassion consistent with Buddhist thought and 
compassionate love is that compassion includes elements of common humanity and 
mindfulness while compassionate love does not. Given that there is some theoretical 
common ground and some theoretical differences as well, it was hypothesized that there 
would be a moderate positive correlation between compassionate love and compassion. 
The moderate positive correlation would support that the two constructs have similar 
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theoretical aspects providing support for convergent validity. However, if the positive 
correlation is moderate it also provides support that compassionate love and compassion 
have different theoretical aspects and are not the same construct thus providing support 
for some preliminary discriminant validity as well. For a more substantial support of 
discriminant validity, it was predicted that compassion would have a stronger association 
with mindfulness, wisdom, and social connectedness than compassionate love given that 
these constructs either are also based on Buddhist conceptualizations (mindfulness & 
wisdom) or related to the definition of compassion (social connectedness is related to a 
sense of common humanity) whereas compassionate love is not. 
Social Connectedness. Another related construct to compassion is social 
connectedness. Compassion views the suffering of others as part of the common human 
experience thus facilitating a sense of social connection. Thus, it was hypothesized that 
there would be a positive correlation between compassion and social connectedness. 
Further, it was also expected that compassion would evidence a stronger association with 
social connectedness than compassionate love given that compassion includes an explicit 
component of common humanity whereas compassionate love does not. Thus, this would 
provide convergent validity suggesting that the element of common humanity was 
functioning within compassion in a way that it is expected to. Further, the differential 
functioning between compassionate love and compassion would provide some support 
for discriminant validity as well. 
 Mindfulness. Measures of mindfulness and compassion were expected to 
positively correlate given that mindfulness is an element of compassion. Similar to the 
analysis with social connectedness, it was expected that compassion will evidence a 
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stronger association with mindfulness than compassionate love given that compassion 
includes mindfulness while compassionate love does not. As in the case of social 
connectedness, both convergent and discriminant validity would be supported by this 
finding.  
 Wisdom. Wisdom was theorized to be functionally related to compassion. Ardelt 
(2003) provides a conceptualization of wisdom based on Eastern traditions that suggests 
that wisdom overlaps with compassion. Wisdom is considered to be the cognitive 
platform that allows for compassion to be felt and acted upon providing the “right mind” 
for a compassionate stance. Specifically, Ardelt (2003) theorizes that wisdom consists of 
reflective, cognitive, and affective aspects. In particular, overlap in the affective aspects 
with compassion may provide common ground between the two constructs. For example, 
affective items include mentions to compassion, comforting others, and feeling sorry for 
others when they have problems (Ardelt, 2003). Thus, a positive correlation between the 
two scales was expected, especially in terms of affective wisdom, but the correlations 
were expected to be disparate enough to suggest that the constructs are distinct. 
Therefore, once again, convergent and some discriminant validity was expected to be 
supported by these theorized findings. 
 Further, because in Buddhist circles, wisdom is considered to be an overlapping 
construct and one that allows for compassion to function optimally, it would be expected 
that wisdom would have a higher positive correlation with compassion than with 
compassionate love. This would provide further support of discriminant validity 
suggesting that compassionate love and compassion are conceptually distinct. 
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Empathy. Other similar measures to compassion include measures that have been 
more extensively researched in psychology, empathy and sympathy. Given that elements 
such as empathetic concern and emotional responsiveness are components of measures of 
empathy, it was assumed that there would be some overlap in construct similarity with 
the element of kindness in compassion. Further, perspective taking is also an element that 
is often measured within empathy (Davis, 1983), and perspective taking may be a 
required element to embody a sense of common humanity. However, empathy is not the 
same as compassion. For example, Gilbert (2005) and Ladner (2004) suggest that 
empathy is a cognitive knowledge of others’ emotional states that can be used equally for 
nefarious purposes as it can for beneficial ones. Taking into account the similarities and 
the differences, it was assumed that measures of empathy would positively correlate with 
compassion providing support for convergent validity, but it was also assumed that the 
positive correlation will not be so high to imply that empathy and compassion are the 
same thus providing support for some discriminant validity as well. 
Self-compassion. Self-compassion and compassion have a number of common 
aspects. First, the six-factor theoretical structure was borrowed from self-compassion and 
applied to the more general construct of compassion. Second, the same conceptualization 
of compassion underlies both constructs with the difference being the target of 
compassion—either self or other. Despite the similar structure between compassion and 
self-compassion, it was unclear how related the two constructs will be. Although 
conceptually similar, the two constructs may function quite differently. For example, the 
same elements of judgment, isolation, and over-identification germane to                    
self-compassion did not make theoretical sense as applied to compassion. Additionally, 
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Neff and colleagues (2008) found that self-compassion was not related to empathetic 
concern for others. This is likely because many people who are kind to others can be very 
hard on themselves, whereas self-compassionate people are equally kind to themselves or 
others (Neff, 2003a). Thus, the way that compassion functions in regard to the self and to 
others may be markedly different. Therefore, no hypothesis was put forth, and the 




Finally, the study also looked at sex differences in compassion. Females have 
often been considered to be more empathetic than males (e.g. Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; 
Zahn-Waxler, Cole, & Barrett, 1991) and given the presumed theoretical overlap between 
empathy and compassion it was presumed that females might have higher levels of 
compassion than men. Further, women have often been conceptualized to maintain roles 
to others that nurture and sustain connection (Gilligan, 1993) providing further support 
that females may be more compassionate than men. The Dalai Lama has reportedly been 
known to have said that, “The female is the source of genuine human compassion.” Thus, 
it was predicted that females may have higher levels of compassion for others than males. 
Study Two: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis #1: A confirmatory factor analysis would reveal that the items 




Hypothesis #2: A confirmatory factor analysis would reveal a single, higher order 
factor of compassion that explains the inter-correlations among the six factors at least as 
well as was the case for the Self-Compassion Scale. 
Hypothesis #3: It was predicted that compassion would have a non-significant or 
low correlation to a measure of social desirability suggesting that compassion was being 
measured over and above socially desirable responding. Thus, this will provide support 
for discriminant validity. 
Hypothesis #4: Correlating a question about individual’s concern for the suffering 
of others to compassion items would show a positive correlation providing rough support 
for content validity. 
Hypothesis #5: A positive correlation was predicted to exist between compassion 
and various similar constructs including compassionate love, social connectedness, 
mindfulness, wisdom, empathy, and perspective taking (a subscale of empathy). Given 
various similar and discrepant aspects of compassion with these other constructs, it was 
presumed that there will be a positive correlation but that it will not be so high as to 
suggest that any of these constructs are the same as compassion. Thus, this would provide 
support for both convergent validity and some discriminant validity. 
Hypothesis #6: Comparing compassion to compassionate love, it was predicted 
that compassion would have a stronger association with social connectedness, 
mindfulness, and wisdom than compassionate love. This would provide support for 
discriminant validity suggesting that the constructs of compassion and compassionate 
love are distinct. 
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Hypothesis #7: Self-compassion and compassion share a similar theoretical 
structure both sharing elements of kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness. 
However, compassion and self-compassion may function differently given that some 
individuals are not very self-compassionate while still being compassionate to others. 
Due to conflicting possible expectations, no hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between these two constructs was proposed. 
Hypothesis #8: Comparing male participants to female participants, it was 
expected that female participants would have higher scores on compassion than male 
participants. 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
Participants included 439 undergraduate students (153 men; 286 women; M age 20.6 
years; SD = 1.82) who were randomly assigned from an educational-psychology subject 
pool at a large Southwestern university. The ethnic breakdown of the sample was 53% 
Caucasian, 7% Asian, 21% Hispanic, 7% African American, 5% Mixed Ethnicity, and 
7% Other. Participants completed the measures online.   
Measures 
Compassion. Compassion Scale Items consisted of 80 remaining items after 
dropping 38 items based on the expert review. Participants were instructed to report how 
often they felt or acted in the stated manner on a scale from 1 “Almost Never” to 5 
“Almost Always”. Examples of the items include “When I see someone fail, I think about 
how hard it must be for them.” (Kindness) “Other people’s problems aren’t really my 
concern.” (Indifference) “Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human.” 
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(Common Humanity) “I don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain.” (Separation)  
“I tend to stay grounded even when other people are over-reacting.” (Mindfulness), and 
“Life can be so overwhelming that I just have to shut down sometimes.” 
(Disengagement). (See Appendix D for 80 Items). 
Social Desirability. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Short Form) 
(Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) is a well known measure used to assess socially desirable 
responding. It consists of 10 items and has been found to have good psychometric 
properties (Fischer & Fick, 1993). (See Appendix E for the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale). 
Compassion and concern about suffering. A single item asked if participants were 
concerned about the suffering of others. The scale ranged from 1 “Almost Never” to 5 
“Almost Always”. This item was intended to provide a rough estimate of content validity. 
Compassionate Love. The Compassionate Love Scale (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005) 
has two versions including the close others version and the stranger-humanity version. In 
the close others version, respondents are asked questions about concern and caring for 
family members and friends. In the stranger-humanity version, respondents are asked to 
think about all of humanity. Both are 21-item scales on a seven-point scale from “Not at 
all true of me” to “Very true of me.” Examples of sample items from the close-other 
version include: “I feel a selfless caring for my friends and family.” “I tend to feel 
compassion for people who are close to me.” “I accept friends and family members even 
when they do things I think are wrong.” Examples of sample items from the         
stranger-humanity version include: “I tend to feel compassion for people, even though I 
do not know them.” “I spend a lot of time concerned about the well-being of 
 
113 
humankind.” “I very much wish to be kind and good to fellow human beings.” The 
Compassionate Love Scale is thought to measure a single underlying factor of 
compassionate love. Support for convergent validity indicated that the Compassionate 
Love Scale was positively associated with empathy, helpfulness, volunteerism, 
religiosity, and pro-social behavior. Cronbach’s alpha was .94 for the close others version 
and .95 for the stranger-humanity version. Further, the two forms of the Compassionate 
Love Scale are positively correlated, r = .56, p < .001. (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). (See 
Appendix F for the Compassionate Love Scale) 
 Social Connectedness. The Social Connectedness Scale (Lee & Robbins, 1995) 
measures feelings of closeness between individuals and others including peers, strangers, 
friends, and people/ society in general. It consists of 20 items on a six-point scale ranging 
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Examples of positively worded sample 
items include: “I fit well in new situations.” “I see people as friendly and approachable.” 
An example of a negatively worded item is: “I feel disconnected to the world around 
me.” Lee & Robbins (1995) report good internal consistency at .91 and good test-retest at 
.96. (See Appendix G for the Social Connectedness Scale). 
Mindfulness. The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire is a 16-item measure 
that measures emotional response to distressing thoughts and images. The questionnaire 
is on a 7-point scale from “strongly disagree” (0) to “strongly agree” (6). Eight items 
were written positively and eight must be reverse scored. Sample items were written to be 
the response to the stem, “Usually when I experience distressing thoughts and images…” 
Positively written sample items responses to the stem are: “I am able to notice them 
without reacting.” “I am able to accept the experience.” Negatively written sample item 
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responses include: “In my mind I try to push them away.” “I find it so unpleasant I have 
to distract myself and not notice them.” Chadwick and colleagues (2008) reported a good 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89 for a community population. (See Appendix H for the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire). 
Wisdom. Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale is a three-dimensional scale 
measuring cognitive, reflective, and affective indicators of wisdom to reflect an Eastern 
perspective on the construct. Sample items include: “You can classify almost all people 
as either honest or crooked” (cognitive). “I try to look at everybody’s side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision” (reflective). “I can be comfortable with all kinds 
of people” (affective). Cronbach’s alpha for the affective subscale was .74 at time one 
and .72 at time two. The scale is considered a reliable and valid instrument as Ardelt 
provided evidence of construct, predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity. The 
scale had a test-retest reliability of .85 over a ten-month period suggesting stability of the 
measure (Ardelt, 2003). (See Appendix I for the Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale). 
Empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980) is a 28-item 
scale that is commonly used as a measure of empathy. The range of the scale is on a   
five-point scale from 0 “Does not describe me well” to 4 “Describes me very well.” The 
scale assesses four distinct dimensions attributed to empathy including perspective 
taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy.  
Davis & Franzoi (1991) describe the subscales: 1) Perspective taking involves 
seeing things from the vantage point of others. An example is: “I sometimes find it 
difficult to see things from the “other guy’s point of view.” 2) Empathic concern is 
described as being able to feel sympathy and/compassion for others. An example is: “I 
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often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” 3) Personal 
distress is feelings of distress and uneasiness in response to other’s distress. An example 
is: “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.” 4) 
Fantasy is the ability to imagine the feelings of a variety of fictional characters. It is 
common for researchers to omit use of the Fantasy subscale, because there is some debate 
on the relation of fantasy to empathy. Therefore, it will not be included in this analysis. 
Internal reliabilities for the four subscales range from .70 to .78 and test-retest range from 
.61 to .81 (Davis, 1983; 1994). (See Appendix J for the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index). 
 The Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendency (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) 
is another commonly used measure to assess empathy. However, it should be noted that 
although it has been taken as a measure of empathetic responding, it could also be 
suggested that it encompasses a variety of other factors. Eisenberg & Miller (1987a) 
report that the measure seems to tap into sympathy, personal distress, susceptibility to 
emotional arousal, perspective taking, and other possible factors. The scale consists of 33 
items on a 9-point scale ranging from “very strong agreement” to “very strong 
disagreement.” Items generally assess susceptibility to emotion, understanding of 
emotion in others, sympathetic tendencies, and emotional responding. Sample items 
include: “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.” “I become 
nervous if others around me see to be nervous.” “It upsets me to see helpless old people.” 
“Another’s laughter is not catching for me.” The internal consistency is reported at .79 
(Kallipuska, 1983) and a split-half reliability was reported at .84 (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972). (See Appendix K for the Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendency). 
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Self-Compassion. The Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a) is a 26-item measure 
on a five-point scale from “Almost Never” to “Almost Always” with higher scores 
representing greater self-compassion. It includes six subscales that sum to an overall  
self-compassion score. Examples of sample items include: Self-Kindness (5 items, e.g. “I 
try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling emotional pain.”), Self-Judgment (5 
items, e.g., “I’m disapproving and judgmental about my own flaws and inadequacies.”), 
Mindfulness (4 items, e.g., “When something upsets me I try to keep my emotions in 
balance.” ), Over-Identification (4 items, e.g., “When I’m feeling down I tend to obsess 
and fixate on everything that’s wrong.”). Common Humanity (4 items, e.g., “When things 
are going badly for me, I see the difficulties as part of life that everyone goes through.”),  
and Isolation (4 items, e.g., “When I think about my inadequacies it tends to make me 
feel more separate and cut off from the rest of the world”). The Self-Compassion Scale 
has a good internal consistency reliability of .92 (Neff, 2003a) and .94 (Neff et al., 2007) 
along with good test-retest reliability (r=.93) (Neff, 2003a). Further, the Self-Compassion 
Scale demonstrates good discriminant validity because it does not correlate with social 
desirability or narcissism and good convergent validity because it correlates with a host 
of positive constructs such as life satisfaction and connectedness to others. (Neff, 2003a). 
(See Appendix L for the Self-Compassion Scale).    
Results 
Factor Structure of the Compassion Scale (CS)  
 Given support for the six-factor model both theoretically and statistically in the 
Neff’s Self-Compassion model (Neff, 2003a; Neff, 2003b), a traditional exploratory 
factor analysis was not conducted. The basic purpose of an exploratory factor analysis is 
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to determine the underlying factor structure. Statistically, each item is loaded on to every 
factor to assess the strength of association of all the items with all of the factors. With this 
information, a determination can be made about which items are most strongly associated 
with a particular factor. In this particular case given pre-existing theoretical and statistical 
support for six highly correlated components, a factor analysis was conducted for each 
subscale separately to identify the best functioning items for each subscale. The 
following table lists the standardized factor loadings per item and subscale.  
TABLE 1 Item & Factor Loadings for the Six Subscale Factors of the Compassion 
Scale (80 Items) 
Item              Loading 
Kindness Subscale  
(Factor 1) 
When I see someone feeling down, I want to offer my support.    .76 
When others need my help, I want to offer it.      .75 
If I see someone going through a difficult time, I try to be caring    .74 
toward that person. 
When others feel sadness, I try to comfort them.      .73 
When others are upset I feel concern for them.      .72 
I like to be there for others in times of difficulty.     .72 
I like to reassure others when they are worried.      .67 
If I encounter someone who is distraught, I try to soothe that person   .66 
with kind words.  
My heart goes out to people who are unhappy.      .61 
I try to be kind to people who are going through a hard time.   .54 
 
(Factor 2) 
I try not to be judgmental of others when they fail.     .72 
I am forgiving of other’s mistakes.       .67 
If I see someone else’s weakness, I try not to be overly critical of    .65 
their failings.  




Sometimes when people talk about their problems, I feel like I don’t care.  .69 
When others are feeling troubled, I usually let someone else attend to them. .64 
_____________________________________________________________________ 




TABLE 1 Continued. 
Item              Loading 
Indifference Subscale 
(Factor 1 continued) 
Sometimes I am cold to others when they are down and out.   .58 
I don’t concern myself with other people’s problems.    .56  
 
(Factor 2) 
I’m not very understanding when people disappoint me.    .67 
When people make me mad I tend to hold a grudge.     .64  
I’m pretty unforgiving of other’s mistakes.      .62  
 
(Factor 3) 
Sometimes I’m indifferent to the plight of others.     .59  
I usually don’t feel sorry for people who screw up.     .59 
To be honest, I don’t really care about people who are starving    .55 
in third world countries.  
I tend to be tough on others when they mess up.     .42 
 
(Factor 4) 
Sometimes, I can be judgmental of others.      .75 
I can be critical when people don’t meet my expectations.    .73 
 
(Factor 5)  
When people fail, it’s usually their fault.      .88 
 
Common Humanity Subscale 
(Factor 1) 
We should give people who’ve messed up a break because everyone   .73 
makes mistakes sometimes.   
I am accepting of other’s flaws as part of what it means to be human.  .70 
When people fail, I try to remember that being human means    .64 
being imperfect. 
I can relate to others in times of need because we are all human.   .60 
Because we are all human, I recognize that other people feel    .58 
pain just like I do. 
When I see someone in a difficult situation I identify with that person  .45 
because I know that we are all human. 
 
(Factor 2) 
Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human.    .83 
It’s important to recognize that all people have weaknesses     .71 
and no one’s perfect.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 




TABLE 1 Continued. 
Item              Loading 
Common Humanity Subscale 
(Factor 2 continued) 
Suffering is just part of the common human experience.    .56  
Despite my differences with others, I know that everyone     .54 
feels pain just like me.  
 
(Factor 3) 
I feel closer to others who are suffering because we share a     .85 
common human experience.   
I feel connected to people in pain because we all go through it.   .75 
When someone is having a difficult time I realize that I could experience  .45 




I don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain.    .73 
I can’t really connect with other people when they’re suffering.   .73 
When I see someone feeling down, I feel like I can’t relate to them.  .68 
I feel detached from others when they tell me their tales of woe.   .51 
 
(Factor 2) 
Other people need to deal with their problems on their own.    .82 
When someone is having a difficult time, they just have to deal with   .76 
their issues on their own.  
When it comes to life’s troubles, I think it’s every man for himself. .  .65 
Other people’s problems are totally separate from my own.     .38 
 
(Factor 3) 
I have trouble finding common ground with people who are failures.  .69 
I tend to feel distant from people who make fools of themselves.   .66 
When someone fails I tend to think “thank God it was them and not me.”  .47 
I find it hard to feel connected to people who are really different from me.  .43 
 
(Factor 4) 
It means little to me that people suffer in far away places because it is  .68 




I tend to listen patiently when people tell me their problems.   .72 
I pay careful attention when other people talk to me.    .72 
I notice when people are upset, even if they don’t say anything.   .67 
_____________________________________________________________________ 




TABLE 1 Continued. 
Item              Loading 
Mindfulness Subscale 
(Factor 1 continued) 
I stay calm when people tell me their bad news.     .56 
When people tell me about their problems, I try to keep a balanced   .55 
perspective on the situation. 
When someone is really upset, I’m able to feel their pain without being  .33 
overwhelmed by it.  
 
(Factor 2) 
I don’t get carried away by other people’s drama.     .74 
I tend to stay grounded even when other people are over-reacting.   .69 
I stay composed when listening to the difficulties of others.    .60 
 
(Factor 3) 
When street people ask me for money, I’m aware of how hard    .86 
they must have it. 




If someone starts to cry, I try to leave the room before I start crying as well.  .66 
When I see someone in distress, it is hard for me to manage my own emotions. .62 
When I see someone crying I get too caught up in their emotion.   .58 
When I see someone in pain, it makes me really uncomfortable.   .52 
When bad news hits, I freeze.        .49 
 
(Factor 2) 
When people cry in front of me, I often don’t feel anything at all.   .68 
I don’t think much about the concerns of others.     .65 
I often tune out when people tell me about their troubles.    .64 
I try to avoid people who are experiencing a lot of pain.    .58  
 
(Factor 3) 
I can’t stop thinking about all the bad things that happen in the world.  .68 
Sometimes, other people’s problems consume me.     .67 
I can get too wrapped up with other people’s problems.    .66 
 
(Factor 4) 
When I see homeless people, I just ignore them.     .77 
_____________________________________________________________________ 




TABLE 1 Continued. 
Item              Loading 
Disengagement/Over-Identified Subscale 
(Factor 4 continued) 
Life can be so overwhelming that I just have to shut down sometimes.  .56 
I tend to shut down when I hear about all the bad things happening in the   .47 
world. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
          
 Items for the model to be tested in the next phase were selected based on 
theoretical strength of the item along with a high factor loading. All selected items 
exceeded a loading of .50 indicating that all items met general recommendations for 
strength of association between the item and the factor. The selected items that were 
submitted for a confirmatory factor analysis are listed in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 Items & Factor Loadings for the Finalized Compassion Scale (24 Items) 
Item              Loading 
Kindness Subscale  
If I see someone going through a difficult time, I try to be caring    .74 
toward that person. 
When others feel sadness, I try to comfort them.      .73 
I like to be there for others in times of difficulty.     .72 
My heart goes out to people who are unhappy.      .61 
 
Indifference Subscale 
Sometimes when people talk about their problems, I feel like I don’t care.  .69 
When others are feeling troubled, I usually let someone else attend to them. .64 
Sometimes I am cold to others when they are down and out.   .58 
I don’t concern myself with other people’s problems.    .56  
 
Common Humanity Subscale 
Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human.    .83 
It’s important to recognize that all people have weaknesses     .71 
and no one’s perfect.  
Suffering is just part of the common human experience.    .56  
Despite my differences with others, I know that everyone     .54 
feels pain just like me. 
 
Separation Subscale 
I don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain.    .73 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
          Continued. 
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TABLE 2 Continued. 
Item              Loading 
Separation Subscale continued 
I can’t really connect with other people when they’re suffering.   .73 
When I see someone feeling down, I feel like I can’t relate to them.  .68 
I feel detached from others when they tell me their tales of woe.   .51 
 
Mindfulness Subscale 
I tend to listen patiently when people tell me their problems.   .72 
I pay careful attention when other people talk to me.    .72 
I notice when people are upset, even if they don’t say anything.   .67 
When people tell me about their problems, I try to keep a balanced   .55 
perspective on the situation. 
 
Disengagement Subscale 
When people cry in front of me, I often don’t feel anything at all.   .68 
I don’t think much about the concerns of others.     .65 
I often tune out when people tell me about their troubles.    .64 




Confirmatory Analyses: Correlated Six Factor Model & Higher-Order Factor Model 
 
 Lisrel 8.80 was used to conduct the confirmatory analyses. A correlated model 
was conducted to test how the 24 items perform together in order to being to finalize the 
CS. The model indicated good fit according to Hu and Bentler’s (1998) joint criteria that 
suggests optimal indices are: (CFI = .95 or higher; NNFI =.95 or higher; SRMR =.05 or 
lower; RMSEA = less than .05). Using Hu and Bentler’s (1998) joint criteria all indices 
met or exceeded criteria except for one (RMSEA) that was only slightly less than optimal 
(CFI = .97; NNFI= .96; SRMR= .05 and RMSEA= .05). In order to provide further 
support the six-factor structure, a one-dimensional model was run to compare findings. 
The results show that a multidimensional model produced better results. The results for 
the one-dimensional model (CFI = .91; NNFI = .90; SRMR =.07; and RMSEA = .09) 
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would suggest marginal fit using the CFI and NNFI indices and poor fit with the SRMR 
and RMSEA indices. 
 In addition, a higher-order factor analysis was conducted to provide support that 
a single higher order factor of compassion would explain the inter-correlations between 
the six factors. The model indicated acceptable fit. Hu and Bentler’s (1998) criteria 
suggest that two of the indices suggest marginal fit (RMSEA = .06; SRMR = .06), but the 
other two of the joint criteria suggest good fit (NNFI = .95; CFI = .96). Given adequate 
fit for a higher-order factor, an overall compassion score was implemented as was the 
case for the Self-Compassion model. Items within the subscales of Indifference, 
Separation, and Disengagement were reverse scored and then the means of all of the 
subscales were averaged to create a total compassion score (See Appendix M for 
finalized version of the CS). Table 3 contains the correlations between factors.  
TABLE 3 Inter-Correlations between Factors for Study Two 
         F1  F2               F3             F4               F5               F6  
Kindness (F1)      1.00 
 
Indifference (F2)   -.66             1.00 
 
Common        .48              .28       1.00 
Humanity (F3)   
      
Separation (F4)      -.55         -.56           -.41          1.00 
 
Mindfulness (F5)     .57                .45            .49           .46              1.00 
 













DeVellis (2003) defines reliability as “the proportion of variance attributable to 
the true score of the latent variable.” Even though it is not possible to ever know true 
score, it is possible to know how well items are related to each other lending support that 
they are tapping into the same latent variable. In order to test to see if a group of items are 
internally consistent, Cronbach’s alpha (1951) is typically used. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
Compassion Scale (CS) was .90. In addition, split-half reliability was also calculated. 
DeVellis (2003) describes split-half reliability as taking items from a single scale and 
dividing them and correlating the two halves. In order to attempt to make the two forms 
as equivalent as possible, 2 items for each of the six categories (Kindness, Indifference, 
Common Humanity, Separation, Mindfulness, and Disengagement) were grouped 
together to form the two halves. The split-half coefficient was also .90. These reliability 
estimates suggest good reliability for the Compassion Scale (CS).  
 
Analyses of the CS and Other Study Variables 
 Zero-order correlations between all study variables are presented in Table 4. 
Means and standard deviations for the scale and subscales along with the reliability 
estimates for all study variables are presented in Table 5. 
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TABLE 4  Zero-Order Correlations between All Study Variables 
























































































































































































































































































Note. CS = Compassion Scale; SM = Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire; SOC = Social Connectedness Scale; SC =                     
Self-Compassion Scale, IRIEC = Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Empathic Concern Subscale); IRIPT = Davis IRI 
(Perspective Taking Subscale); IRITPD = Davis IRI (Personal Distress Subscale); MEH = Mehrabian Questionnaire of Empathic 
Tendency; WISC = Ardelt 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (Cognitive Subscale) WISRF = Ardelt 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (Reflective 
Subscale); WISA = Ardelt 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (Affective Subscale); CLC = Compassionate Love Scale (Close-Other Version); 
CLS = Compassionate Love Scale (Stranger-Humanity Version); MC = Marlow Crowne 
*p <.05.  **p <.01.
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TABLE 5 Compassion Scale & Subscale Means, Standard Deviations, & 
Reliability Estimates for Study Two   
     α  M  SD 
Compassion   .90  3.84  .60 
 
Kindness   .77         3.90              .64 
 
Indifference   .68  3.60  .60 
 
Common Humanity  .70  4.06  .63 
 
Separation   .64  3.72  .58 
 
Mindfulness   .67  3.96  .57 
 
Disengagement   .57  3.82  .56 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Overall compassion scores were calculated by reverse scoring the Indifference, 
Separation, and Disengagement items then summing all subscale means.  
 
Socially Desirable Responding. The CS was assessed for socially desirable 
responding to make sure that responses were based on compassion and not the need to 
look favorable to others. As indicated in Table 4, there was a significant correlation 
between socially desirable responding as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Scale and 
the CS, but it was quite low, r = .19. Given the nature of the construct, it is not unusual 
that some socially desirable responding may occur. However, due to the fact that there 
was an association, all correlations reported below controlled for socially desirable 
responding. (Note that correlations in Table 4 are zero-order correlations.) 
 
Validity Analyses  
 Convergent Validity. As expected, the CS showed a significant partial correlation 
(controlling for social desirability) with a general question about participant’s level of 




 Providing support for convergent validity, measures of compassionate love, social 
connectedness, wisdom and empathy were all significantly correlated to the CS (All 
correlations related to convergent validity can be found in Table 6). Both the Close 
Others Version and the Stranger-Humanity Version of the Compassion Love Scale were 
significantly correlated to the CS. Further, the Social Connectedness Scale was 
significantly correlated to the CS. All three subscales of the 3-Dimensional Wisdom 
Scale were significantly correlated with the highest being the Affective Subscale as 
would be expected.  
In addition, the two measures of empathy, The Empathic Concern Subscale of the 
Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index and Mehrabian’s Questionnaire Measure of 
Empathic Tendency were significantly correlated to the CS. The Perspective Taking 
Subscale of the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index was also significantly correlated to 
the CS. Further, the Personal Distress Subscale of the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index had a significant but quite small negative correlation to the CS. 
Contrary to hypothesis, the Southampton Mindfulness Scale had a small negative 
correlation to compassion. It was assumed that mindfulness would have a moderate and 
positive association with compassion given that it is one of the three components of the 














TABLE 6  Correlations between the Compassion Scale (CS) & Convergent Measures 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Measure         r 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Compassionate Love Scale 
Close Others Version       .54* 
Stranger-Humanity Version      .27* 
Social Connectedness Scale       .41* 
Ardelt 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale 
 Affective Subscale       .56* 
 
Ardelt 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale 
 Reflective Subscale       .26* 
 Cognitive Subscale       .39* 
Empathy Scales 
 Davis IRI (Empathic Concern Subscale)    .65* 
 Davis IRI (Perspective Taking Subscale)    .35* 
 Mehrabian Questionnaire of Empathic Tendency   .58* 




Discriminant validity. In addition to providing support for convergent validity, the 
findings above support the contention that the correlations with other constructs were not 
so high as to suggest that any of these constructs were the same as compassion. Thus, this 
provides some initial support of discriminant validity. 
 To provide additional support for discriminant validity, the CS was compared to 
the Compassionate Love Scale. It was hypothesized given the nature of the theoretical 
structure of the CS that it would have stronger associations with social connectedness 
(The Social Connectedness Scale), mindfulness (The Southampton Mindfulness Scale), 
and wisdom (The 3-Dimension Wisdom Scale) than the Compassionate Love Scale 
would.  
 In comparing correlations between the CS and the Compassionate Love Scale for 
the Close-Others Version to social connectedness and wisdom, it was found that the 
correlations were not significantly different, p > .05. However, the correlations between 
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the CS and the Stranger-Humanity Version of the Compassion were statistically different 
for social connectedness, t (436) = 6.15, p <.01 and the three subscales of wisdom, 
Affective subscale, t (436) = 5.23, p <.01, Cognitive subscale, t (436) = 4.81, p < .01 and 
Reflective subscale, t (436) = 2.75, p <.01. 
Although the Southampton Mindfulness Scale did not significantly or positively 
correlate with the CS as hypothesized, it’s worth noting that the correlations between the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire and both versions of the Compassionate Love 
Scale were not significant either.  
Compassion & Self-Compassion 
Whether or not compassion and self-compassion would be related was proposed 
as an open question. Findings indicated that there was no association between             
self-compassion and compassion, r = .01, p = .69. Those low in self-compassion (based 
on a median split, M = 2.60) had high compassion scores (M = 3.84).  Those with high 
levels of self-compassion (M = 3.50) had compassion scores that were relatively similar  
(M = 3.81). 
Gender Differences 
It was hypothesized that women would have higher levels of compassion than 
men. An independent-samples t test indicated that women (M = 3.96, SD = .41) have a 
significantly higher overall compassion score than men (M= 3.62, SD = .48), t (437) = 
7.65, p =.00. 
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Study Three: Cross Validation Study 
 
A cross-validation sample is a good way to provide support for findings when 
both the developmental sample and the cross validation sample evidence similar internal 
consistency and factor structure. This would suggest that the findings were less 
determined by chance and that the true source of the findings was more likely generated 
from the items themselves.  
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis #1: A confirmatory factor analysis would confirm that the items 
perform adequately well together in a correlated six-factor model as was the case in 
Study 1. 
Hypothesis #2: A confirmatory factor analysis would reveal a single, higher order 
factor of compassion that explains the inter-correlations among the six factors at least as 
well as was the case in Study1. 
Hypothesis #3: Reliability estimates would evidence good internal consistency as 
was the case in Study 1. 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
 Participants included 510 undergraduate students (238 men; 272 women; M age 
21.4 years; SD = 3.29) who were randomly assigned from an educational psychology 
subject pool at a large Southwestern university. The ethnic breakdown of the sample was 




4% Mixed Ethnicity, 2% Foreign, and 2% Other. Participants completed the measures 
online.   
Measures 
Compassion. The Compassion Scale was re-administered. See Study 2 for details.  
Results 
Confirmatory Analyses: Correlated Six Factor Model & Higher-Order Factor Model 
For the validation sample, Lisrel 8.80 was used to conduct the confirmatory 
analyses. A correlated model was conducted again to cross-validate that the 24 items 
would replicate the findings from the first sample. The model indicated good fit once 
again. Using Hu and Bentler’s (1998) joint criteria all indices met or exceeded criteria 
except for one (RMSEA) that was marginal (CFI = .98; NNFI= .97; SRMR= .05 and 
RMSEA= .06). In addition, a higher-order factor analysis was re-conducted. The model 
indicated better fit than in the first sample. In the first sample two of the indices 
suggested marginal fit while two of the indices indicated good fit. In this second sample, 
Hu and Bentler’s (1998) criteria suggest that only one index suggests marginal fit 
(RMSEA = .06), but the other three of the joint criteria suggest good to excellent fit 
(NNFI = .97; CFI = .97; SRMR = .05). Therefore, both the correlated model and the 
higher order model appear to suggest good fit. In addition, they both replicated findings 
from the first sample. Table 7 reports the correlations between factors for the             







TABLE 7 Inter-Correlations between Factors for the Cross-Validation Study 
         F1   F2             F3  F4              F5              F6  
Kindness (F1)      1.00 
 
Indifference (F2)   -.58  1.00 
 
Common        .48               .34       1.00 
Humanity (F3)        
Separation (F4)      -.52              -.61           -.33          1.00 
 
Mindfulness (F5)    .54                .47             .50           .44           1.00 
 





The Cronbach’s alpha for this second sample for the CS was .87. In addition, 
split-half reliability was also calculated in the same way as it was in the first sample so 
that the two forms as equivalent as possible. The split-half coefficient was .86. These 
reliability estimates were slightly lower than in the first sample, but still good. These 
reliability estimates also suggest good reliability for the CS. Thus, this cross-validation 
provides support that the items were capturing the latent variable given similar findings 
in the confirmatory correlated model, the confirmatory higher order model, and the 
reliability estimates. Table 8 reports the means, standard deviations, and reliability 





TABLE 8 Compassion Scale & Subscale Means, Standard Deviations, & Reliability 
Estimates for the Cross-Validation Study   
     α  M  SD 
Compassion   .87  3.57  .61 
 
Kindness   .83  3.89  .67   
 
Indifference   .71  3.52  .59   
 
Common Humanity  .71  4.07  .61   
 
Separation   .68  3.59  .59   
 
Mindfulness   .72  4.02  .58   
 
Disengagement   .71  2.32  .64  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Overall compassion scores were calculated by reverse scoring the Indifference, 




Chapter Five: Discussion 
“If you want others to be happy, practice compassion. If you want to be happy, practice 
compassion.” 
-The Dalai Lama 
 These studies indicate that the Compassion Scale has good psychometric 
properties. The Self-Compassion Scale was used as a model for this scale. Both the 
theoretical groundwork and the psychometric success of the Self-Compassion Scale 
supported adopting this model for the Compassion Scale. The Compassion Scale actually 
resulted in better fit indices than the Self-Compassion Scale. This is promising given that 
the Self-Compassion Scale has been used effectively in many research studies (e.g. Leary 
et al., 2007; Pauley et al., 2010; Neff & Vonk, 2009; Neff et al., 2007; Thompson, 2008; 
Raes, 2010; Ying, 2009).  
 Results for the Compassion Scale indicate that the six-factor correlated and 
higher order model have good fit both in the initial sample and in the cross-validation 
sample using Hu and Bentler’s (1998) criteria. Further, Cronbach’s alpha and  split-half 
reliability estimates also suggest good reliability. There was a significant association 
between socially desirable responding and the Compassion Scale. Given the nature of the 
construct, it is not wholly unanticipated that responding in a way to look more 
compassionate to others may occur. However, the association was small enough to 
suggest that the Compassion Scale is primarily measuring the targeted construct.  
Content Validity 
Content validity was established in part by having the Compassion Scale 
examined by experts. A general question about concern for the suffering of others was 




validity. The over-arching goal of the Compassion Scale was to measure compassion as 
defined by Neff (2003a): “being touched by the suffering of others, opening one’s 
awareness to others’ pain and not avoiding or disconnecting from it, so that feelings of 
kindness towards others and the desire to alleviate their suffering emerge” (p. 86-87). 
Thus, this rough estimate along with the expert review provided support for the content 
validity of the Compassion Scale.  
 
Convergent & Discriminant Validity 
Study two examined the link between the Compassion Scale and various other 
scales with similar content in order to provide convergent validity for the scale. It was 
expected that these scales would evidence a moderate correlation, explaining the 
overlapping content. At the same time, given the discrepant aspects of the scales, it was 
expected that correlations would not be so high as to suggest that the scales were 
measuring the same construct thus providing some preliminary support for discriminant 
validity as well.  
As predicted, the Compassion Scale had a positive correlation with the 
Compassionate Love Scale, both for close others and for strangers. These correlations 
were in the moderate range, suggesting that the two scales are related but that are not 
overlapping to the point of redundancy. The Compassionate Love Scale and the 
Compassion Scale are both composed of elements of kindness, caring, and concern for 
others in instances of suffering. The major difference in definition and in structure is that 
the Compassion Scale also explicitly suggests that compassion is additionally composed 




Compassionate Love Scale (CLS) had a stronger correlation with the Compassion Scale 
(CS) than the Stranger-Humanity version did. This seems counter-intuitive at first, given 
that the Compassion Scale is aimed at others in general and not close-others in particular. 
However, many items in the Stranger-Humanity version of the Compassionate Love 
Scale explicitly use the word “stranger.”  For instance, one item reads “I try to understand 
rather than judge people who are strangers to me.”  It may be that the use of the word 
“stranger” actually heightens a sense of disconnection with others, rather than 
recognizing the common humanity of self and others. In fact, it may be that the        
Close-Others version includes a stronger sense of common humanity than the      
Stranger-Humanity version does. It is easier to have a stronger sense of connection with 
close others (family and friends) than strangers. Therefore, while the concept of common 
humanity may not be explicitly stated in the Close-Others version of the Compassionate 
Love Scale, it may be inherently included/facilitated through the inclusion of family and 
friends.  
The Social Connectedness Scale was also found to be moderately and positively 
correlated Compassion Scale as predicted. It was presumed that the element of common 
humanity (a sense of understanding for others) within compassion would facilitate a 
strong sense of social connection with others.  
There was a significant moderate correlation of the Compassion Scale with the 
Ardelt 3-Dimension Wisdom Scale, as expected. The Wisdom Scale consists of three 
separate components proposed to make up wisdom including the Affective subscale, the 
Reflective subscale, and the Cognitive subscale. All three subscales were positively 




suggest that a conceptualization of wisdom based on Buddhist principles is related to a 
Buddhist conceptualization of compassion as anticipated. Also as expected, the strongest 
association was that of the Affective subscale to the Compassion Scale. It was presumed 
that the Affective subscale would strongly correlate with compassion given that this 
subscale is meant to assess positive emotions and behavior including sympathy and 
compassion (Ardelt, 2003).  
Both measures of empathy, the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the 
Mehrabian Questionnaire measure of empathic tendency were positively and moderately 
associated with compassion as theorized. The three subscales from the Davis 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index used in this study include Perspective Taking, Empathic 
Concern, and Personal Distress. Perspective taking, as one would expect involves seeing 
a situation from the point of view of another. Empathic concern is simply the ability to 
feel sympathy and/or compassion for others. Finally, personal distress is described as 
uncomfortable feelings that arise out of experiencing another’s distress (Davis & Franzoi, 
1991). As would be expected, empathic concern had the strongest association of the three 
to the Compassion Scale. Given that the Davis subscale of Empathic concern is also a 
western conceptualization of empathy and/or compassion (note: compassion is often used 
as an interchangeable word and/or definition of empathy in this literature) a moderate 
positive correlation may account for the similar and discriminant aspects between the two 
constructs. Perspective taking was also moderately and positively correlated to 
compassion as expected. It was assumed that in order to exercise common humanity 




another individual’s perspective. In doing so, one could then foster a sense of common 
humanity by putting themselves in the place of the other.  
Although the relationship between personal distress and compassion was not 
predicted a priori, it makes theoretical sense that there would be a significant negative 
correlation between the two constructs. Personal distress has been associated with a 
heightened personal emotional response that becomes so overwhelming that it interferes 
with empathic responding (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Fabes 
et al., 1993). Similarly, compassion for others would be difficult to experience if an 
individual is pre-occupied with their own emotional response. Specifically, to become 
overly concerned with one’s own emotional responding would suggest that an individual 
is not keeping an emotional balance that is central to a mindful and therefore 
compassionate response. Thus, the significant negative correlation between this subscale 
and the Compassion Scale provides some discriminant validity as well. Therefore, taken 
as a whole, each subscale of the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index either performed as 
predicted or performed in a manner theoretically consistent to what would be expected in 
relation to the Compassion Scale. 
Mehrabian’s Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendency also performed as 
expected with a significant and moderate correlation to the Compassion Scale. The 
Mehrabian is a more general measure of empathy. It has been suggested that it measure a 
variety of related constructs including but not limited to sympathy, personal distress, 
perspective taking, and emotional arousal (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Once again, it was 




in the convergent aspects of the two measures. Elements such as personal distress may 
account for the discrepant aspects.  
Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that the Compassion Scale is functioning 
as it predicted that it would having moderate, significant associations with similar 
constructs of compassionate love, social connectedness, wisdom, empathy, and 
perspective taking.  
In contrast, the hypothesized relationship between mindfulness as measured by 
the Southampton Mindfulness Scale and compassion was not confirmed. Unexpectedly, 
the relationship was not only small but it was also negative. The Southampton 
Mindfulness Scale was chosen because the items appear to be written in a way that 
matches the definition of mindfulness within Neff’s (2003a; 2003b) theoretical model 
adopted for construction of the Compassion Scale. Both the Southampton Mindfulness 
Scale and mindfulness within Neff’s model (2003a; 2003b) reflect mindfulness as a 
balanced emotional perspective.  
However, viewing mindfulness items from the Compassion Scale and the items 
on the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire, it is clear that mindfulness is presented 
as an internal process in the Southampton (i.e. the mindfulness of one’s own painful 
emotions) while in the Compassion Scale mindfulness was written as a process that 
functions jointly with others. For example, some items in the Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire include: (Items respond to the following stem: “Usually when I experience 
distressing thoughts and images…” Example of Items: “They take over my mind for 
quite a while afterwards”; “I judge myself as good or bad, depending on what the 




is a process that involves others. (Example of some mindfulness items on the Compassion 
Scale: “I pay careful attention when other people talk to me.” “I notice when people are 
upset, even when they don’t say anything.” “When people tell me about their problems, I 
try to keep a balanced perspective on the situation.”) Thus, comparing these two sets of 
items, it is clear one presents an internal process, related to the self (Southampton 
Mindfulness Questionnaire) and the other a process that is focused on others 
(Compassion Scale). It is this difference that may account for the unanticipated results 
when correlating the CS to the SMQ. 
In support of this interpretation, it should be noted that self-compassion (also 
focused on the self’s distressing emotions) and mindfulness as measured by the SMQ had 
a positive, significant correlation. Therefore, the selection of measure for mindfulness 
might have been inappropriate for the CS. In the future, it will be important to select 
other measures of mindfulness that take these points into consideration in order to 
establish the relationship between the CS and mindfulness. 
 
Discriminant Validity Based on Comparisons of Compassion and Compassionate Love 
In order to provide additional discriminant validity, the relative strength of 
correlations between the Compassion Scale and the Compassionate Love Scale with other 
measures was examined. Given the differences between these two concepts of 
compassion, it was presumed that Compassion Scale would have a stronger association 
with constructs thought to be related to a conceptualization of compassion consistent with 
Buddhist thought (social connectedness, mindfulness, and wisdom) than the 




of compassion in the Compassion Scale from other more westernized theories of the 
construct. 
It was hypothesized that compassion would have a stronger association with 
social connectedness than compassionate love would. Given that compassion includes a 
sense of common humanity with others it is assumed that a sense of social connection 
would naturally occur. Further, it was presumed that an Eastern conceptualization of 
wisdom would have a stronger association with a Buddhist conceptualization of 
compassion than Compassionate Love, which is a western conceptualization. The 
Compassion Scale did have a significantly stronger association with social connectedness 
and wisdom than the Stranger-Humanity version of the Compassionate Love Scale did. 
However, this finding was not replicated with the Close-Others version. It may be that 
use of terminology in each of the version may accounts for the finding. Many items in the 
social connectedness scale measures connectedness in terms of connectedness to peers 
and friends. In the Close-Others version a sense of social connectedness may naturally be 
facilitated in the use of terminology that directs compassionate love at friends and family. 
In contrast in the Stranger-Humanity version, the word “stranger” is used often and may 
promote a sense of alienation. Thus, either with built sense of social connection (with the 
inclusion of friends or family) or the absence of this same sentiment (with the inclusion 
of strangers) may account for the reason why there was a difference between the 
Compassion Scale and the Stranger-Humanity version but not the Close-Others version. 
The relationship between mindfulness and the Compassion Scale did not provide 
support for discriminant validity. Neither the Compassion Scale nor the Compassionate 




specific scale used, the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire. As previously stated, 
the conceptualization of mindfulness in the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire may 
reflect more of an internal conceptualization of mindfulness while the Compassion Scale 
and the Compassionate Love Scale are written to represent compassion as an external 
process.  
 
Link between Compassion for Others and Self-Compassion 
The relationship between compassion and self-compassion was proposed as an 
open question given conflicting rationales for how they would relate to each other. It was 
thought that the two constructs may be related given they have the same theoretical 
structure and base definition. However, it was also thought that they may be unrelated 
because: 1) compassion is directed towards others as opposed to the self; and 2) 
individuals are often more compassionate to others than they are themselves (Neff et al., 
2008). The results indicated that there was no relationship between self-compassion and 
compassion. 
Thus, even though the same model of compassion was used to measure           
self-compassion and compassion for others, findings suggest that the two are unrelated.  
This is largely explained by the fact that individuals who were either high or low in    
self-compassion were both kind to others. While self-compassionate people were equally 
kind to themselves and others, those lacking in self-compassion reported much higher 
levels of compassion toward others.  
In addition, it should be first noted that while elements of kindness, common 




constructs were conceptualized differently given the orientation of compassion being 
directed to others as opposed to the self. A lack of kindness for self exhibits itself in a 
critical and judging internal voice. A lack of kindness for others suggests a cold and 
indifferent view projected to others. If an individual does not feel an internal sense of 
connection with others (common humanity) then they feel cut off or isolated. If an 
individual does feel connection for others, then they feel separate or different from 
others. A lack of emotional balance will lead an individual to dwell or over-identify with 
problems, inadequacies, etc. An inability to balance an emotional response when 
encountering the suffering of others would lead one to retract, disengage, or deny that 
suffering. Thus, three of six components of the model for compassion are explicitly 
conceptualized differently from that of self-compassion.  
There may also be a cultural component to the finding that self-focused and   
other-focused compassion are unrelated. The current finding was obtained with a 
predominantly White American sample. The 2008 Statistical Abstract from the U.S. 
Census Bureau indicates that Christianity in its various forms is the largest religious 
group in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, The 2010 Statistical Abstract, 2010). A 
key principle in Christianity is that sacrificing the self for others is virtuous. Perhaps, 
individuals have learned that it is virtuous to be hard on themselves and simultaneously 
kind to others in order to be a good person. Notably, when monks first came to the United 
States to teach meditation, they were astounded by the presence of self-loathing in this 
culture. It was a concept they were unfamiliar with in their own culture (Goleman, 2003).  
For this reason, it will be important to determine the relationship between 




self-compassion and compassion for others are equally valued. It is presumed that in 
those populations where compassion and self-compassion do not function differentially 
that the association between these two constructs will be stronger. 
 
Gender Differences in Compassion 
Women were found to have higher levels of compassion than men, as predicted. 
Given that women were found to be more empathic in previous findings (e.g. Eisenberg 
& Lennon, 1983; Zahn-Waxler, Cole, & Barrett, 1991) and that empathy was theorized to 
be moderately related to compassion, it was assumed that women might have higher 
levels of compassion than men. Further, as outlined in the theory of Gilligan (1993) 
women may tend to embrace compassionate roles with others.  
The findings of the gender differences may also lend support for the differential 
functioning of compassion and self-compassion. Women were found to have higher 
levels of compassion than men, as predicted. In the case of self-compassion, Neff (2003a) 
found that women have significantly lower levels of overall self-compassion than men. 
Given that it was found that women have higher levels of compassion (in the current 
study) yet lower levels of self-compassion (in Neff’s 2003a study), it would appear that 
women may be more compassionate to others than they are to themselves. Thus, it may 
be that the differential functioning of compassion and self-compassion may not only be a 
cultural phenomenon as suggested in the previous section, but there may also be a gender 
difference in how compassionate individuals are to themselves and others. Further 






In sum, most of the hypotheses were confirmed according to prediction. Only two 
predictions were not supported. First, the link between the Compassion Scale and 
mindfulness was not supported. It may be that this was not due to a failure to predict the 
construct, but a problem with the selection of the scale to measure mindfulness. Second, 
the Compassion Scale did not have significantly stronger association with wisdom or 
social connectedness than the Close-Others version of the Compassionate Love Scale. It 
is presumed that the inclusion of family and friends in the items in this version may have 
created a sense of common humanity thus accounting for this finding. Taken as a whole, 
these findings are very promising and timely. Compassion is becoming an increasing 
important topic of study in Western psychology. Moreover, psychologists are becoming 
more and more interested in the benefits of Buddhist conceptualizations of mindfulness 
and compassion (Allen & Knight, 2005; Gilbert, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2010; Goetz et al., 
2010; Frederickson et al., 2008; Goleman, 2003; Harrington, 2002; Hutcherson et al., 
2008; Keltner, 2009; Oevis & Keltner, 2010; Wang, 2005). Thus, a scale to measure the 
concept should facilitate the ability to empirically investigate theoretical assumptions 
about the construct. This will be especially true when evaluating the effectiveness of 
Buddhist meditation practices as a way to increase the compassion for others. 
 
Limitations 
It should be noted that there are limitations to the present study. First, selection of 
the Southampton Mindfulness Scale may have been a poor selection for mindfulness in 




process of mindfulness while compassion is clearly a process that involves others. In 
future studies, it will be important to establish a connection between compassion and 
mindfulness given that mindfulness is one of the three component parts of the construct. 
Of course, an appropriate measure that describes mindfulness as an interpersonal process 
as opposed to an intrapersonal process will be necessary. However, at this time, there 
appears to be no available measure of mindfulness as interpersonal process.  
Second, as often stated in many studies, student samples are a drawback. They 
were a drawback in the development of the Compassion Scale. To develop a scale it is 
preferable to sample from a wider range of the population in order to generalize findings 
to populations other than student populations. Further, as is the case most often with 
student samples, individuals in the sample identified mostly as White. As such, cultural 
and ethnic diversity was limited. This was a particular limitation in this study because it 
may not have given a broader and more inclusive picture of how self-compassion and 
compassion are related. Given that internal and external processes may manifest quite 
differently as a function of culture and gender, it will be important in future studies to 
assess specifically if: 1) cultures or groups that value/practice self and other oriented 
compassion would evidence a stronger association between self-compassion and 
compassion; and 2) women have differential functioning where they exhibit much higher 
levels of compassion for others than they do for themselves. Thus, an ideal would be to 
investigate findings with more diverse populations in the future and to further assess 
possible gender differences. 
Third, it should be noted that self-report measures have their limitations. Most 




to that concern, individuals may also assume that they are more compassionate than they 
in fact are. Thus, individuals may report compassion levels that they believe to be true 
but may not seem to match behavior thought to be compassionate or be supported by 
informant reports.  
Future Directions 
There are many possible future directions in terms of examining the psychological 
processes associated with compassion. First, in order to provide further support for the 
scale, other studies will need to be conducted comparing the scale to a variety of other 
constructs (e.g. forgiveness, altruism, and depression). Further, a known-groups 
validation study should be conducted comparing a general sample (e.g. student sample) 
from a sample that should theoretically score high on compassion (e.g. Buddhists who 
meditate).  
In addition, it will be important to determine whether a relationship between 
mindfulness (as one of the key components of the scale) and compassion exists when 
mindfulness is measured in terms of external rather than internal phenomena.  
It would also be useful to further examine compassion’s relation to social 
desirability in additional studies, especially since compassion may be differentially 
related to different forms of social desirability. Paulhus (1984) has a two component 
model of socially desirable responding. One form focuses on deceiving others so that the 
self is viewed more positively (impression management), while the other focuses on a 
lack of self-awareness (self-deception). Future research should examine the link between 
scores on the Compassion Scale and socially desirable responding using the Paulhus 




understanding of the role of socially desirable responding in the assessment of 
compassion. 
Future studies should also focus on ways of assessing compassion that do not rely 
on self-reports. For instance, there may be physiological markers that help to detect a 
compassionate stance in individuals—such as skin conductants, facial expressions, 
facial/muscle contractions, heart rate, and breathing rate. Ekman’s extensive work (e.g. 
Ekman, 2007; Ekman et al., 2005) with emotion has centered on facial expressions 
particularly with emotions of anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. Perhaps, 
these particular emotions lend themselves to facial expression more than other emotions. 
Keltner (2009) suggests that there may be alternative ways to measure emotion other than 
facial expression. For example, he suggests that it may be useful to try to investigate if 
compassion can be communicated and thus measured through touch. It is suggested that 
compassion may not easily be communicated through facial expression but may be 
communicated more readily through touch, posture, and vocalization (Goetz et al., 2010).  
Another possibility for future assessment of compassion may be to assess brain 
activity while individuals are actively engaging in compassionate feelings. For example, 
Davidson (2006) has done some preliminary work using fMRI (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging) to investigate the brain activity of monks while they were 
specifically meditating on compassion. His small sample size (participants were monks) 
limited his ability to report his findings formally, but this was an important first step to 
begin to assess compassion biologically. 
Another possibility would be to compare self report to well-designed informant 




compassion may be the best way to measure an overall compassionate response in 
individuals. Although multi-method matrix analysis is not used very often, probably due 
to the effort that it requires, it may be the best way to provide evidence of successfully 
capturing the construct. Campbell & Fiske (1959) indicate that evidence of convergent 
validity is established when different methods of measuring the same trait produces 
intended results.  
Examining the relationship of compassion to markers of positive physical and 
psychological health will also be particularly important. In the growing field of positive 
psychology, there is a body of research indicating that there is an association between 
social support and positive physical and psychological health (e.g. Cohen & Syme, 1985; 
Fredrickson, 2003; Pierce, Sarason, & Sarason, 1996; Uchiono, 2004; Wachholtz & 
Pearce, 2007). It would be of interest to also investigate the relationship between 
compassion and these positive markers. Theoretically, compassion could be one of the 
active agents in the relationship between positive health outcomes and social support 
(Waccholtz & Pearce, 2007). In the future, it would be advantageous to investigate to see 
if compassion could act as a mediator in the relationship between social support and 
positive health outcomes. Further, compassion may also be a mediator for other           
pre-existing findings between religion and helping and these positive health outcomes as 
well.  
Additionally, compassion may act as a buffer for negative psychological states. 
The premise that the generation of compassionate feelings is actually beneficial not only 
for the recipient but also the donor is beginning to be recognized (e.g. Crocker & 




compassion may act as a buffer against a host of negative emotions such as fear, anger, 
envy, and vengeance. Therefore, compassion may be related to positive states and buffer 
negative ones. Further research with the assistance of the Compassion Scale may be a 
first step in beginning to understand the relationship that compassion has to variety of 
other constructs.  
The scale may also be of great use to test previous theoretical assumptions in 
counseling and therapy about compassion. Compassion or terms that Gilbert (2005) 
suggests are more scientifically-sounding pseudonyms of compassion (e.g. empathy, 
unconditional positive regard, containment or holding, client-therapist rapport, and 
working alliance) have been thought to be beneficial in a variety of ways in therapy. For 
example, Teasdale (1997) suggests that compassion allows for the separation of a painful 
experience from a client’s identity; once that separation has occurred the client can let go 
of the painful experience. Bates (2005) further reports that when the counselor or 
therapist demonstrates compassion it allows clients to learn how to be more                
self-compassionate. Thus, this skill can be learned and taken away from the counseling 
experience when counseling is finished. Compassion has also been cited as a possible 
remediator for depression (Allen & Knight, 2005). These theoretical assumptions are 
based off of practical counseling experiences, but now can begin to be scientifically 
investigated with the use of the Compassion Scale.  
In addition, the scale may be of use in other fields that require compassionate care 
similar to counseling and therapy. For example, in the medical field and educational 
settings compassionate delivery of services may effectively bolster the health of patients 




(e.g. Figley, 2002; Keidel, 2002), the problem of compassion fatigue has been discussed 
and research has been conducted to remediate the problem of burnout within professions 
requiring emotional care. The emergence of the term “compassion fatigue” came out of a 
practical problem in terms of applied care in therapy and physical health. Thus, there has 
been research on compassion fatigue without any initial research on compassion itself. 
Perhaps, research on compassion may shed light on the functioning of compassion 
fatigue if the two constructs, in fact, do have a relationship. The use of the Compassion 
Scale may be of use in these instances to begin the investigation of these practical 
problems within professions that provide emotional care.  
Further, there appears to be a philosophical inconsistency within the medical 
profession. Although the profession claims to value compassion as a cornerstone of its 
ethics in the field (American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics; 1981), 
in practice, medical students are often taught that emotional engagement with patients is 
problematic and that their approach should be more “objective” in delivery of medical 
services (Ladner, 2004). Research to scientifically address this contention in the field 
may be applicable to the practical delivery of services in medicine in the future. 
In the field of education, it may be that compassionate interaction between 
instructors and students facilitates learning. Teacher expectation and bias has been related 
to the actual performance of students either facilitating or putting a damper on student 
academic outcomes (e.g. de Boer et al., 2010). Further, student perception of alienation 
from teachers has been linked to student dropout from school (e.g. Wayman, 2002). 
Assessing the effect of compassion in these instances may prove informative about the 




they may impact learning and retention. Compassion may also be important for 
facilitating relationships among students in educational settings. Bullying has become a 
salient issue in schools and has started to be addressed in research studies (e.g. van 
Goethem, 2010; Due et al., 2009). In the past, “school yard antics” were considered 
harmless in nature and of little importance for adults to address. However, with the 
advent of such incidences as Columbine High School massacre in 1999, it has become 
clear that bullying in school is a serious problem. Assessing instructor and student 
compassion levels in differentially functioning school settings may provide more 
information about the relevancy of compassion in these settings. 
In addition, the compassion scale could be used with a variety of compassion 
trainings that are beginning to emerge. For example, Gilbert (2005) has begun to develop 
a therapy training to help clients develop compassion referred to as compassionate mind 
training. Further, several studies have begun to examine a Buddhist meditation called 
loving-kindness meditation (e.g. Carson et al, in press; Fredrickson et al., 2008; 
Hutcherson et al., 2008). This meditation requires that individuals to begin the meditation 
thinking about close others with warm feelings and gradually apply those feelings to a 
widening circle of others. Specifically, Frederickson and colleagues (2008) reported in 
their study that their measure of compassion was inadequate. They measured compassion 
with one question. They suggested in future directions that an adequate measure would 
help. Perhaps the Compassion Scale could be used to assess the acquisition of 
compassion in these experimental studies utilizing different types of compassion training. 
Lastly, it would be of interest to look at compassion in relation to religiosity 




inspired by Buddhist thought, it is clearly presumed that other religious and spiritual 
traditions also have some overlapping understanding and practice of compassion. 
Theoretically, selfless love is theorized to be strongly associated with compassion both in 
Buddhism and in other religious traditions as well. Thus, measures of religiosity and 
spirituality may provide further support of convergent validity for the scale and may be a 
useful endeavor for future studies.  
Conclusion 
Hopefully, the Compassion Scale will be of great use in psychology given that 
many Buddhist concepts are receiving more and more attention within the field. The scale 
is expected to be of use for: 1) researchers assessing outcomes related to Buddhist 
practices such as meditation; 2) assessing compassion’s relation to positive markers of 
physical and psychological health; 3) compassion’s possible buffer from negative 
psychological states; 4) fields of counseling and therapy; and 5) medical professions that 
require compassionate care, and educational settings that would benefit from a 
compassionate stance between instructor and student and also between students.  
Compassion is considered a very powerful and important concept. Applying it to 
a scientific analysis suggests that intellect and emotion are not mutually exclusive. Not 
only can compassion be subjected to a scientific analysis, an understanding of 
compassion is sorely needed in science because without a sense of humanity, our intellect 
is lost: 
 So relying on reason alone is dangerous. Look where ‘reason’ and ‘intelligence’ 
has brought us! Reason in itself is blind to the considerations of deeper moral 




intelligence. It is our basic humanity that must guide our intelligence in the 
positive direction. The key to genuine peace lies in each of us reconnecting with 
the power of our mother’s love, the affection that nurtured us when we were all 
children…Even as a vision based on proper motivation can lead to wonders, when 
one’s motivation is divorced from basic feeling, its potential for destruction 
cannot be overestimated.              






Initial Item Pool  
Total: 118 items 
 
 
Kindness (22 Items) 
 
1. When others suffer, I feel badly for them. 
 
2. I try not to condemn others for their drawbacks. 
 
3. When evaluating others, I do not try to find fault with them. 
 
4. If I see someone else’s weakness, I try not to be overly critical of their failings. 
 
5. I try not to be judgmental of others when they fail. 
 
6. If I see someone going through a difficult time, I try to be caring towards that person. 
 
7. When I see someone upset that I do not like I still try to be understanding. 
 
8. If I see someone struggling with their problems, I try to be kind to them. 
 
9. When I see someone feeling down, I want to offer my support. 
 
10. When someone is in need, I feel for that person. 
 
11. I am forgiving of other’s mistakes. 
 
12. When others feel sadness, I would lessen it if I could.  
 
13. When others are upset I feel concern for them. 
 
14. When I see someone feeling miserable, I try to show consideration to that person. 
 
15. My heart goes out to people who are unhappy. 
 
16. When others need my help, I want to offer it. 
 
17. If I encounter someone who is distraught, I try to soothe that person with kind words. 
 








Appendix A (continued) 
 
19. In times of trouble, I like to offer my assistance. 
 
20. I like to be there for others in times of difficulty. 
 
21. When others experience a painful loss I feel compelled to console them. 
 
22. I like to reassure others when they are worried. 
 
Indifference (19 Items) 
 
23. I tend to be tough on others.  
 
24. I can be judgmental of others. 
 
25. Sometimes I am cold to others when they are down and out. 
 
26. Some people deserve the trouble that they get themselves into. 
 
27. I do not think much about the concerns of others. 
 
28. If I see someone who is upset it is hard for me to offer encouragement. 
 
29. I have too much to worry about without concerning myself with the problems of other 
people. 
 
30. I can be nit-picky. 
 
31. To be honest, I don’t really care about people who are starving in third world 
countries. 
 
32. Sometimes I am too focused on myself to care about what happens to other people. 
 
33. There are times when people talk about their problems that I feel like I don’t care. 
 
34. Sometimes I avoid feeling concern for others because it will make me look too soft. 
 
35. When others are feeling troubled, I would rather allow someone else to attend to 
them. 
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37. I find it difficult to come up with kind words when someone is experiencing 
emotional pain. 
 
38. Attending to people who are upset takes up too much of my emotional energy. 
 
39. When others are beside themselves with their issues, they need to work it out on their 
own without any help from me. 
 
40. I am distant to people experiencing pain. 
 
41. When someone talks about their problems, I feel detached from them. 
 
Common Humanity (23 Items) 
 
42. When I see someone going through a hard time I try to comfort that person by 
explaining that everyone has problems. 
 
43. I believe that everyone feels bad at times. 
 
44. Suffering is just a part of the common human experience. 
 
45. If I see someone in distress, I sit with that person so that they don’t feel so alone. 
 
46. When I see someone in a difficult situation I identify with that person because I know 
that we are all human. 
 
47. I think that everyone makes mistakes at some point. 
 
48. When times are bad for others I recognize their experience as common to my own. 
 
49. The gap between others and myself is small because we share a common human 
experience. 
 
50. I value the experiences of others because I can connect to them through my own 
experiences. 
 
51. If I see someone who feels embarrassed I try to help him feel better by sharing an 
embarrassing story about myself.  
 
52. I think everyone experiences failure in life. 
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54. When others are feeling down, I encourage them to share their problems with me to 
help them realize that they are not alone. 
 
55. Because we are all human, I recognize that people who don’t look like me still feel 
pain just like I do. 
 
56. I can relate to others in times of need because we are all human. 
 
57. People’s private pain is easier to bear when they share it with others. 
 
58. My experience is similar to other people because we share a common human 
experience. 
 
59. Despite my differences with others, I know that everyone feels pain just like me. 
 
60. Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human. 
 
61. Everyone has limitations, including myself. 
 
62. People are the same wherever you go because everyone wants to be happy. 
 
63. When others are upset, I try to help them feel connected to me to alleviate their 
emotional pain. 
 
64. If I see someone going through a loss, I try to communicate my understanding to that 
person. 
 
Separation (18 Items) 
 
65. When others fail, I just feel glad that it wasn’t me. 
 
66. I have trouble finding common ground with others. 
 
67. Sometimes when I listen to the problems of others, I can’t empathize with their 
situation because I am so different from them. 
 
68. When someone else feels bad, I tend to think that I could never feel as bad as they do. 
 
69. Because I am happier than other people, I don’t have a lot of sympathy for others who 
are down in their luck. 
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71. When I see someone excluded from the group I am just happy not to be that person. 
 
72. Our differences as people do matter, because some people just can’t measure up to 
life’s expectations. 
 
73. The world is a lonely place because everyone has to handle problems themselves. 
 
74. I don’t feel emotionally connected to others. 
 
75. Feeling isolated from others is just how life is. 
 
76. People have to make their own way in life.  
 
77. When someone is having a difficult time, I know that they just have to deal with their 
issues on their own. 
 
78. Sometimes people just have to suffer alone. 
 
79. Everyone has to deal with their own shortcomings by themselves. 
 
80. Even in a crowd of people, I feel disconnected from others. 
 
81. I feel detached from others. 
 
82. When I see someone feeling hopeless, I feel like I can’t relate to them. 
 
Mindfulness (17 Items) 
 
83. When someone else tells me about a problem and is overly negative about it, I try to 
keep a balanced perspective on the situation. 
 
84. When I see someone getting emotional, I am willing to be open to that person’s pain. 
 
85. When bad news hits, I try to help everyone stay calm. 
 
86. When I see someone suffering, I try to help that person not become preoccupied with 
it. 
 
87. I am responsive to others when they are going through a hard time. 
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89. I listen to others carefully when they are telling me about their problems. 
 
90. I feel for others deeply when they are struggling with their problems. 
 
91. I try to be there for other people when times are tough. 
 
92. When other people are bothered by their problems, I notice. 
 
93. I am willing to pay attention to others when they are upset. 
 
94. I don’t avoid people who are having a hard time. 
 
95. When others are experiencing tough times, I try to help them keep a balanced outlook 
on their circumstances. 
 
96. I stay composed when listening to the difficulties of others. 
 
97. When hearing about a loss of someone else, I am receptive to their pain. 
 
98. I don’t get emotionally wrapped up with others’ problems even though I do care. 
 
99. I am open to others in times of trouble. 
 
Disengagement/Over-Identification (19 Items; D= Disengagement Item;  
  O=Over-Identification Item) 
 
100. When watching the news, I feel overwhelmed by the bad things happening in the 
world, and I switch the channel. (D) 
 
101. When people cry in front of me, I often don’t feel anything at all. (D) 
 
102. When listening to the problems of other people, I find myself tuning them out. (D) 
 
103. When I see someone crying I tend to get caught up in her emotion. (O) 
 
104. When others gossip to me, I get caught up in the negativity. (O) 
 
105. When I see someone in pain, it makes me feel so uncomfortable that I can only think 
about my own feelings. (O) 
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107. I can’t stop thinking about all the bad things that happen in the world. (D) 
 
108. I don’t think much about the concerns of others. (D) 
 
109. Sometimes, I can be obsessed with other people’s problems. (O) 
 
110. I get caught up in other’s feelings when they tell me about their problems. (O) 
 
111. I don’t like to get too close to people by listening to their problems. (D) 
 
112. I try to avoid people who are experiencing a lot of pain. (D) 
 
113. When I see images on T.V. of people starving in Africa, I try to shut it out. (D) 
 
114. I often tune out when people tell me about their troubles. (D) 
 
115. If someone tells me about his problems, I try to pretend that I am listening even 
though I am not. (D) 
 
116. If someone starts to cry, I try to leave the room before I start crying as well. (O) 
 
117. When someone is dealing with a loss, I avoid having to talk about it by pretending 
that there is nothing wrong. (D) 
 
118. Life can be overwhelming to the point that I just have to shut down sometimes. (D) 
 
   
      










1. Read the items below.  
2. Indicate which subcategory the item best fits in (i.e. Kindness/Caring versus 
Judgment/Indifference, Common Humanity versus Isolation/Separation, or 
Mindfulness versus Denial/Over-identification) or indicate if you think the item 
doesn’t fit any of those categories. 
3. Indicate if you think the item does not fit the overall construct of compassion. 
4. Indicate if the item does not make sense to you. 
5. Indicate any comments you have after each item and any general comments at the 














































Dear (Dr. Name): 
 
I have a graduate student, Elizabeth Pommier, who is developing a compassion for others 
scale as her dissertation project. The scale will be based on the three-component model of 
self-compassion that I used for the Self-Compassion Scale (self-kindness vs.               
self-judgment, common humanity vs. isolation, and mindfulness vs. over-identification). 
We are assuming that this structure will also apply more generally to compassion, with a 
few modifications. We are going to pilot test some items this fall, and would like to get 
expert feedback regarding what component each potential item belongs to. Given your 
expertise on this topic, we would really appreciate your help. The items are written to be 
either positive or negative reflections of the three components, although at this point we 
are not sure if the positively or negatively worded items will load on separate subscales 
(as they did for the SCS) or not. We will make that determination later using factor 
analysis. We would greatly appreciate your input and feedback on this task, using the 
attached checklist. First, we ask if you could categorize the items in one of the following 
three categories (without worrying about the positive or negative poles at this point): 
 
Kindness/Caring or Judgment/Indifference 
Common Humanity or Isolation/Separation 
Mindfulness or Denial/Over-Identification 
 
Afterwards, please indicate if you think that the item does not fit any of these categories; 
if you think it doesn’t fit the overall construct of compassion; or if it doesn’t make sense 
to you (there are boxes to check to indicate this). We also supply a space for you to 
comment on each item if needed, and a space at the end for general comments. You can 
simply e-mail the checklist that is attached to this email back to us by replying to this 
email, or else send it by mail to: 
 
Attention: Elizabeth Pommier 
Vaughn Gross Center for Reading and Language Arts 
College of Education SZB 228 U of Texas at Austin 
Austin, TX 78712-0365 
 
We hope that you will take few moments to fill this checklist out and help us in our 
endeavor to create a new scale to measure a Buddhist conceptualization of compassion 
for others. 
 
Thank you so much for your time, 
 
 
Dr. Kristin Neff, Associate Professor 
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 (80 Items) 
 
Kindness Subscale  
 
When I see someone feeling down, I want to offer my support.   
   
When others need my help, I want to offer it.  
      
If I see someone going through a difficult time, I try to be caring     
toward that person. 
 
When others feel sadness, I try to comfort them.   
     
When others are upset I feel concern for them.  
     
I like to be there for others in times of difficulty.  
    
I like to reassure others when they are worried.   
     
If I encounter someone who is distraught, I try to soothe that person    
with kind words. 
  
My heart goes out to people who are unhappy.  
      
I try to be kind to people who are going through a hard time.  
   
I try not to be judgmental of others when they fail.  
     
I am forgiving of other’s mistakes.  
       
If I see someone else’s weakness, I try not to be overly critical of     
their failings.  
 




Sometimes when people talk about their problems, I feel like I don’t care.  
  
When others are feeling troubled, I usually let someone else attend to them. 
  
Sometimes I am cold to others when they are down and out. 
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Indifference Subscale (continued) 
 
I’m not very understanding when people disappoint me. 
 
When people make me mad I tend to hold a grudge.  
     
I’m pretty unforgiving of other’s mistakes.  
     
Sometimes I’m indifferent to the plight of others.  
     
I usually don’t feel sorry for people who screw up.  
     
To be honest, I don’t really care about people who are starving     
in third world countries. 
  
I tend to be tough on others when they mess up.  
     
Sometimes, I can be judgmental of others. 
       
I can be critical when people don’t meet my expectations.  
    
When people fail, it’s usually their fault.       
 
Common Humanity Subscale 
 
We should give people who’ve messed up a break because everyone    
makes mistakes sometimes. 
   
I am accepting of other’s flaws as part of what it means to be human. 
   
When people fail, I try to remember that being human means     
being imperfect. 
 
I can relate to others in times of need because we are all human.  
   
Because we are all human, I recognize that other people feel     
pain just like I do. 
 
When I see someone in a difficult situation I identify with that person   
because I know that we are all human. 
 
Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human.   
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Common Humanity Subscale (continued) 
 
It’s important to recognize that all people have weaknesses      
and no one’s perfect.  
 
Suffering is just part of the common human experience.  
     
Despite my differences with others, I know that everyone     
feels pain just like me.  
 
I feel closer to others who are suffering because we share a      
common human experience.  
  
I feel connected to people in pain because we all go through it. 
    
When someone is having a difficult time I realize that I could experience   
the same thing in my life. 
 
Separation Subscale  
 
I don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain. 
     
I can’t really connect with other people when they’re suffering. 
    
When I see someone feeling down, I feel like I can’t relate to them. 
   
I feel detached from others when they tell me their tales of woe.  
   
Other people need to deal with their problems on their own.  
    
When someone is having a difficult time, they just have to deal with    
their issues on their own.  
 
When it comes to life’s troubles, I think it’s every man for himself. . 
   
Other people’s problems are totally separate from my own.   
   
I have trouble finding common ground with people who are failures. 
   
I tend to feel distant from people who make fools of themselves.  
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Separation Subscale (continued) 
 
I find it hard to feel connected to people who are really different from me.  
 
It means little to me that people suffer in far away places because it is   




I tend to listen patiently when people tell me their problems. 
    
I pay careful attention when other people talk to me.  
    
I notice when people are upset, even if they don’t say anything.  
   
I stay calm when people tell me their bad news.  
     
When people tell me about their problems, I try to keep a balanced    
perspective on the situation. 
 
When someone is really upset, I’m able to feel their pain without being   
overwhelmed by it.  
 
I don’t get carried away by other people’s drama. 
      
I tend to stay grounded even when other people are over-reacting.  
   
I stay composed when listening to the difficulties of others.    
          
When street people ask me for money, I’m aware of how hard    . 
they must have it. 
 




If someone starts to cry, I try to leave the room before I start crying as well.   
 
When I see someone in distress, it is hard for me to manage my own emotions.  
 
When I see someone crying I get too caught up in their emotion.  
   
When I see someone in pain, it makes me really uncomfortable. 
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Disengagement/Over-Identified Subscale (continued) 
 
When bad news hits, I freeze.  
 
When people cry in front of me, I often don’t feel anything at all.  
   
I don’t think much about the concerns of others.  
 
I often tune out when people tell me about their troubles.  
    
I try to avoid people who are experiencing a lot of pain.   
   
I can’t stop thinking about all the bad things that happen in the world.  
  
Sometimes, other people’s problems consume me.  
     
I can get too wrapped up with other people’s problems. 
     
When I see homeless people, I just ignore them.  
     
Life can be so overwhelming that I just have to shut down sometimes.  
  







The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Short Form) 
 
Read each question carefully and then decide whether the statement is true or false and 
write your response in the space provided. There are no right or wrong answers. Please 
only use the numbers that are provided when responding to each statement. 
 
 
   TRUE    FALSE 
       1         2 
 
___1. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
 
___2. There have been a few occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
 
___3. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. 
 
___4. When I do not know something, I do not at all mind admitting it. 
 
___5. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
 
___6. I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
 
___7. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
 
___8. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
 
___9. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they 
deserved. 
 







Compassionate Love Scale 
(Close-Others Version) 
 
Instructions: Please respond to each of the items by circling the number that most 
closely describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
Very True     Somewhat True   Not at All  
of me            of me    True of me 
7  6  5  4  3  2     1 
 
 
1. When I see family members or friends feeling sad, I feel a need to reach out 
to them. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
    
 
2. I spend a lot of time concerned about the well-being of those people close to 
me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
3. When I hear about a friend or family member going through a difficult time, 
I feel a great deal of compassion for him or her. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
4. It is easy for me to feel the pain (and joy) experienced by my loved ones. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
5. If a person close to me needs help, I would do almost anything I could to help 
him or her. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
6. I feel considerable compassionate love for those people important in my life. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
7. I would rather suffer myself than see someone close to me suffer. 
 





8. If given the opportunity, I am willing to sacrifice in order to let the people 
important to me achieve their goals in life. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
9. I tend to feel compassion for people who are close to me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
10. One of the activities that provides me with the most meaning to my life is 
helping others with whom I have a close relationship. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
11. I would rather engage in actions that help my intimate others than engage in 
actions that would help me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
12. I often have tender feelings towards friends and family members when they 
seem to be in need. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
13. I feel a selfless caring for my friends and family. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
14. I accept friends and family members even when they do things I think are 
wrong. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
15. If a family member or close friend is troubled, I usually feel extreme 
tenderness and caring. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
16. I try to understand rather than judge people who are close to me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
17. I try to put myself in my friend’s shoes when he or she is in trouble. 
 





18. I feel happy when I see that loved ones are happy. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
19. Those whom I love can trust that I will be there for them if they need me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
20. I want to spend time with close others so that I can find ways to help enrich 
their lives. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
21. I very much wish to be kind and good to my friends and family members. 
 

































Appendix F (continued) 
 
Compassionate Love Scale 
(Stranger-Humanity Version) 
 
Instructions: Please respond to each of the items by circling the number that most 
closely describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
Very True     Somewhat True   Not at All  
of me            of me    True of me 
7  6  5  4  3  2     1 
 
 
1. When I see people I do not know feeling sad, I feel a need to reach out to 
them. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
2. I spend a lot of time concerned about the well-being of humankind. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
3. When I hear about someone (a stranger) going through a difficult time, I feel 
a great deal of compassion for him or her. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
4. It is easy for me to feel the pain (and joy) experienced by others, even though 
I do not know them. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
5. If I encounter a stranger who needs help, I would do almost anything I could 
to help him or her. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
6. I feel considerable compassionate love for people from everywhere. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
7. I would rather suffer myself than see someone else (a stranger) suffer. 
 





8. If given the opportunity, I am willing to sacrifice in order to let people from 
other places who are less fortunate achieve their goals. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
9. I tend to feel compassion for people even though I do not know them. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
10. One of the activities that provides me with the most meaning to my life is 
helping others in the world when they need help. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
11. I would rather engage in actions that help others, even though they are 
strangers, than engage in actions that would help me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
12. I often have tender feelings towards people (strangers) when they seem to be 
in need. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
13. I feel a selfless caring for most of humankind. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
14. I accept others whom I do not know even when they do things I think are 
wrong. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
15. If a person (a stranger) is troubled, I usually feel extreme tenderness and 
caring. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
16. I try to understand rather than judge people who are strangers to me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
17. I try to put myself in a stranger’s shoes when he or she is in trouble. 
 





18. I feel happy when I see that others (strangers) are happy. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
19. Those whom I encounter through my work and public life can assume that I 
will be there for them if they need me. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
20. I want to spend time with people I don’t know well so that I can find ways to 
help enrich their lives. 
 
7                    6                    5                    4                    3                   2                   1 
 
21. I very much wish to be kind and good to fellow human beings. 
 

















Social Connectedness Scale 
 
   1               2              3                  4            5             6 
         Strongly    Disagree    Mildly        Mildly    Agree  Strongly     
      Disagree        Disagree     Agree                 Agree 
 
 
1.  I feel comfortable in the  1                2              3                  4            5              6 
presence of strangers. 
 
2.  I am in tune with the world.           1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
3.  Even among my friends,                1                2              3                  4            5              6 
there is no sense of  
brother/sisterhood. 
 
4. I fit in well in new situations.          1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
 
5. I feel close to people.    1                2              3                  4            5              6  
 
6. I feel disconnected from the  1                2              3                  4            5              6 
world around me. 
 
7. Even around people I know, I  1                2              3                  4            5              6 
don’t feel that I really belong. 
 
8. I see people as friendly and   1                2              3                  4            5              6 
approachable. 
 
9. I feel like an outsider.    1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
10. I feel understood by the people    1                2              3                  4            5              6 
I know. 
 
11. I feel distant from people.   1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
12. I am able to relate to my peers.   1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
13. I have little sense of togetherness  1                2              3                  4            5              6 
with my peers. 
 
14. I find myself actively involved  1                2              3                  4            5              6 





15. I catch myself losing a sense of   1                2              3                  4            5              6 
of connectedness with society. 
 
16. I am able to connect with other      1                2              3                  4            5              6 
people. 
 
17. I see myself as a loner.     1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
18. I don’t feel related to most   1                2              3                  4            5              6 
people. 
 
19. My friends feel like family.     1                2              3                  4            5              6 
 
20. I don’t feel I participate with   1                2              3                  4            5              6 







The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) 
 
Instructions: Use the following indication of your level of disagreement or agreement to 
complete the statement below: 
 
Strongly     Moderately     Slightly     Neutral     Slightly     Moderately     Strongly               
Disagree     Disagree      Disagree       Agree Agree  Agree  
                                
    0   1           2                3               4       5       6  
    
 
Usually when I experience distressing thoughts and images… 
 
_____1. I am able just to notice them without reacting 
 
_____2. They take over my mind for quite a while afterwards 
 
_____3. I judge the thought/image as good or bad 
 
_____4. I feel calm soon after 
 
_____5. I am able to accept the experience 
 
_____6. I get angry that this happens to me 
 
_____7. I notice how brief the thoughts and images really are 
 
_____8. I judge myself as good or bad, depending on what the thought/image is about 
 
_____9. I ‘step back’ and am aware of the thought or image without getting taken over by 
it 
 
_____10. I just notice them and let them go 
 
_____11. I accept myself the same whatever the thought/image is about 
 
_____12. In my mind I try to push them away 
 
_____13. I keep thinking about the thought or image after it’s gone 
 
_____14. I find it so unpleasant I have to distract myself and not notice them 
 












Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale  
 
This section asks you about your opinion and feelings. How strongly do you agree or 

















1. In this complicated world of 
ours the only way we can know 
what’s going on is to rely on 
leaders or experts who can be 
trusted. 
     
2. I am annoyed by unhappy 
people who just feel sorry for 
themselves. 
     
3. Life is basically the same most 
of the time. 
     
4. People make too much of the 
feelings and sensitivity of 
animals. 
     
5. You can classify almost all 
people as either honest or 
crooked. 
     
6. I would feel much better if my 
present circumstances changed. 
     
7. There is only one right way to 
do anything. 
     
8. There are some people I know 
I would never like. 
     
9. It is better not to know too 
much about things that cannot be 
changed. 
     
10. Things often go wrong for 
me by no fault of my own. 
     
11 Ignorance is bliss.      
12. I can be comfortable with all 
kinds of people. 



















13. A person either knows the 
answer to a question or he/she 
doesn’t. 
     
14. It’s not really my problem if 
others are in trouble and need 
help. 
     
15. People are either good or 
bad. 







































































1. I try to look at everybody’s side 
of a disagreement before I make a 
decision. 
     
2. If I see people in need, I try to 
help them one way or another. 
     
3. When I’m upset at someone, I 
usually try to “put myself in his or 
her shoes” for a while. 
     
4. There are certain people whom I 
dislike so much that I am inwardly 
pleased when they are caught and 
punished for something they have 
done. 
     
5. I always try to look at all sides 
of a problem. 
     
6. Sometimes I feel a real 
compassion for everyone. 
     
7. I try to anticipate and avoid 
situations where there is a likely 
chance I will have to think in depth 
about something. 
     
8. When I look back on what has 
happened to me, I can’t help 
feeling resentful. 
     
9. I often have not comforted 
another when he or she needed it. 
     
10. A problem has little attraction 
for me if I don’t think it has a 
solution.  
     







































11. I either get very angry or 
depressed if things go wrong. 
     
12.. Sometimes I don’t feel very 
sorry for other people when they 
are having problems. 
     
13. I often do not understand 
people’s behavior. 
     
14. Sometimes I get so charged up 
emotionally that I am unable to 
consider many ways of dealing 
with my problems. 
     
15. Sometimes when people are 
talking to me, I find myself 
wishing that they would leave. 
     
16. I prefer just to let things 
happen rather than try to 
understand why they turned out 
that way.  
     
17. When I am confused by a 
problem, one of the first things I 
do is survey the situation and 
consider all the relevant pieces of 
information. 
     
18. I don’t like to get involved in 
listening to another person’s 
troubles. 
     
19. I am hesitant about making 
important decisions after thinking 
about them. 
     
20. Before criticizing somebody, I 
try to imagine how I would feel if I 
were in their place.   
     









































21. I’m easily irritated by people 
who argue with me. 
     
22. When I look back on what’s 
happened to me, I feel cheated. 
     
23. Simply knowing the answer 
rather than understanding the 
reasons for the answer to a  
problem is fine with me. 
     
24. I sometimes find it difficult to 
see things from another persons’ 
point of view. 




























Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
number on the scale at the top of the page: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. When you have decided on 
your answer, fill in the number on the answer sheet next to the item number. READ 




0 1 2  3 4 
 
0 Does not describe me well 
4 Describes me very well 
 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate then me. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
3. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
4. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
 







__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
5. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
6. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel find of protective towards them. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
7. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
8. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
9. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
 







__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
10. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
11. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other 
people’s arguments. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
12. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
13. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for 
them. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 









__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
15. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
16. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
17. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
18. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
19. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
 







__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
20. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
 




__ 4 Describes me well 
 
 
21. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
 










Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendency (The Mehrabian) 
 
Instructions: Please read each of the following statements and select the number which 
best represents your feelings and beliefs. 
 
+ 4  (Very Strong Agreement) 
+ 3  (Strong Agreement) 
+ 2  (Agreement) 
+ 1  (Weak Agreement) 
0  (Neutral) 
- 1  (Weak Disagreement) 
- 2  (Disagreement) 
- 3  (Strong Disagreement) 
- 4  (Very Strong Disagreement) 
 
___1. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group. 
 
___2. People make too much of the feelings and sensitivity of animals. 
 
___3. I often find public displays of affection annoying. 
 
___4. I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just sorry for themselves. 
 
___5. I become nervous if others around me seem to be nervous. 
 
___6. I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness. 
 
___7. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems. 
 
___8. Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply. 
 
___9. I tend to loose control when I am bringing bad news to people. 
 
___10. The people around me have a great influence on my moods. 
 
___11. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and unemotional. 
 
___12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job training center. 
 
___13. I don’t get upset just because a friend is acting upset. 
 





___15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly. 
 
___16. Seeing people cry upsets me. 
 
___17. Some songs make me happy. 
 
___18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
 
___19. I get very angry when I see someone being ill-treated. 
 
___20. I am able to remain calm even though those around me worry. 
 
___21. When a friend starts to talk about their problems, I try to steer the conversation to 
something else. 
 
___22. Another’s laughter is not catching for me. 
 
___23. Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the amount of crying and sniffing 
around me. 
 
___24. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people’s feelings. 
 
___25. I cannot continue to feel OK if people around me are depressed. 
 
___26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset people too much. 
 
___27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain. 
 
___28. Becoming involved in books or movies is a little silly. 
 
___29. It upsets me to see helpless old people. 
 
___30. I become more irritated than sympathetic when I see someone’s tears. 
 
___31. I become very involved when I watch a movie. 
 
___32. I often find that I can remain cool in spite of the excitement around me. 
 









HOW I TYPICALLY ACT TOWARDS MYSELF IN DIFFICULT TMES 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. To the left of each item, indicate 
how often you behave in the stated manner, using the following scale: 
 
Almost         Almost  
Never          Always 
 
1                             2                             3                             4                             5  
 
_____1. I’m disapproving and judgmental about my own flaws and inadequacies. 
 
_____2. When I’m feeling down I tend to obsess and fixate on everything that’s wrong. 
 
_____3. When things are going badly for me, I see the difficulties as part of life that 
everyone goes thorough. 
 
_____4. When I think about my inadequacies, it tends to make me feel more separate and 
cut off from the rest of the world. 
 
_____5. I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling emotional pain. 
 
_____6. When I fail at something important to me I become consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy. 
 
_____7. When I’m down, I remind myself that there are lots of other people in the world 
feeling like I am. 
 
_____8. When times are really difficult, I tend to be tough on myself. 
 
_____9. When something upsets me I try to keep my emotions in balance.  
 
_____10. When I feel inadequate in some way, I try to remind myself that feelings of 
inadequacy are shared by most people. 
 
_____11. I’m intolerant and impatient towards those aspects of my personality that I 
don’t like. 
 
_____12. When I’m going through a very hard time, I give myself the caring and 
tenderness I need. 
 
_____13. When I’m feeling down, I tend to feel like most other people are probably 





_____14. When something painful happens I try to take a balanced view of the situation. 
 
_____15. I try to see my failings as part of the human condition. 
 
_____16. When I see aspects of myself that I don’t like, I get down on myself. 
 
_____17. When I fail at something important to me I try to keep things in perspective. 
 
_____18. When I’m really struggling, I tend to feel like other people must be having an 
easier time of it. 
 
_____19. I’m kind to myself when I’m experiencing suffering. 
 
_____20. When something upsets me I get carried away with my feelings. 
 
_____21. I can be a bit cold-hearted towards myself when I’m experiencing suffering. 
 
_____22. When I’m feeling down I try to approach my feelings with curiosity and 
openness. 
 
_____23. I’m tolerant of my own flaws and inadequacies. 
 
_____24. When something painful happens I tend to blow the incident out of proportion. 
 
_____25. When I fail at something that’s important to me, I tend to feel alone in my 
failure. 
 
_____26. I try to be understanding and patient towards those aspects of my personality 






Compassion Scale (Finalized Version)  
 
HOW I TYPICALLY ACT TOWARDS OTHERS 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. To the left of each item, indicate 
how often do you feel or behave in the stated manner, using the following scale: 
 
Almost         Almost  
Never          Always 
 
1                             2                             3                             4                             5  
 
_____1. When people cry in front of me, I often don’t feel anything at all. 
 
_____2. Sometimes when people talk about their problems, I feel like I don’t care.  
 
_____3. I don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain. 
 
_____4. I pay careful attention when other people talk to me. 
 
_____5. I feel detached from others when they tell me their tales of woe. 
 
_____6. If I see someone going through a difficult time, I try to be caring toward that 
person. 
 
_____7. I often tune out when people tell me about their troubles. 
 
_____8. I like to be there for others in times of difficulty. 
 
_____9. I notice when people are upset, even if they don’t say anything. 
 
_____10. When I see someone feeling down, I feel like I can’t relate to them. 
 
_____11. Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of being human. 
 
_____12. Sometimes I am cold to others when they are down and out. 
 
_____13. I tend to listen patiently when people tell me their problems. 
 
_____14. I don’t concern myself with other people’s problems. 
 
_____15. It’s important to recognize that all people have weaknesses and no one’s 
perfect. 
 





_____17. Despite my differences with others, I know that everyone feels pain just like 
me. 
 
_____18. When others are feeling troubled, I usually let someone else attend to them. 
 
_____19. I don’t think much about the concerns of others. 
 
_____20. Suffering is just a part of the common human experience. 
 
_____21. When people tell me about their problems, I try to keep a balanced perspective 
on the situation. 
 
_____22. I can’t really connect with other people when they’re suffering. 
 
_____23. I try to avoid people who are experiencing a lot of pain. 
 




Kindness Items: 6, 8, 16, & 24 
Indifference Items: 2, 12, 14, & 18 (Reversed Scored) 
Common Humanity: 11, 15, 17, & 20 
Separation: 3, 5, 10, & 22 (Reversed Scored) 
Mindfulness: 4, 9, 13, & 21 
Disengagement: 1, 7, 19, & 23 (Reverse Scored) 
 
To compute a total Compassion Score, take the mean of each subscale and compute a 
total mean. 
 
Please remember that if you plan to examine the subscales separately, you should not 
reverse-code. Before reverse-coding, for example, higher indifference scores represent 
more indifference, but after reverse-coding higher indifference scores represent less 
indifference. This is why the subscales of indifference, separation, and disengagement are 
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